

TOWARDS A RESOLUTION OF THE ABSOLUTE-RELATIVE
TENSION IN AXIOLOGY AS IT RELATES TO
PASTORAL COUNSELING AND CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

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CHAPTER I

THE INTRODUCTION

From the beginning man has been concerned with value. At the present he appears to be caught between the "absolutists" on the one hand and the "relativists" on the other. The present undertaking presumes that there is not only the urgent necessity, but also the possibility, of some resolution of the tension existing between these two extremes. This is an attempt to set forth the problem of formulating a theory of value as it relates particularly to the areas of pastoral counseling and Christian education, and to suggest some resolution of the conflict which will be in harmony with the best insights of both psychotherapy and theology. The two extremes of the relative and the absolute are used to focus the issues.

The basic motivation for the work is the need for a theory of value relevant to the above areas and validated on psychological, philosophical and theological grounds. A more immediately precipitating motivation for the work is the urgent necessity for some authenticated guidelines for community and campus mores.

The Thesis. The thesis is stated thus:

. . . that although the problem of values is being

examined with significant insight and relevance in the area of psychotherapy, a satisfactory solution is not yet available from this discipline (Section 1):

. . . that some advance towards a resolution of the problem is to be found in an understanding of man as a social being, teleologically oriented towards relation (Section 2):

. . . that relation is not limited to particularity but rather is of cosmic generality actualised in the relation of man as social creature with God as Social Creator (Section 3):

. . . that Christology provides the conceptual context for avoiding the Scylla of deistic supernatural absolutism and the Charybdis of subjective humanistic relativism (Section 4).

The Premises. This writing assumes a monistic *Weltanschauung* wherein the inherent dualism of Kantian epistemology,¹ the dichotomy of Schleiermacher's scientific

¹The fact that Kant intended only a distinction and not a division is taken into account. The above is in agreement with Richard R. Niebuhr's assessment of Kantian influence on theology. He says: "By distinguishing between pure reason as it dealt with the experiential phenomenal world (theoretical reason) and pure reason as it sought the unities lying behind experience (practical reason), Kant succeeded in preserving . . . the contemporary methods of natural science and the concepts of metaphysics and theology. . . . But the price was the recognition of the limits of human understanding and practical reason, . . . the

thought and religious experience,² the traditional contrast of the Thomist's faith and reason or Barthian reason and revelation take a secondary stance. Rather, life is seen as a unity and any distinctions are differences of degree on a continuum, and pure reason is not subordinate to practical reason (Kant); scientific thought is not secondary to religious experience (Schleiermacher) or reason in radical discontinuity with revelation (Barth). Such distinctions are only tolerated as analytical aids and each is subsidiary to the whole. Whether man be regarded as a cosmic microcosm or atomic macrocosm, it is affirmed that he cannot be dichoto-

recognition of the absence of all warrant for using experience to prove the regulative ideas or for claiming to find evidence of . . . any of the postulates of practical reason in our knowledge of nature" (Richard R. Niebuhr, *Resurrection and Historical Reason* [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957], pp. 74-75). With his adamant refusal to accept any doctrine of general revelation, Karl Barth is at this point a thoroughgoing Kantian. Cf. also Paul Tillich (*Systematic Theology* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956], I, 82) when he says, "In post-Kantian metaphysics reason forgot its bondage to the categories of finitude. But this self-elevation to divine dignity brought on dethronement and contempt of reason and made the victory of one of its functions over all the others possible."

²A poignant criticism--though a little satirical in its extreme--is that made by Hegel of Schleiermacher on this very point. "In the *Discourses*, nature is abolished as a collection of finite actualities and recognised as a universe; so that longing is recalled from its flight beyond reality to an eternal Beyond. The partition between the subject and the absolutely unattainable object is torn down, the pain atoned for in enjoyment, and the endless striving satisfied in intuition" (Richard B. Brandt, *The Philosophy of Schleiermacher* [New York: Harper, 1941], p. 302).

mised into a rational, a religious, a moral, or an intuiting being. None of these valid distinctions of functions of his being is to be taken as superior in relation to any other.³ This is not to say that within a designated environment one may not be functionally superior to another. In an exercise of logic, for example, the rational faculty would predominate, or in a religious observance the intuitive, but it does affirm that none of these can be regarded as more than parts of a whole and the whole is efficacious only to the degree of the efficient functioning of the parts.

It is affirmed further that the efficient functioning of the parts is to be seen as dependent on the coherence of the whole and that the more pertinent the definition of the parts in relation to the congruent whole, the more harmonious the functioning of the total organism.

This is the basis on which it is affirmed that the congruous relation of the organism (*homo sapiens*) intra-psychically for internal stability and inter-psychically for

³This takes issue with statements reflected by Peter A. Bertocci in his *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1959), p. 66, namely: "We live ultimately by faith and not by reason." In a most coherent and persuasive manner the author discusses the relation of faith and reason, but his conclusions only serve to contradict his statement and support the above contention--that faith is an hypothetical extension of reason and that reason is validated by pragmatic substantiation of faith and that life is the cohesion of both in reciprocal tension.

cosmic congruence is necessary to the integrity of the whole. This is as true of the atom and the cosmos as it is of man.

Being in these harmonious reciprocal relations makes for the highest degree of integration of all faculties. The degree to which such integration is established will be the degree of the functional efficiency of all the various parts of man's being--rational, religious, moral, intuitive. This is the basis for claiming that relation is the *telos* of man. This is also the reason that relation becomes very significant in any discussion concerning the formulation of a theory of value.

Any discussion of a value is concerned with two main aspects. The first one is the formulation of a sound theory of value, and the second is the stimulation of man's inclination to act in accord with the highest value when it is presented to him by his best theory of value. Inter-personal and intra-personal relations do not formulate man's theory of value. Neither does relation guarantee his choosing the highest value when his best rational faculties have formulated one for him. But, and this is the main point of the discussion, the more congruent his external and internal relationships, the more efficiently his rational faculties may provide him with accurate criteria for a theory of value and the better inclined his desire to act in accordance with these criteria.

At least this is something of the premise of the declared thesis.

Theory of Value, Its History, Some Categories and an Absolute. The theory of value as such is only a recent development in philosophy. Wilbur Marshall Urban says that

Its discovery has been held by some to be the "greatest philosophical achievement of the 19th Century," and its development as a special field of psychological and philosophical study has gone so far that a special name has been created for it, namely "axiology."⁴

How is it possible to say that axiology is only a recent development when the earliest writers have been concerned with the subject of the "good"? Dewey believes that the question as such is *the* modern problem in philosophy, but Aristotle and most of the classicists spent a great deal of time with it too.

In the introduction to one of his major works, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle could say:

Every art and every enquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which things aim.⁵

In the Middle Ages the theologian takes up the strain. Anselm could accept this Aristotelian dictum and use it as a

⁴Wilbur Marshall Urban, "Theory of Value," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (30th ed.), XXII, 961.

⁵Aristotle, *Basic Works*, ed. Richard P. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 935.

basis for his argumentation towards the ontological proof for the existence of God. "That than which no higher can be thought," must be an existent or else the existent thinker could be "more excellent" than that which he thinks. Accordingly, Jones *et al.* point out that Anselm's ontological argument

indicates the famous "valuational" approach to God, a view which sees the world ordered in hierarchies, the progression through which leads to God as the archetype of all goods. There is no positive evil, all apparent evil is merely lesser good.⁶

Kant's epistemology was to open the way again for regaining some sense of the "objectivity" of values which had been well nigh destroyed by empiricists who reduced value to a subjective relativism.

If secondary qualities such as colour, taste, sound, etc., are made dependent upon the percipient subject, all the more must the tertiary qualities, such as beauty, goodness, etc., be made dependent upon human desire and feeling.⁷

Kant's value became a sort of "phenomenal object" even if its "objective" reality was only "real" to practical reason. Nevertheless it is from this *Sitz im Leben* that theory of value developed into its modern form through Lotze, Nietzsche, Ritschl and Windelband in the neo-Kantian tradition.

It is obvious that there are different categories and

⁶William T. Jones, *et al.* (eds.), *Approaches to Ethics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), p. 127.

⁷Urban, *op. cit.*, p. 961.

classes of values. Perry says that

We need the term "value" as a term to apply to all predicates in a group describing one subject from different angles--cognitive value, economic value, moral value and aesthetic value.⁸

Economic value has always been part of the life of man.

Dewey observes that "valuations take place only where there is some need, lack or privation."⁹ Adam Smith defines two levels of economic value as "value in use" and "values in exchange."¹⁰ Ethics deal with values though it is no longer generally agreed that they are to be found in such substantives as "pleasure" or "happiness." There are aesthetic values although these are questioned by some pragmatists

since valuation is always judgmental, and the aesthetic "has no logical function, it must be denied the name of value."¹¹

There are religious values, and although it might be claimed that these are in a peculiarly syncretistic position with respect to all values, some neo-Kantians are giving expression to the idea of the "holy" as the paradigm of the category of value.¹²

⁸Ralph Barton Perry, *General Theory of Value* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1926), p. 10.

⁹John Dewey, *Theory of Valuation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 14.

¹⁰Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations* (London: Dent, 1950), I, 24-25.

¹¹Urban, *op. cit.*, p. 962.

Urban has gathered the various distinctions of value into three major divisions:

psychological, assuming values to be the functions of interests or desires, . . . [and] tends to become ultimately biological and genetic, . . . [and],

institutional form, such as economic, moral, cognitive, political, aesthetic, religious . . . [and],

axiological, [which] accepts in the main the trinity or the tetrad of the good, the beautiful and the true, to which it adds the higher unity of God.

At the conclusion of his summary, Urban lays bare the very core of our present problem when he says:

Such classifications or systems of value all have their uses, but it is generally felt that the first two are not sufficient. A large body of opinion, accepting the axiological classification, holds that while the economic values are clearly instrumental and relative to the others, the other groups are intrinsic and absolute, and as such ultimately co-ordinate. Others hold that they may be put in relations of subordination in a comprehensive scale of values.¹³

If this is taken to mean that there is one ultimate to which all others might be subordinated, doubts may be expressed as to the validity of this claim. If it is taken to mean that all may eventually be reduced to the terms of each other, Urban would correct this impression.

All attempts at such reduction, whether, for instance, of the aesthetic to the ethical, of the ethical to the logical, or of the logical to the ethical, have proved unsatisfactory. On the other hand, it seems clear that they are intimately related.¹⁴

¹²Cf. Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John W. Harvey (second edition; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 5.

In this last phrase Urban has touched on the secret of the whole matter and seems not to have been recognising it. The thesis of this writing is that the only ultimate exposed to our empirical gaze is to be found within a concept of "intimate relation." That there is a discernible hierarchy in any scale of values in the various fields is also affirmed. Such a possibility is examined in the first section of this work, but the matter is only of secondary importance at the moment. It needs first to be established that the only common thread through all categories of value is relation--internal and external--and that fragmentation is not only the enemy of any *uni*-verse but also the destroyer of value and the inhibitor of any theory of value.

It becomes possible then to agree with Perry in his axiological aim.

A theory of Value not only undertakes to reduce all values to a common descriptive denominator, it undertakes to render them commensurable--to provide a rational ground for judgments of comparative value; and in particular for those ultimate judgments in which man estimates his civilization, his progress, or the salvation of his soul.¹⁵

The common denominator is relation. In this sense relation is the ultimate. Yet this infers an underlying relativity. It is not, however, a relativity which denies any certitude

¹³Urban, *op. cit.*, p. 962. ¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵Perry, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

or certainty, but rather makes possible a clear definition of boundaries--through recognition of relationship, so that not only certitude but also a greater degree of certainty within a scale of values is possible in every particular instance.¹⁶ It is a cosmic relativity with respect to which man is the microcosm. Better still, the relation of man to man is a paradigm of the internal relation of everything within the universe. When relation is seen as the ultimate and determining principle of the world, archaic distinctions between "certitude" and "certainty" will blur.¹⁷ It is true that relation in the human dimension is perceived in Ritschlian "faith" (certitude) as distinct from "scientific

¹⁶Cf. *infra*, p. 25.

¹⁷It is observed that the entity man may be regarded as peculiar in all the cosmos in his failure to take such an ultimate into account. Bergson's *élan vital* (B. A. G. Fuller, *A History of Philosophy* [revised edition; New York: Holt, 1945], p. 476); Alfred North Whitehead's "creativity" (*Process and Reality* [New York: Harper, 1960], pp. 11, 46); Boltzmann's "Second Law of Thermodynamics" (Wolfgang Köhler, *The Place of Values in a World of Fact* [New York: Liveright, 1938], pp. 304 ff.); *et al.*, point out the fact that although, "when the macroscopic state of a system is given, the actual position and the behavior of its microscopic parts--molecules, electrons, [etc.,] are not strictly determined by those data which serve to describe the macroscopic situation" (Köhler, *ibid.*). The exercise of "freedom" of the parts is so overwhelmingly in accord with the requirements of the situation that the material world is entirely dependable and the probability of continuity in the prescribed direction is enhanced with every "right decision." Man alone seems to be unable to use his "freedom" with such consistency. Perhaps this is the price of his [*homo sapiens*] distinctive self-conscious responsibility.

knowledge" (certainty) and that "matters of pure reason" become subordinate to "matters of practical reason" in the archeo-Kantian style. But according to the degree of the "depth" of the relation of man with his others (animate and inanimate entities) so will the present fragmentations of reason ("practical" and "pure"), his values--normative and specific, psychological, economic, aesthetic, moral and religious--become integrated and some of the present tension in value theory be resolved.

The Topology. The topology of the writing is in accord with the outline of the argument above, and is in four major sections. Section One will present the problem from the empirical and pragmatically-oriented field of psychology. This is not only because the empirical-pragmatic atmosphere is the one which pervades the culture of the day but also because the writer is convinced that not only is the anthropocentric starting point most acceptable by reason of this climate but that it is in fact the only starting point. Fortunately there is an intense contemporary interest in the subject of values in this area. The question and its discussion becomes thus academically and clinically sophisticated. This serves the present purpose well.

Section Two will attempt to formulate a theory of personality (the theologian's "doctrine of man") which, while not pretending to be comprehensive in its scope,

attempts to lift out the relevant themes indicative of some resolution of the axiological problem. In this second section the application will be more specifically directed to the Christian educator, where in the first section it was directed to the role of the pastoral counselor.

Section Three will evaluate the contribution of the process philosopher, the pragmatic educator, and the social theologian towards the end of a satisfactory theory of deity, which, while not providing an objective static ultimate, demonstrates an essential element of the "absolute," i.e., relation, as suggested above.

The final section will be the attempt to synthesise the conclusions and suggest a resolution of the axiological problem in a clarified concept of the historic (*geschichtlich*) Jesus of Nazareth and the historical (*historisch*) Christ.

Throughout the work it will be remembered that the whole theme is concerned with the extremes resident in the current dispute in axiology, that of the absolute and the relative. The alternatives are not as extreme or clear-cut as these suggest, but for the advantages of clarification, the dangers resident in oversimplification are accepted under the terms of a calculated risk.

SECTION 1

ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM

CHAPTER II

THE AXIOLOGY-PSYCHOTHERAPY TENSION

Axiology is as broad and inclusive as life itself. Interest in values is as varied and intense at the highest academic levels as it is at the family meal table. Aristotle is as interested in the virtues as the sophomore of a modern campus.

Values constitute an integral part of one's philosophy of life. Therefore they are not regarded lightly. They are often interpreted as the essence of one's religion. Therefore they are not easily discarded. They are objectively committed to and are deeply and intimately affective of personal behaviour. They are myriad in number, yet elusive of objectification.

It is no small wonder, then, that values are seldom discussed dispassionately and with dignified decorum, for to question one's values is to question the very basis upon which he has built the structure of his life. His values are the major and minor premises of a man's syllogism of life. To destroy the axioms of his premises is to bring the whole logical structure of his universe about his ears. For this reason one will often make every last ditch stand to defend the axioms of his theory of values. For this reason, also, any discussion of values is accompanied by

problems--problems so intense and deeply rooted that it is almost impossible to commence any discussion of the subject of values without taking some account of them.

The major problems where axiology and psychotherapy meet will be discussed under four headings. The remainder of this chapter will be given to the problems confronting any "speculative science" as it attempts to formulate an authoritative and authenticated structure. The following chapters will examine three tensions which seem to be the matrix for most of the current dissatisfaction, namely: "The Individual-Universal Tension" (Chapter III); "The Absolute-Relative Tension" (Chapter IV); and "The Essence-Existence Tension" (Chapter V).

Each chapter will be divided into two main parts--a summary of the problem followed by some suggested resolutions. As noted above, this section is empirically oriented, drawing mainly from the discipline of psychotherapy in its theoretic formulations and clinical applications.

PRELIMINARY CONCERNS

A Speculative Science. Axiology (from the Greek *axios*, worthy) is the science of values. It is not to be understood, however, as a science in the sense of the physical sciences, but rather as one of the abstract and speculative sciences, e.g., psychology, theology, and philosophy.

This status constitutes a problem. In the physical and more concrete sciences one can reasonably isolate or manipulate constants within a constant frame of reference and control the variants in an experiment. Within the frame of reference of Newtonian physics, theoretical mathematics, plane geometry, or organic chemistry, for instance, the constant 2 and the constant 2 can be said to total 4, the angles of every triangle to equal 180° , and the combination of H_2O can be trusted to produce water.

A constant frame of reference for axiology as Newton is to physics is not yet available and even the units of the system--human individuals--are likely to react differently within what appear to be identical frames of reference on two occasions. The experimental psychologist may emphasise his success with constants in the behaviour of conditioned animals. It must be said that *homo sapiens* is distinguishable from a trained animal, and the constant frame of reference possible in animal experiments is hardly ever available in the human situation. The maze is seldom if ever the same; the length of run is not equivalent and the reward or effect is seldom controlled. Because of this it is most difficult in a speculative science to deduce general laws from which particular effects may be predicated.¹

¹Experimental psychology has developed a complex of concepts, terms and procedures within its discipline which

This constitutes a major problem in the evolution of an axiology.

Ambiguity of Cause-Effect Correlation. Although the form of the "good" is the subject of never-ending debate, a theory of value must assume some such criterion. An empirical science must necessarily attempt to identify and define the cause of each "good" or "not good" effect. But the correlation of cause and effects is not so obvious in this area as it is in the physical sciences. It is immediately evident to any observer or participant that the cause of a broken limb was the fall off the cliff. The law of gravity is substantiated. It is a misnomer when one is said to break the law of gravity on such occasions. One breaks his leg: he proves the law. Temporally and spatially the cause and effect are immediately correlated. One does not break his leg half an hour or half a day after he fell off the cliff, nor half a mile or continent away from the scene of the fall.² Not so with the human experiment and the laws of

establish a closer affinity with the physical sciences than any of its contemporary behavioural disciplines. Ernest R. Hilgard's chapter entitled "The Nature of Learning Theories" (*Theories of Learning* [second edition; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956]) is a good introductory summary.

²Correlation does not necessarily establish a cause-effect bond but contiguity apparently not only allows the observer to calculate a law of probability and so predictability, but appears in natural "atropism" and in learning motivation to contribute towards the formulation of a cause-

the psyche.

Man is so conditioned to repress his immediate feelings and responses that they are at most times below the level of his own awareness. He sublimates others. He compensates for this one and compromises on that. There are developed neurotic reactions as well as healthy defence mechanisms so complicated and profound that often he himself cannot be sure of what is cause to which effect in his behaviour patterns. The human psyche appears to have the same compensating built-in mechanism as Cannon's physiological principle of homeostasis,³ and even a neurotic effect can become a new stimulating cause in the attempt to satisfy this principle.

Psychic laws (there are some few consensually validated) can be repeatedly broken without any apparent immediate deleterious effect. When the break occurs it is most times extremely difficult to identify the cause of an effect even after much painstaking research and examination. Such conditions make it most difficult to hypothesise, let alone

effect bond. This is the subject of later discussion. Cf. Hilgard, *op. cit.*, pp. 380, 389. Russell L. Ackoff (*Scientific Method* [New York: Wiley, 1962]) discusses the problems of correlation in scientific method in his chapter "Experimentation and Correlation" and enumerates the skills developed--"variant analysis," "factorization," etc.--which have been developed to eliminate the dangers.

³Walter B. Cannon, *The Wisdom of the Body* (New York: Norton, 1939).

formulate general principles or laws upon which an axiology may be structured. To experimentally locate the cause of "good" or "bad" psychic health is fraught with difficulty. This is one of the main contributions to the problem of formulating a science of values.

The Necessity of Values. In spite of the difficulty in establishing an axiology, life demands one. If Descartes can find ontological satisfaction for the proof of his existence in "I doubt, therefore I think: I think, therefore I am"; we may find axiological satisfaction from "I am, because I doubt: I doubt because there are alternatives; alternatives and doubt establish the necessity of choice; choice indicates valuation and most probably value." The question of whether choice subjectively creates value or whether objective value designates the "good" or "bad" choice will be the subject of later discussion. It is sufficient to notice here that "to be" is corollary to "to value."

Not as profound but more empirically authoritative than the foregoing are the following statements in support of the contention that life demands an axiology.

Charlotte Buhler claims that:

values permeate our development and personality to such a degree that they can never be left out of the picture. . . . One cannot live without encountering the problem of values . . . [nor] avoid, or pretend to avoid, the evolving of an understanding about some basic principles of living.⁴

While the same author quotes Nathan Ackerman as saying that "there is no healthy emotional living without values,"⁵ and Clark Moustakas in a paper presented before the Merrill-Palmer Institute claims that:

Value . . . refers to that integrating or unifying dimension of the self; to that quality which renders the person whole . . .⁶

Donald Glad *et al.* go so far as to say that "a science of psychotherapy is ultimately concerned with human values,"⁷ and Robert Hartman asserts strongly that "a science of value will change the world as did the science of nature."⁸ Erich Fromm is most specific on the point that:

values are rooted in the very conditions of existence; knowledge of these conditions gives us values which have objective validity; this validity exists only with regard to the existence of man; outside of him there is no value.⁹

⁴Charlotte Buhler, *Values in Psychotherapy* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. x, 1, 4.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 174.

⁶Clark E. Moustakas, "Moral and Ethical Values in Education and Therapy" (address to the Merrill-Palmer Institute, Detroit, Michigan, May, 1961), p. 4. (Mimeographed.)

⁷Donald D. Glad *et al.*, *Operational Values in Psychotherapy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 1.

⁸Robert S. Hartman, "The Science of Value," *New Knowledge in Human Values*, Abraham H. Maslow, editor (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 13.

⁹Erich Fromm, "Values, Psychology, and Human Existence," in Maslow, *New Knowledge in Human Values*, p. 151.

The point is made. Values are basic to human life. Human existence demands a value system and human experience with the speculative science of axiology indicating only too clearly the frustration inherent in attempting to establish one. This tension is a third problem for axiology.

TOWARDS SOME RESOLUTION

It is believed that these preliminary concerns which confront the axiologist need no longer be regarded as negating any attempt to formulate a theory of value and that a great deal of the frustration they hitherto presented may be alleviated.

Can axiology lay claim to the authority and prestige accorded scientific method and matter? Are its conclusions liable to validation on "scientific" grounds, or must it continue to smart under the indignity of the "non-verifiable" classification? These questions merit the closest scrutiny before any real basis for axiology can be established.

Scientific Method and Psychotherapy. Instinctively the physical scientists would say that the term "speculative science" is self-contradictory. At least the usual assumption is that "speculative" places the credentials of any so-called "science" under grave suspicion. It would be said that such nebulous theorising within a structureless

framework could claim little authority for its conclusions.

However, it is possible for the Professor of Mathematics of Cambridge to become the most "creative original philosopher of this century." A most structured scientist has turned to speculative metaphysics. Alfred North Whitehead contends that it is both reasonable to expect and possible to construct a system of objective criteria by which a structured theory of values may be formulated. In the introduction to his definitive work, Whitehead states that

Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.¹⁰

The twentieth-century upheaval within science projected when Einstein's theory of relativity and Max Planck's quantum theory superceded the Newtonian era has also stimulated a new interest in a philosophy of science. This tends to build the bridge between the speculative and the physical sciences.¹¹ As experimental, analytical and clinical psychology have probed the depths in research in their respective fields they have been met more than half way by this movement towards a philosophy of science. This is particu-

¹⁰Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 4.

¹¹Cf. Everett W. Hall, *Modern Science and Human Values* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956), pp. 237 f.

larly evident in the specialised area of "scientific method." A contemporary and sophisticated work relevant to the subject is that of Russell L. Ackoff. In the preface to Ackoff's book, Rapoport observes that the writer puts "science into a much broader social context" than usual, and through his attention to the "decision maker" in scientific method and process, brings science into the forecourt of the humanities. Rapoport reminds both the author and his readers that after all "science emerged not only from technology and administration; it emerged from art and religion as well."¹² In the chapter on "The Meaning of Science" Ackoff searches among the traditional alternatives for a definition of "science." It can be regarded as "the process of enquiry" or equally as "a body of knowledge," he says. Some have claimed that "common-sense" (or other so-called non-scientific) enquiry is concerned with more practical and immediate problems than is science. This distinction will not hold, however, in the face of modern "applied science" which is most immediate and most practical. He is inclined to agree with Dewey that common-sense enquiry may be qualitatively defined while the scientific is quantitative. However, "an eminent historian of science," Herbert Dingle, asserts that the "outstanding scientific achievement of the

¹²Ackoff, *op. cit.*, p. vii.

nineteenth century was the theory of evolution" which "has nothing to do with measurement" and "is concerned with qualitative changes and deals with them qualitatively."¹³

Ackoff himself comes to the conclusion that the traditional lines dividing scientific and non-scientific enquiry have become increasingly blurred

and that there is hardly a type of question or problem to which science successfully addresses itself today that, at some time in the past, someone did not claim was not susceptible to scientific enquiry.¹⁴

Köhler notes that it is within science and scientific method itself that the criteria for validation of a theory of values on scientific grounds is possible. He is critical of those scientists who

insist upon "objective procedure," on "careful verification," or on "genuinely scientific theory," perhaps on the "principle of parsimony" and on "consistency," and who will courageously defend freedom of thought, of research and of speech, . . . but in the very next moment express contempt of "metaphysical speculation such as concern ethics," which "cannot be submitted to the absolutely indispensable experimental test." One begins to wonder if logic would also have to pass this indispensable test--which is itself full of logical premises.¹⁵

The main problem seems to be the assumption that such things as theory of value cannot be subject to the above-mentioned criteria of scientific enquiry--verification, con-

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵Wolfgang Köhler, *The Place of Values in a World of Fact* (New York: Liveright, 1938), p. 36.

sistency, parsimony, etc. Otto von Mering says that the social scientist of today has discovered this to be a modern "taboo"¹⁶ in the sense of being a fictitious axiom by which men live their lives, namely:

the belief that there exists an absolute difference between value and fact, or between ethical and scientific statements, and the conviction that values are not amenable to scientific treatment.¹⁷

On the contrary, then, and in agreement with Mering, it is affirmed that data relevant to the formulation of a theory of value not only can be made subject to the criteria of good "scientific method" but is also increasingly available from the clinical files and laboratory experiments of

¹⁶Otto von Mering, *Grammar of Human Values* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1961), p. 3. Mering notes that Jeremy Bentham and Auguste Comte a century ago realised such "fictions and fallacies often guided the behaviour of man." Teleological attraction has long been advocated as a motivation of human behaviour, with the classical example in Aristotle's concept of the Unmoved Moved whose perfection moved (attracted) all things to itself. "Fictional goals" seems to be a relatively recent idea, however, and it is emphasised to an extreme in the philosophy of Hans Vaihinger. He called it the philosophy of "as if." Man, he adduced, lived by such "fictions" as suited his pragmatic ends. These need not even "be true to experience, not to speak of being valid beyond experience, . . . it is more convenient and it pays better to act as 'as if' the universe were an orderly and determined affair" (B. A. G. Fuller, *A History of Philosophy* [revised edition, New York: Holt, 1945], p. 478). Of significance to the present work is that it was Vaihinger's influence on Adler which enabled him to formulate his important theory of "fictional finalism" which provided the goal of all human endeavour. This subject is treated in the final chapter.

¹⁷*Ibid.* Cf. also, Erich Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 6.

the behavioural sciences for analysis, evaluation and verification. Some contemporary serious attempts are being made to formulate a science of value subjected to the rigors and discipline of the most stringent scientific methods and criteria. The following is a brief introduction to one such effort.

A Science of Value. In an essay entitled "Value Propositions" Hartman has spelled out his formula for an objectively verifiable science of value. He claims the possibility of expressing by a mathematical equation the specific value status of any given proposition. Some of the surprise occasioned by such a claim is annulled when we hear Hartman say that the

"value" in question is not moral or ethical or any other specific kind of value but value in general.¹⁸

Hartman is convinced that axiology has as firm an objective foundation as any of the sciences, and deplores the fact that morality and value have been so ambiguous in their application and relation to each other that any distinction has been obliterated. He takes pains to stress their distinction and indeed the distinction of formal axiology from all other disciplines.

¹⁸Ray Lepley (ed.), *The Language of Value* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p. 197.

We do not deal with ethics, aesthetics or economics, but with axiology. Axiology is a formal discipline which is *applicable* to ethics, aesthetics or economics and other philosophical and social disciplines, but which is not any of these disciplines--just as geometry is applicable to but is *NOT* physics.¹⁹

The term "good" must be understood as a concept rather than as a descriptive adjective of the properties of an object. "Good" is a concept, not a property. It is the "good" of a Platonic universal "concept" that becomes the value norm in Hartman's axiology. The value of any particular thing is the extent to which it meets the standard of the universal class to which it belongs.

The axiom or fundamental principle of formal axiology . . . [is that] a thing is good when it fulfills the definition of its concept. . . . One knows little of a thing in question unless he knows something of the concept of which the thing is an instance.²⁰

According to Hartman this axiom of value has "four propositions which make it scientific."²¹ The first is that it opens up a new field of scientific enquiry by defining the central term of that field (axiology) in formal logic.

The relation between a concept, its definition and its referents is the fundamental relation of logic.²²

Secondly, the scientific characteristics of axiology are evidenced by the fact that the axiom of axiology is parallel

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 199.

²⁰Hartman, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 20. ²²*Ibid.*

to that of mathematics.

The recognition that value predicates apply to concepts rather than objects corresponds to the exactly analogous recognition that arithmetical propositions such as "four"--apply to concepts rather than to objects.²³

The formal nature of the axiom of axiology is the third indication of its scientific characteristics. It consists of a variable form not of specific values but a formula by which the specifications of all values may be determined. The "universal nature and form of the 'good' has been observed throughout Philosophical history."²⁴ The fourth scientific characteristic of formal axiology is to be found in the fact that it provides the standard for measurement of value. Galileo discovered the necessity of "primary qualities" for the standard of measurement of motion, namely those qualities which were amenable to measurement in centimeters, grams, seconds, etc. The sense phenomena were regarded as the secondary qualities. Value measurement elevates these "secondary qualities" as its standard of measurement. The norm of theory of values is stated as "concept by definition."

Value measurement, in a word, is measurement of conceptual qualities. . . . [F]or a thing has value in the degree to which it fulfills the definition of its concept.²⁵

It is necessary to make a distinction between the

²³*Ibid.*, p. 21. ²⁴*Ibid.* ²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 22.

objective structure of axiology and its subjective application. For an inebrate to see "2" to my "1" is not to invalidate the scientific objectivity of mathematics. The error is in the "seeing" not in the mathematics. So one might call good what another will call bad, but this is the application of axiology and not axiology itself. The significant thing for the axiologist is that "everyone call good what he thinks fulfills the definition of its concept."²⁶ This is a point of great significance to the whole discussion and necessary to our final conclusion on the problem.

A further confusion that needs clarification is the traditional one between axiological good and moral good. According to Hartman this has been the bane of theory of value for 2,000 years. He says:

A murderer can be axiologically good if he murders well, but he cannot be morally good; the definition of himself suffers then from a self-contradiction; one cannot fulfill a self by extinguishing other selves.²⁷

One must question Hartman at this point concerning an unnecessary dichotomy and invalid use of his terms. With respect to man one cannot "value" *him* as "murderer" in the concepts of axiology but only his act as such. A man may commit the function of murder at one moment of his being, but this function does not become the essence of his being.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 24. ²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 32.

He murders but he is not in essence a murderer. He is only a good or bad man. He may commit an act of murder well or badly and the value judgment may then be made on the "concept of a function." Man *per se* may be axiologically judged only on the concept of "man." There is no need for the dichotomy above.

The dichotomy between moral and axiological good may be eliminated in yet another way. Hartman must eventually admit to a hierarchy of concepts coming under axiological judgment in some sort of necessary interdependent order and with some precedence. If it were to be granted that man could be a "murderer," as above, then the axiological "good" of an efficient murder must become subject to the judgment of the axiological concept of man. When performing the function of murdering as that which is contrary to "fulfilling the definition of the concept" of man, man as murderer must be judged "bad." So the former "good" (efficiency) of the murder will be negated by the latter "bad" in the axiological hierarchy. Thus the affirmation that murder is bad may be established in formal axiological terms, and not necessarily "moral" ones. "Moral" good is an unnecessary distinction from another point of view.

There is, however, a place for moral good in the system. Hartman says that the ultimate norm of his axiology is the "value of value." Now it may be affirmed that, al-

though axiology may establish a hierarchy of value and objectify the value status of anything within its terms, it does not necessarily follow, as he confidently asserts, that all will be well. "Value" laid bare before his gaze need not be valued as such by man--a free agent. It is at the point of "choice" that the term "moral" becomes definitive. It is only in his status as volitional, responsible being that man may be called "moral agent." Man is not held culpable for axiology misjudgments, any more than he is for "scientific" ignorance, but at the point of choosing what his best rational faculties (axiology) have revealed to him as the "good," a man becomes moral agent. The "value of value," then, is the only point at which the term "moral good" is applicable.²⁸

The point illustrated in this section is that formal axiology can make good claims to a place among the "sciences." I have no doubt, though I cannot pretend to understand his mathematical symbols and equations, that Hart-

²⁸Socrates believed that to know the good was to do it ("knowledge is virtue"). If this is established, the above distinction of moral good is also eliminated. The affirmation depends on the epistemological definition of "to know." If this is taken to mean something like "to be convinced to the depth of his being" that the axiological "good" is the "good," then, so the Greek said, man will value it. If this is granted, then the problem is not a moral one at all, but one primarily of identification and communication of the "good." This point is of interest to the educator, and especially the Christian educator.

man is able to represent the axiological valuation of the remark made by the bomber pilot of the *Enola Gay* when he saw Hiroshima disappear under him--"My God, what have we done!" --in the formula (I_S)¹, "to signify a very high value."²⁹

The Cause-Effect Correlation. Although it is granted that the identification of the cause of a psychic effect is much more difficult than in the physical sciences, it is suggested that it is becoming more possible by the day. If the time, attention and scholarship had been demanded of this study as has been forced upon science in our age by the theory of relativity, quantum theory and the atomic bomb, the identical stage of profundity and efficiency could have been achieved. It is not unreasonable to suggest that there is no greater degree of difference between Einsteinian physics and its Newtonian counterpart than between the identified laws of biology and those of depth psychology. Physiology increasingly binds these two latter together and in featuring the psychosomatic unity, points to a wider frame of reference than either, including them both. Greater clarity and skill in the one make it possible to attain clarity and skill in the other and in the principle of their unity. The development of these skills will allow for a more accurate establishment of norms and values in the area

²⁹Hartman, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

of psychotherapy than is now possible.

At a depth level much energetic research is directing experiments and clinical data into the two schools of process and outcome analysis. These schools are simply explained as the "what" which results from therapy (outcome) and the "how" it takes place (process). One enthusiastic exponent can say on behalf of outcome analysis: "Outcome must be established before process can be studied"³⁰--while another claims for process: "Outcome studies are quite meaningless, and should be given up in favour of process studies."³¹

Outcome analysis involves such things as behavioural and other phenomena as observed by the patient himself, the therapist, or as determined by psychological testing--projective and standard.

In process analysis a great deal of work is being done with peripherally accessible measurements of physiological changes such as galvanic skin responses, heart rate, blood pressure, skin temperature, blood oxygen saturation, muscular tension, and pupillary diameter, etc., to assess more accurately some of the dynamics involved in the process

³⁰Paul LeRoy Dressel, "Some Approaches to Evaluation," *Personnel and Guidance Journal*, XXXI (1953), 285.

³¹Marvin Reznikoff and Laura C. Toomey, *Evaluation of Changes Associated with Psychiatric Treatment* (Springfield, Illinois: Thomas, 1959), p. 16.

of psychotherapy.³²

It takes little imagination to appreciate what an invaluable aid it is for the therapist to know that the pulse rate or the galvanic skin response rises rapidly every time sexual matters or the name of a particular person or incident is mentioned in the consultation.

There are many specialists contributing research to these fields, among them such well-known names as Rogers, Goldstein, Eysenck and Gallagher.³³ There can be no doubt that outcome and process analysis will provide some real answers in the near future to the problem of cause-effect correlation.

The Necessity and Communication of Values. Life's

³²John I. Lacey, "Psychophysiological Approaches to the Evaluation of Psychotherapeutic Process and Outcome," in *Conference on Research in Psychotherapy*, E. A. Rubinstein and M. B. Parloff, editors (Washington: American Psychological Association, 1959), pp. 160-208. Also see J. E. Dittes, "Galvanic Skin Response as a Measure of Patient's Reaction to Therapist's Permissiveness," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LV (1957), 295-303.

³³Carl R. Rogers, "Process Equation of Psychotherapy," *American Journal of Psychology*, XV (1961), 27-45; also the chapter entitled "A Process Conception of Psychotherapy" in his *On Becoming a Person* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), pp. 125-58; Arnold P. Goldstein, "Therapist and Client Expectation of Personality Change in Psychotherapy," *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, VII (1960), 180-84; J. H. Eysenck, "The Effects of Psychotherapy--An Evaluation," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, XVI (1952), 319-24; James J. Gallagher, "MMPI Changes Concomittant with Client-Centered Therapy," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, XVII (1953), 334-38.

demand for values in the face of the difficulties attendant upon the formulation of a theory of value contributes to tension in axiology. How best can it be resolved?

The first step is a conscious acceptance of the fact of the necessity of value. The next is the expediting of an enthusiastic and informed structuring of a theory concerning values and value transmission. There have been three retarding factors. A previous timidity or reluctance to openly affirm the necessity for values; the willing acceptance and examination by the therapist of his own value structure; and the non-recognition of the stark reality that values are inherent in and communicated by every therapy relationship.

The early Carl Rogers gave good warning of destructive value judgments inherent in "directive" counseling. It can be assumed that Lewin, Lippitt and White have demonstrated that the authoritarian leadership role is not conducive to good social climate.³⁴ Case books are full of the neurotic and psychotic results of overbearing authority figures imposing a scale of values upon resisting psyches. The dangers are real and the warnings are valid. But the later Rogers is no longer purely "non-directive"; the group

³⁴Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt, and Ralph K. White, "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created 'Social Climates,'" *Journal of Social Psychology*, X (1939), 271-99.

dynamics movement has substituted *maieutic* (midwife) leadership for democratic, as the ideal, and declared there is a valid place for both *laissez faire* and authoritarian roles of leadership.

Within contemporary psychotherapy there is an increasing consciousness of the inability of the therapist to "hide" his theory of values from the client. Charlotte Buhler notes that with pure Rogerian counseling,

Officially, it is only the patient who talks about his values. And, officially, all he gets in response are interpretive remarks and questions. But is this actually so?³⁵

Greenspoon's now famous experiment of reinforced plural noun responses answers the question. The subjects in this experiment were requested to spontaneously verbalise a list of words. Plural nouns were reinforced by two supposedly non-committal responses as "Mmm-hmm" and "Huh-uh" by the experimenter. Subjects who became conscious of the connection were eliminated. Reinforcing took place without the subject being conscious of the process. The "mmm-hmm" group increased and the "huh-uh" group decreased their plural noun responses very significantly. "The results suggest that the nature of the response (even an mmm-hmm) is a determinant of the reinforcing character of the stimulus."³⁶ Gardner

³⁵Buhler, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

³⁶Joel Greenspoon, "The Reinforcing Effects of Two

Murphy reflects his belief that the therapist transmits his system of values to his client and in the following quote projects a common wish. He says:

No one knows enough to construct an adequate philosophy of life . . . nevertheless if he who offers guidance is a whole person, with real roots in human culture, he cannot help conveying directly or indirectly to every client . . . the perspective in which his own life is lived.³⁷

Not only is the therapist not able to prevent communicating his value system to his client, it is often demanded of him by the client and necessary for good therapeutic outcome. It is often the collapse of their values, writes Charlotte Buhler, which leads the clients to apply to the analysts for values that analysis cannot provide.³⁸ An increasing number of analysts believe that values--their own and their patients--do and should play a part in therapy. In a poll of New York psychiatrists only 28% denied that values were a factor in therapy.³⁹

The fact is that values are a necessary part of human existence and it is conclusive that they do enter the analyst-analysand relationship. If values are transmitted, what shall a therapist do?

Spoken Sounds on the Frequency of Two Responses," *American Journal of Psychology*, LXVIII (1955), 416.

³⁷Quoted by Buhler, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 13. ³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 12.

First, if his values influence the therapeutic encounter the therapist must take professional responsibility for the emotional and intellectual integration of his personal theory of value. To accept the role as physician of the psyche in others, the therapist must be able to assume a reasonably good foundation for health in his own. Roger's injunction that "he must have congruence"⁴⁰ who would encourage it in others, is heartily endorsed. If the counselor is not able or willing to be responsibly concerned in this respect he must be encouraged to seek another profession where the matter is of less significance.

Secondly, it appears necessary for the therapist in so far as possible to have a cognitive-intellectual appreciation of his value structure. If he cannot formulate good reasons for his values they may need revising. If they satisfy the demands of sound rational criteria the therapist need not be afraid of what they might do if they "show" themselves in counseling. If he is confident of their "reasonableness" he should develop some "verbalising" skill with respect to them and when appropriate use them to advantage in supportive and didactic counseling, thus:

Therapist: . . . I know how you feel. The identical experience has been mine many times. Here is an idea I found most helpful and if you have not tried it perhaps it's worth using.

⁴⁰Rogers, *On Becoming a Person*, p. 61.

I say to myself in the face of such an anxiety . . . [and conscious of the inherent dangers in the process and the skill required, the therapist shares something of his own *Weltanschauung* at this point in a "transactional" type of encounter].

Third, the therapist should not be afraid that he is held responsible for the client's acceptance of the therapist's system of values. It is accepted that the therapist will communicate his system of values one way or another. He must accept responsibility for this influence whether he likes to or not. If he is too threatened by this, again, therapy is not his profession. Neither can he avoid the dangers by saying he is a complete relativist and so has no system of value. This view is a system of value in itself and it is certainly communicated. And it appears to be a most inadequate system of value, especially for those patients whose main need is for value structure or "value bolstering." It may be a little better, however, than one lightly held and being communicated without any examination of its therapeutic implications.

To be a therapist is to be a communicator of values. The roles of authority and specialty in the "helping" professions are the warp and woof of the therapist's gown. If it befits him in emotional congruence, intellectual adequacy and responsible use, he may wear it confidently aware of its marked therapeutic advantage. An approach that appears to avoid some of the dangers of accepting the responsibility of

bold communicator of values, as well as eliciting something of a positive self-regard in the patient, could be:

Therapist: You desire my opinion. Here it is and I accept responsibility for it. But, as you know, I do not accept responsibility for what you do with it. You are more familiar with the whole situation than I am. You must judge my opinion in the light of your "inside" information and on your own responsibility accept or reject what I say. You know from past experience that your acceptance or rejection of what I may say will not affect our relationship, so here is my opinion for what it's worth . . .

Sensitive to such variables as ego strength, situational anxiety, etc., the therapist may use this approach to mutual advantage in the therapeutic encounter.

Conclusion. The tensions within axiology and psychotherapy are as real as they are numerous. Few are of simple solution and most are extremely difficult to focus. This preliminary survey gives some idea of the structural problems confronting the aspirant axiologist. The pattern of attempted resolution is also illustrated in the foregoing chapter. First, the problem of clarification of the source of the difficulty: second, a recognition that no absolutely final solutions may be yet available: but, third, that some enervating innovations are available for at least some resolution of the problem. Courage, skill and initiative in application appear to be the next step.

Having attempted to deal with some basic preliminary

concerns, the subject now attempts to focus its attention upon the major problems.

CHAPTER III

THE INDIVIDUAL-PARTICIPANT TENSION

Polar Elements of Being. The major problems in the formulation of an axiology may be represented by a number of tensions existing between three significant polar extremes. They are the individual-participant, the absolute-relative and the essence-existence tensions. The first pair will anticipate to some extent those following, but each of the three contribute a peculiar emphasis to the discussion and for that reason require separate treatment.

The individualisation-participation (or universality) tension constitutes the first of Tillich's polar elements of being. The acceptance of the tension between such polar elements as an unpleasant necessity is the existentialists' resolution of the perennial philosophical dilemma of the "one and the many." It is the attempt to establish the unity or unifying principle of the whole. It will be suggested that there is a better resolution of the problem than that of an accepted tension between equal and opposite poles, but for the understanding of the existential problem which confronts the axiologist we must take account of the apparent tension which exists between these polar elements.

At the risk of doing a great injustice to Tillich by oversimplification, I would interpret the one pole of indi-

vidualisation to mean that everything that "is" is individual because it is different and distinct from everything else. It is not by its sameness it is known, but by its differentiation. The generic derivation of "existence" is "to stand out." This is the individualisation of everything.¹ But for anything to be different it must of necessity have that from which it is different. There must be that from which it stands out. Individualisation demands an environment of its individuality. Environment is the whole and individualisation is the part. As surely as every part is necessarily a part of a whole, so every whole must of necessity be the whole of parts. Universality is Tillich's term for the whole of which the part is individualisation.²

¹At this point Tillich's distinctions are metaphysical constructs and are distinguished from the psychological concept of "individuation." It is interesting to note that the difference may be represented by Aristotle's theory of "individuation" and that of Jung. Both Erikson's "ego-identity" and Jung's "individuation" may be simply described as the sense of self-conscious ontic peculiarity on the part of the individual (*homo sapiens*), while Aristotle's "individuation" was the peculiar unity of form and matter, the process of the union of form and matter to provide the essential peculiarity of his metaphysical unit--primary substance (*tode ti*) (Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* [second edition; New York: Norton, 1963], pp. 235 f.; Carl G. Jung, *The Integration of the Personality*, trans. Stanley M. Dell [New York: Norton, 1963], p. 261; Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 1016^a 32, 1028^a 10 ff., in Aristotle, *Basic Works*, ed. Richard McKeon [New York: Random House, 1941], p. 935; and also, William David Ross, *Aristotle* [New York: Barnes and Noble, 1964], pp. 169 f.)

Tillich declared that the structure of being and existence is best illustrated for man in the structure of his own being and existence (self-world correlation). It is appropriate, then, to apply this ontological tension of individuality and universality to the tenets of the behavioural sciences. And man does experience this "individual-participant" tension in his own existence. The tension indicates the reality of the extremes and the reality of the extremes creates problems for the formulation of a theory of values.

The Individual and the Self. There are few terms more widely discussed in the modern behavioural sciences than that of "self." Its definition may be at times vague and elusive. Erikson speaks of "inner sameness and continuity,"³ and Sullivan of "a center of reflected appraisal."⁴ Hall and Lindzey group together Goldstein, Maslow and Rogers and interpret their self as "a name for a group of processes."⁵ They would all, it appears, not disagree basically

²Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), I, 147 f.

³Erikson, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

⁴Harry Stack Sullivan, *Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry* (New York: Norton, 1953), pp. 164 f.

⁵Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, *Theories of Personality* (New York: Wiley, 1957), p. 330. They make a small exception with Goldstein, however, in that "the skin

with Charlotte Buhler when she claims that the self is "a structure, a dynamic structure to be sure, but not just a group of processes," and with Horney's affirmation that "the self is something innate, common to all, unique in each . . . the deep source of growth."⁶

It is the uniqueness of the innate source of growth which, for Goldstein and Maslow particularly, provides the whole basic motivation for the development of the human organism. It is in fact the self actualising its self.⁷ Buhler interprets Goldstein as saying that the actualisation of each self is "according to its own nature."⁸ For Erikson the unique individuality of each self is demonstrated by the developmental task of seeking its own identity. The extreme importance of the self to feel its own uniqueness, know its own identity and to actualise its own self is evidenced by the campus and consulting room cry of "Who am I?" when there

is a boundary between the organism and the world; exchanges take place across the boundary but the organism and the environment are treated as separate realms."

⁶Charlotte Buhler, *Values in Psychotherapy* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 57.

⁷Hall and Lindzey (*op. cit.*, p. 109) say that the concept of "self-actualization" is found in "Goldstein, Rogers, Angyl, Murphy, Allport and Maslow, to name only those who are mentioned in this book. In no instance do we find Jung being credited with developing the conception." It is obvious that the authors feel he should be.

⁸Buhler, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

is any doubt about or interruption of this natural and inherent drive for individual identity.

It is because each self must realise its own individuality; because each actualisation is unique in its methods and end; because the center of each self is a choosing, adaptive and developing self; because no pattern of any unique developing self quite matches another; because no external or prescribed formula of "self" may be superimposed on another--because of all this the axiologist is confronted with a major task when he attempts to find a norm as basis for his "science of value" relevant to the human situation.

Universality and Society. But man is more than just that "unique individual" of Kierkegaard. He knows he belongs. In his individualisation he experiences his universality. Although Adler had much to say about the highly "personalised subjective self system" which he termed the "creative self"⁹ and had a high regard for this aspect of the human organism, he was the first of the Freudian school to place primary importance upon the social aspect in personality development. It was his insistence that the etiology of neurosis was social and not libido which became

⁹Alfred Adler, *The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler*, ed. Heinz L. and Rowena R. Ansbacher (New York: Basic Books, 1959), pp. 179 f.

his unpardonable deviation.¹⁰ This difference of opinion with Freud is stated as the reason for his resignation as President of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1911.¹¹

Adler claims that all behaviour patterns are socially instigated. It is not instinctual drive or archetypal control but the innate potential social needs of the organism which motivate personality growth.¹² The "fictional goal"¹³ of perfection is a valid social instrument while its neurotic degeneration becomes the goal of personal superiority.¹⁴ The development of the innate sociality of the individual begins the day of birth and is established by the fifth year.¹⁵ The roles of mother, parents and siblings, therefore, are of definitive significance in the structuring of the "life cycle" of the child. Pampering, organ inferiority or neglect are the three most potent factors¹⁶ which frustrate the normal development of the social-

¹⁰Heinz L. Ansbacher, "Introduction," in *ibid.* This was not an isolated instance of Adler's deviation. See reference for Ansbacher's summary of the differences between the two theories of psychotherapy.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹²Adler, "Problems of Neurosis," in *ibid.*, p. 134.

¹³Ansbacher, "Comment," in *ibid.*, pp. 87 f.

¹⁴Kurt A. Adler, in *ibid.*, p. 158.

¹⁵Alfred Adler, "Education of Children," in *ibid.*, p. 189.

¹⁶Adler, "*Individual Psychologie in der Schule*," in

ising process and result in neurosis, psychosis and criminal tendencies.¹⁷ Normalcy may be regained in Adlerian terms only in new and supportive social relationships. To provide such a relationship is the purpose of the therapeutic interview. Transference has peculiar connotations in Adler. Positive transference enhances the danger of a repetition of the pampering situation. Negative transference threatens the withdrawal of relationships.¹⁸ Adler was not so concerned, however, about the dangers as he was enamoured of the creative possibilities in the transference phenomenon. From the patient's point of view transference is the attempt to establish roles with the therapist which had not been fulfilled in the formative years, and work them through.¹⁹

There can be no doubt that Adler's thought "contains many precursors of later development in modern . . . psychology," as the Ansbachers say,²⁰ but it is a little doubtful that every advance and every major contributor to later developments can be traced to this authority, as these erstwhile disciples would claim. It may be stated with some

ibid., pp. 369-71.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 156.

¹⁸Adler, "Problems of Neurosis," in *ibid.*, pp. 340-41.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 341.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. v.

justification, however, that with the emphasis on the individual self, he anticipated the Freudian ego structure and projected the ego into the authoritative place of the modern ego psychologists; by stressing the importance of the "whole" and the significance of the "foreground" of neurotic symptomology, he anticipated something of the Gestalt emphasis; by highlighting the socialisation process he anticipated the field theorist's work (Lewin characterised his work on one occasion as "having confirmed experimentally the correctness of the Adlerian views"). All the contemporary emphasis on interpersonal relationships by Sullivan, Fromm, etc., represent an Adlerian influence.²¹ One also finds support for these "participation" emphases in Kunkel's theories of "we" psychology; the "understanding psychology" of Dilthey; the "phenomenological approach" of Snygg and Combs and the "client-centered therapy" of Carl Rogers.²² In addition, the relational philosophy of Buber's "I-Thou" is widely acclaimed cross-culturally and interdisciplinarily.

It may be affirmed, then, that from its early modern beginning, theory of psychotherapy has substantiated that man as a social being experiences the deep need to establish good relationships with his environment. This need represents one element of Tillich's polar tension, namely "par-

²¹*Ibid.*, pp. 11-17. ²²*Ibid.*, p. 65.

ticipation." Both poles of this tension are most evident in the personality theories cited.

It may be noted, however, that the "self" psychologists can too easily overlook the importance of the social interaction, and the "interpersonal" school can too readily forget the dynamic center of a responsible, creative "self." Buhler, after surveying the implications of dynamic interpersonalism, exclaims with some justification: "Where is the Individual?"

But this tension is not only evidenced in metaphysical enquiry, personality theory and clinical experience. It is most readily experienced in the commonplace of every day, in the conflict between individual desire and social demand; between personal gratification and cultural mores; between ego needs and societies' requirements. This tension is so common to man's experience that, as Maslow puts it:

it has become the maxim that interests of individual and society are of necessity mutually exclusive and antagonistic, and that society is primarily a mechanism for controlling and policing human instinctual impulses.²³

Maslow later deduces, however, as this thesis also concludes, that the tension is not a necessary one. There can be no doubt that it exists at most levels of individual and social development today and is one of the most potent fac-

²³Abraham H. Maslow, "Psychological Data and Value Theory," *New Knowledge in Human Values*, Abraham H. Maslow, editor (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 129.

tors that militate against the establishment of a consensually validated theory of values. The individual is too afraid of losing his constitutional individual rights to submit readily to what appears in any form to be the imposition of external codified behavioural demands, and society in its attempt to structure itself is constantly intimidated by the same fear. Yet both the individual and the society feel the threat of chaos unless they take account of and act responsibly toward each other.

And the axiologist is caught in this tension.

A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

The tension between individual needs and social demands is real. All experience it; few successfully resolve it; many are broken by it. Attention is now to be given to some possible solution of the individual-participation tension. The conclusion of this paragraph is the main concern of Section Two so it will not be dealt with at length here.

Polar Elements. A necessary basic for the resolution of tension is to be found in the acceptance of the fact that tension as such is not a necessary corollary of being. It is suggested that Paul Tillich's diagnostic skill in identifying the cause of this particular tension is not matched by his prognosis. Polar tension is not a necessary element of being. The time is ripe (*kairos*) to logically and experi-

entially test the truth of this existential premise.

Immediately three reasons basic to the present dilemma come to mind. Most of the current misconceptions would be eliminated if it were noted that:

. . . no two "things" ("actual entities" of Whitehead or "primary substance" of Aristotle) from electrons to elephants, thoughts to theologies, are identical.²⁴ Any structure of being, therefore, which is dependent on equals or equal-opposites must be judged ontologically inadequate:

. . . with respect to compatibles there is to be found a hierarchy of inclusiveness, which when observed will define the cosmic congruence:

. . . universality and individuality, rather than being mutually exclusive, are indeed compatibles, and that one is inclusive of the other.

Tillich's diagnosis that many ills of our culture are caused by this tension is a sound one. The prognosis that accepts the tension as permanent and inevitable is erroneous. It is an inadequate prescription to adjure an existential acceptance of the inevitability of the tension and it is an inadequate injunction to face the inherent threat of

²⁴A distinction needs to be drawn between the concepts of "identity," which is founded on absolute peculiarity, and "identification," which speaks of common similarity. We refer to the former concept here.

non-being with the "courage to be." Existentially the tension is real. Ontologically it was never intended. Existentially it can be reduced and finally, it is hoped, resolved.

But how?

Man as Social Being. The point being made is that Tillich's elements are not constituted by the tension of equal and opposite poles. The contrary thesis suggested is that participation is the ontological element and that individualisation is its accidence. The recognition and acceptance of this hierarchial ontological structure is a beginning to the resolution of the existential conflict. Resolution of conflict is not in itself the goal nor the justification of this argument. Tension is seen rather as a means or motivation to an end higher than itself. Any concept which includes an irreducible tension appears to contradict the best present psychological and philosophical insights. Tillich's solution is rejected.

Man as social being is connoted here as "man in relation." Relation is highly valued in the behavioural sciences, but usually as a means to the end of meeting the "individual" needs of the developing personality. The present thesis has it the other way around. The real *telos* of human existence is relation and "self"-fulfillment is one of the results--a by-product (accidence), so to speak. In-

dividuality is not incompatible with participation and participation (universality) is congruous with and inclusive of individuality.

The strongest language encountered to substantiate the priority of participation over individuality in psychotherapy is that of Harry Stack Sullivan. He says:

if we could be absolutely isolated from the physical world in which we have our being, our life on earth would be a matter of minutes . . . the process of becoming a person is synonymous with the process of acculturation with the "significant others" or their surrogates.²⁵

The first portion of the statement may be a little poetic, but agreement is registered with the point that becoming a person is synonymous with life lived in significant and intimate relation.

Lewis Sherrill, a noted authority in Christian education, speaks for that discipline when he says:

The self is formed in its relationship with others. If it becomes deformed it becomes so in relationships. If it is reformed or transformed that too will be in its relationships.²⁶

Erich Fromm can be quoted at length on the subject. Using the term "love" to illustrate the point, he says:

Love is an active power in man; a power which breaks through the walls which separate man from his fellows,

²⁵Patrick Mullahy, *Oedipus, Myth and Complex* (New York: Grove Press, 1948), p. 280.

²⁶Lewis J. Sherrill, *The Gift of Power* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 45.

which unites him with others; love makes him overcome the sense of isolation and separateness, yet it permits him to be himself, to retain his integrity. In love the paradox occurs that two become one and yet remain two.²⁷

This good statement is almost wholly supported. The paradox, if this infers irreconcilable opposites, is rejected. Participation (love relationship) and Individuality are not two of a kind. One precedes the other, that is, "real" selfhood is derived from "real" relation. So when Fromm says:

In contrast to symbiotic union, mature love is union under the condition of preserving one's integrity, one's individuality,²⁸

the phrase "under the condition of" must be replaced with the phrase "with the result of" in order to reach full agreement with him on the point.

The citing of many futile and frustrated attempts of an individual to establish satisfactory relationships is not to negate the point. The sadist who imprisons another with "love," the authoritarian "will to power" domination of a partner in "love," or the masochist who craves the exploitation, shame, and hurt of his "love," does not, as Fromm points out, know love at all. This is the predominance of the "individual" pole in the hierarchial order. Mature love is able to give, not motivated by ulterior reasons of

²⁷Erich Fromm, *The Art of Loving* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1962), pp. 21-22.

"self"-seeking purpose. Love (ideal and most intimate form of relation) is genuinely amazed to receive more than it has ever known or expected in return. One receives "himself." Unfortunately this relationship in adulthood requires two reasonably mature persons to begin with. This fact is not overlooked and the necessary corollary of mature individuality with mature relation will be discussed in detail in Section Two.

Not only in love (Freudian "genital love," I suppose) does this giving of self result in a fulfillment of self. Fromm illustrates:

The teacher is taught by his students, the actor is stimulated by his audience, the analyst is cured by his patient--provided they do not treat each other as objects but are related to each other genuinely and productively.²⁹

These conclusions are generally supported by: the Christian philosophy of

He that would save his life will lose it, but he that would lose his life for my sake and the gospel [relation to person and principle?] will surely save it . . . ;³⁰

by the Buddhist injunction that *tanha* (inadequately translated "desire"), "the will to private fulfillment," is the "ego oozing like a secret sore,"³¹ and the basic cause of

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 20. ²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 27.

³⁰Mark 8:35. Also Matt. 10:39, 16:25; Luke 9:24, 17:33; John 12:25.

³¹Huston Smith, *The Religions of Man* (New York:

life's dislocation, so that "when we are selfless we are free";³² by the Hebrew commendation to "Rest in the Lord"³³ (relax in ultimate relation); by the later Heidegger's "openness to being";³⁴ and by Margaret Fuller's "I accept the Universe."

Conclusion. Two words need to be said. One is that genuine participation--the giving of self in relation--is not the reluctant resignation to an unacceptable inevitable, but the enthusiastic affirmation of a deliberate intention to enter relation. It is the self-conscious eager choice from among alternatives. The second is that the self is not to be found by entering relation as a means to this end. This is not the negation of *tanha*, the desire for self "at the expense if necessary of all other forms of life,"³⁵ but is rather its expression. The point is that relation is not a means to the end of selfhood, but is the end in itself.

One final piece of evidence that it is so. A most

Mentor Books, 1962), p. 110.

³²*Ibid.* ³³Psalms 37:37.

³⁴James M. Robinson, "The German Discussion," in James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb (eds.), *The Later Heidegger and Theology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 15, 16. Also see John B. Cobb, *Living Options in Protestant Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962), p. 216, with reference to Heidegger and the question under review.

³⁵Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

vivid and appropriate reaction that love experiences is the desire to value the "love relation" above its own individuality. The clutching of independence to itself is incompatible with love. When one experiences himself in his most intimate love relations he knows with great clarity two things: one, that he is more himself (his essential being) than at any other time; and two, that this state of "more himselfness" is the effect of the relation and not the cause. It is said again--participation is the *telos* of man, and individuality is the accident.

CHAPTER IV

THE ABSOLUTE-RELATIVE TENSION

The terms "relative" and "absolute" are common parlance in our culture because of the contemporary fascination for values. There are available to our day philosophies like those of Kant, Sidgwick and Spencer which suggest the possibility of some "absolute" ethical norms, while Westermarch and Dewey, notably, have strongly advocated the need for a moral relativity.¹

The work of the cultural anthropologists, Margaret Mead and Dorothy Lee, for example,² have succeeded in questioning the validity of the authority of the contemporary cultural milieu and of the traditional standards of behaviour. Speaking of such studies, Spindler has commented:

Commonalities and regularities were obscured, and the insight that every culture is a complex solution to a set of common problems by a sentient animal with a universal sharing of biological and intellectual propensities was temporarily lost.³

¹William T. Jones, *et al.* (eds.), *Approaches to Ethics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), p. xxv.

²Margaret Mead's cultural study, *Coming of Age in Samoa* (New York: New American Library, 1959), has become something of a classic in this area. Also see George D. Spindler (ed.), *Education and Culture* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), pp. xiv, xv.

³Spindler, "The Character Structure of Anthropology," *ibid.*, p. 18.

Yet, rebel as he might, civilised man does not seriously question the necessity of red traffic lights or the existence of law enforcement officers to safeguard some necessary values and authoritatively ensure at least some patterns of behaviour. So there is tension.

The Relative Extreme. The theory and practice of psychotherapy gives evidence of the wide acceptance of relativity theory in respect to behaviour patterns, cultural mores and value norms. Charlotte Buhler comments that Redlich "feels different cultures call for different therapeutic approaches."⁴ She herself states that "a choice might be right under one aspect and not another," and notes that Frankl "makes the individual responsible for finding his own specific task and meaning." It is significant that she also believes that each culture has a definitive effect on the formulation of its particular system of psychotherapy. She says, "Institutional values of the system correspond to the institutional values in the culture."⁵ The best summation of this emphasis on relativity, however, is Simkins':

Values are functional, relative and idiosyncratic,
rather than organic, absolute and generalized. What is

⁴Charlotte Buhler, *Values in Psychotherapy* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 52.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 177.

meaningful and valuable to me need not and frequently is not meaningful or valuable to someone else.⁶

A final word comes from Buhler herself that "there is no standardized philosophy of life and in all likelihood there never will be."⁷ The expression of these authoritative opinions leaves little doubt that the relative nature of every existential situation is, and has been, one of the main problems in the formulation of a theory of values.

Paul Tillich regrets that:

It is almost pathetic to see how the philosophers of value tried to overcome one of the main weaknesses of the value theory--its subjective and relative character.⁸

Relativity and Religious Absolutism. Before we turn to the other pole of this tension, it is necessary to note two other cultural expressions of relativity. One is the current reaction against religion; the other is the cult of non-conformity. Organised religion is the historical preserver of the form and norm of absolutism. Relativism is an hegelian antithesis, in contemporary culture, of the absolutist thesis. It is somewhat expected that religion should become absolutist. Every religion necessarily has its "god," and a god must necessarily be absolute something

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 208. ⁷*Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁸Paul Tillich, "Is a Science of Human Values Possible?" *New Knowledge in Human Values*, Abraham H. Maslow, editor (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 191.

or other. It is only a small step from ultimate something or other to absolute authority in most things or other. Revelatory absolutes soon follow. This appears to be the common path of development with most religions. Starting from an original general principle or axiom, time, attention and devotion have woven the pattern of that general principle into the most minute and burdensome details of individual behaviour. Unless some discerning weaver constantly and painstakingly picks out the inappropriate and irrelevant threads in the pattern, there comes the time when there is a cataclysmic rending of the whole fabric so that a whole new pattern may be established. It is significant that Buber sees this process of the link between any culture and religion as a necessary corollary.

Culture is the stabilization of the life impulse and life forms between two religious upheavals. Religion is the renewal of the life impulse and life forms between two cultural developments.⁹

So on the contemporary scene one can interpret the enthusiasm for relativism as the current revolt of culture against the rigidity of life forms and impulses in absolute norms of religion. It may be admitted as a stage in a necessary process.

The ideas of two great men have had an unusual effect on the thought patterns of this generation--Sigmund Freud

⁹Maurice S. Friedman, *Martin Buber* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 40.

and John Dewey. Freud and the whole psychoanalytical effort has been a big influence in the beginning of this revolt.¹⁰ Dewey's voice carried it far into educational philosophy.¹¹ The enthusiasts took their theories to extremes often not anticipated by the instigators themselves. This is especially true of Dewey and the progressivists.¹² It reaches to the very grass roots of the culture. In its desire to include within the etiology of many neurotic and psychotic disturbances, the oppressive religious norms represented in the superego in conflict with the instinctual id drives of the organism, psychoanalytic theory placed a stigma on "religion" from which it has not recovered. Dewey's hostility

¹⁰Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud* (New York: Basic Books, 1957), III, 349 f. "This critical topic, Freud and Religion, has been the occasion of many books and a spate of essays. It has evoked more controversy and condemnation than any other of his writings except perhaps those on sexuality" (*ibid.*). Jones quotes the early Freud: "I believe in fact that a great part of the mythological view of the world, which reaches far into the most modern religions, is nothing other than psychological processes projected into the outer world."

¹¹John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955). Also see John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," *Contemporary American Philosophy*, G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague, editors (New York: Macmillan, 1930), II, 24.

¹²Lawrence A. Cremin, *The Transformation of the School* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 142, interprets Dewey's attitude to the "progressivism" he had espoused, as being one of "disappointment; and later he pronounced progressive education a failure, a movement that had destroyed well but too soon abandoned the more difficult task of building something better to replace what had been done

to the imposition of rigid behaviour patterns justified by an appeal to "supernatural" authority, found ready support from those already critical of established religion.

Explicitly or implicitly, the very idea of religious authority has been placed under suspicion in these academic and clinical areas. Even the association of any theory of values with religion is to place that theory's authority under suspicion. One becomes conscious that it is necessary to apologise for the use of religious symbols, doctrines, or biblical illustrations. Henry Margenau, in wanting to use the Hebrew Ten Commandments to illustrate a point, introduces it by saying: ". . . a ridiculously simple illustration . . ."; halfway through he states: ". . . our model of narrow range . . ."; and at the conclusion gives it a parting shot with: "the model was odiously artificial."¹³ It was a strong illustration of his point, and so is this of the one above.

So relativity in this particular form is the revolt against, and a rejection of, absolutism represented by those traditions of our culture upheld and preserved by organised religion.

Yet organised religion, as the Church, is the most

away with."

¹³Henry Margenau, "The Scientific Basis of Value Theory," in Maslow, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.

common institution of our culture; its material assets greater than a combination of the next largest concerns in the land; the overwhelming majority of the population owning membership or paying some sort of allegiance to the enterprise; and very few who disclaim belief in, or loyalty to, its god, flocking on every Easter day to fulfill the ritual of attendance to the ultimate it represents, to the embarrassment of the capacity of even the most commodious facilities. The Church remains the "greatest society on earth."

The tension is real and the necessity to give more discerning and intelligent attention to this polar phenomenon of disdain for, and devotion to, this form of the absolute is an urgent one. The tension only serves to exacerbate the issue.

Relativity and Non-Conformity. The second factor relevant to the problem of the relative-absolute tension is the "cult" of non-conformity. Like all errors of the extreme, it is self-destructive of its emphasis and self-contradictory in its terms. One may reply to the ardent relativist who says: "All things are relative," "Yes, including the statement you just made"; and it may be retorted to the non-conformist who indicates that everyone should be a non-conformist, namely, "So then you advocate conformity to the principle of non-conformity?" A high

school senior exclaimed in disgust to her father, the high school principle: "Oh Daddy, why can't you be a non-conformist like everyone else." To the mature (writer and readers included, of course), the cult appears immature rebellion for rebellion's sake against any figure of authority or norm of tradition. In some cases it is the adolescent psyche flexing its muscles in necessary testing of strength, or in sheer psychic "kinaesthetic" exhilaration of newly emerging independence. Paradoxical as it may appear, there is the subject's experience of existential disappointment if such tests of strength find no complementary resistance from the authority or tradition against which they rebel. The necessity of Erikson's "adult guarantor"¹⁴ is well illustrated in the life of most adolescents.

The adolescent rebellion against authority, which so often expresses itself in the outburst "Why can't I do what I want?" is often an escapist relativity in fearful flight from absolutes and the authority figures who transmit and represent them. We do not question there is a law of limitation, rescuing being and existence from chaos,¹⁵ ordering

¹⁴Erik H. Erikson, *Young Man Luther* (New York: Norton, 1958), p. 17. The reference is to the role of Father Staupitz, the mentor, father confessor of young Luther, as representative of the solidarity of being and existence expressed in the tradition of the faith and order of the church, when insecurity and doubt--the threat of non-being--thrust itself in upon the young priest.

mind and matter, specifying actuality and potentiality, just as binding on the psyche as on the soma, on the electron as on the human spirit. It is easier to answer the question with: "Because the world would fly to pieces if you did," than it is to isolate those specific laws, values, which are the essentials preventing such catastrophes. The question is, rather, "What?" "What can't I do which I want to?" What is the measure of limitation and of freedom? What are their essential elements and how are they applied? These are the real questions of genuine non-conformist motivation, and not the energy-dissipating blind rebellion against the principle of limitation as such. Energy is required for the task of the identification of value, not for rebellion against it.

Non-conformity which deserves the name is that stance, surely, which questions all things on their individual merits relevant to the circumstances, and not by the criteria of who said it or how many are doing it, or from what tradition it comes. Mere non-acceptance of norms, mores or traditions, just because they are norms, mores or traditions, only serves to aggravate the problems inherent in the attempt to identify and apply the guideline of human and cosmic behaviour; that is, to establish theory of value.

¹⁵*Infra*, p. 297 f.

Anti-conformity (term by Tillich)¹⁶ is the second factor which tends to cloud the real issues in the relative-absolute debate. This problem needs some clarification.

The Absolute. In spite of the current enthusiasm for relativity, there is also a widespread feeling concerning its adequacy. At the Conference for Creative Altruism, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October, 1957, Walter Weisskopf said:

Ultimate ground of values . . . is rooted in ultimate ground of being; . . . we may learn from history that all cultures derive their ultimate values from a basic concept or symbol which stood for the ground of being--such as god, nature, universe . . . this union is the essence of ultimate values--the dialectical trinity.¹⁷

On the same occasion, Robert Hartman, in commenting on the tension between the relative and absolute, declared that the

resolution is simple. Is there an absolute norm of value; that is, a universal measure in terms of which every other value is determined? The answer is, "Yes, there is."¹⁸

Intent on justifying any attempt to establish a basis for a so-called science of values, Hartman refers to the

¹⁶Tillich, "Is a Science of Human Values Possible?" in Maslow, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

¹⁷Walter A. Weisskopf, "Existence and Values," in Maslow, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

¹⁸Robert S. Hartman, "The Science of Value," in Maslow, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

work of Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Hume, Locke, and even Berkeley to this end. They founded their attempts on such possibilities as "mathematically validated value systems"; a "geometrical method for the whole of ethics"; a "mathematical morality" or "moral knowledge as capable of real certainty as mathematics."¹⁹ Moustakas reminds us that Kant discovered:

there really exist pure moral laws which entirely *a priori* determine the use of freedom of our rational being . . . what has to be done and what has not to be done.²⁰

The same writer, distinguishing between a "value system" and value, goes on to say:

Value, as I use the term, is the absence of any system, but rather refers to an ultimate, final, absolute moral and ethic which enhances goodness in a permeating sense, touches the individual in the roots of his existence, touching life itself and contributing to universal goodness . . . value is not a preference--an alternative among alternatives. . . .²¹

There can be added to the foregoing the confidence expressed by Maslow that it would be possible to find an equivalent norm for human values to that established by the ability to define chickens as "good choosers of value or bad choosers."²²

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

²⁰Clark Moustakas, "Moral and Ethical Values in Education and Therapy" (address to the Merrill-Palmer Institute, Detroit, Michigan, May, 1961), p. 3. (Mimeographed.)

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 4.

Even if we delete the rhetoric or wishful thinking from the above, there are some significant points to be made. First, there is evidence that some of the sophisticated in the major disciplines are not afraid to use the terms "absolute" or "ultimate"; to speak of "moral laws" and "code of ethics" as though they were possibilities, and that one can still use the connotation of "good" or "bad" in a definitive way. The present fascinations for cross-cultural studies are provoking some idea of possible common values. George Spindler speaks of the current search for universals in the various cultures. He says:

Anthropologists, while impressed by the diversity of human cultures and the character definition given each by its core values, have not neglected to point out the essential similarities among them.²³

He cites the list composed by George Murdock of "over one hundred items that are found in every culture known to history and ethnography."²⁴

Sports, ethics, feasting, ethnobotany, folklore, family, hospitality, kinship nomenclature, puberty customs, sexual restrictions, . . . are a few of the cultural properties all humans share.²⁵

It now seems possible that every known language can be resolved into comparable components--three to be exact--of "phonemes (conventional sound units), morphemes (meaning-

²²Abraham H. Maslow, "Psychological Data and Value Theory," in Maslow, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

²³Spindler, *op. cit.*, p. 22. ²⁴*Ibid.* ²⁵*Ibid.*

ful elements) and grammar."²⁶ Kluckhohn can ask the question:

Are there fairly definite limits within which cultural variation is constrained by panhuman regularities in biology, psychology and the processes of social interaction?²⁷

There are some who will identify specifics. Henry Margenau identifies two values which have been generally accepted in history and cultures, namely, the golden rule and maximum happiness. "I dare say there is greater unanimity with respect to these . . . than there is concerning a value methodology."²⁸ Kluckhohn asserts that there is in all societies an "interdiction against 'killing, indiscriminate lying and stealing' within the ingroup."²⁹ Dorothy Lee supports the report of Margaret Mead concerning the common taboo of incest among all tribes.³⁰ Anthropologists have noted the fact that as man progressed to civilisation so he has tended to monogamy.

These are rare items in the total of man's experience but show a common recognition of things inherently valuable to the race. They are thus so far not relative, but have

²⁶*Ibid.* ²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

²⁸Margenau, in Maslow, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

²⁹Dorothy Lee, "Culture and the Experience of Value," in Maslow, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 168.

some measure of absolute authority available to empirical and analytical observation.

Here, then, is sufficient evidence of both poles of a tension. The absolute-relative tension is aggravated by the apparent necessity for both extremes. The issue is a current one. There are few theorists at either extreme. Some are marked by one or the other emphasis, but the majority seem to be caught somewhere in the middle, not satisfied with either extreme as an alternative, and yet knowing the qualifying necessity of each for the other. The urgency for some criteria by which life may be lived, behaviour may be judged, and goals may be chosen is alluded to on both sides. The rebellion against passive submission to some objectified norm or code without serious questions concerning its relativity is universal. This tension is the second great problem for the axiologist as he attempts to clarify the situation, sharpen the issues and evolve a theory of value.

EASING THE TENSION

How is it possible to reduce the tension between the absolute and the relative? If everything is relative, chaos results. If all life is to be bound by absolutes, then life and growth are negated. How is the tension resolved?

The Absolutists. There are four terms involved in the introductory statement above. There are those of "rela-

tive" and "absolute." To each of these is added the other term "everything" or "all." To distinguish between these four terms is to expose the first fallacy. Because some things appear not to be relative, it is concluded that nothing can be relative. This could be termed the "absolute absolutist" position. On the other hand, because it is impossible to accept some things as absolute, then it is concluded that nothing is absolute. This would be the "absolute relativist" position. It is suggested that although some things cannot be absolute, there is a possibility that some may be. It may be true in fact that although some things can never be relative, others should always be.

To accept this insight is the first step on the way to a resolution of much of the current tension between the absolutistic and relativistic views of life. In addition, such an initial easing of the tension will direct attention towards a clearer definition of the two categories of relative and absolute, the relation and contents of each. The philosophy of Charles Hartshorne will return us to this point later.

Unity in Meaning. The notion that two opposites held in polar tension can be the elements of being has already been rejected. This objection is reiterated with reference to the relative-absolute tension. A "paradox" or a "polar tension" is the complimentary title given to one's antino-

mies, while those of an opponent are called "irreconcilable irrationalities." Life and being do not consist of sets of equal and opposite things, needs, facts, satisfactions or values. Existence indicates an infinite variety of difference.

Existence also indicates some semblance of unity. One unifying agent of the "many" is meaning. Every paradox and every polar tension must find some unity with respect to meaning. The attraction that holds them together is the meaning of their unity. A transcendent meaning reconciles their ambiguity. The tension is eliminated in the unity of meaning, the paradox is resolved in the meaning of their unity.

An appreciation of this principle is a further step towards a reduction of the tension. The immediate difficulty is that the unifying meaning of the paradox and the polar tension often remains in the mists of the undifferentiated. It has often not been possible to reduce the unifying meaning intuitively grasped into an objectified formula, and it has not been discerned that this deficiency was part of the problem. The need represented by each polar element was intuited as necessary, but until the unifying principle was objectified the tension was retained by the necessity for the expression of both elements in the nature of man, and the tension was aggravated by his fear of allowing either one to have ascendancy. When the validity of each is recog-

nised with respect to the other and their meaning discovered, the tension will be eased.

In psychotherapy Viktor Frankl has discovered the significance of "meanings." His system of "logotherapy" has evolved from the theory that the basic drive in man is the "will to meaning." His death camp experiences persuaded him that even the agonising ambivalent tension between the will to live and the constant threat of death can be endured with sanity if given a meaning. Allport, in the introduction to Frankl's book *Man's Search for Meaning*, lays bare the impulse of the theory when he says: "Frankl is fond of quoting Nietzsche, 'he who has a *why* to live can bear with almost any *how*.'"³¹

A Hierarchy of Value Spheres. There is another way in which some tension may be reduced between polar elements. This is by the recognition of a hierarchy of increasingly inclusive spheres of value. The previous paragraph implied this, as did the suggestion in the previous chapter that the tension between universality and individuality is reduced by recognition that participation or universality was inclusive of particularity and individuality. To discover the meaning of a paradoxical tension is to discover this same principle.

³¹Viktor Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1963), p. xiii.

Perhaps a particular meaning is that one need can be satisfied by inclusion in the other, or that both can be satisfied by mutual inclusion in a higher, more inclusive principle to both.³²

Instead of a philosophy of polar elements, we now have a philosophy of spheres.³³ A sphere can be better understood as the category of "environment." Everything implies the category of environment. Environment in this sense is a universal category. Any particular environment, until the last all-inclusive environment, is included in that environment or environments higher than itself on a hierarchical scale. This is illustrated in that loyalty

³²See Tillich's doctrine of meaning behind meanings until the ultimate meaning behind all meanings is discovered (Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951], pp. 209-210).

³³The late "Amsterdam Philosophy" of the Dutch Reformed philosopher, Herman Dooyeweerd, has evolved a very complicated philosophy of "law spheres" designed to support his "denial of the autonomy of theoretical thought." "There is an order of the law spheres which leads Dooyeweerd to speak of the cosmic law order. This order is determined by God and can only be discovered by science. The arrangements of the law spheres is according to complexity, the less complex coming first." The first sphere is the "numerical aspect" as it is the least complex, and then in ascending order until the final of the fifteen, which is the "pistal aspect." Through this last, God's authority is vouchsafed to all being and this includes the sphere of theoretical thought. It is of significance to the terms above, which were conceived prior to exposure to Dooyeweerd's philosophy, that he claims: "the terms 'law sphere' and 'meaning aspect' are correlative." (Ronald H. Nash, *Dooyeweerd and the Amsterdam Philosophy* [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1962], pp. 28-29.)

values resident within the individual are autonomous until they come under judgment of the family loyalty values, and these are nonrelative until they come under judgment of the nation, and these until they come under judgment of the world or humanity, and these under the history of this eon and this under the cosmic epoch of the race. And who is to say that this is the only cosmic epoch? And so on. In this sense we have a "hierarchical" relativism. But within itself any environment can be said to have complete authority with respect to the certain limitations of its components. Within a sphere there are absolutes. Dooyeweerd says that this is the principle upon which his theory of law spheres is founded. The principle was first enunciated by the Dutch philosopher, theologian and educator, Abraham Kuyper. It is the "principle of sovereignty in one's own sphere."³⁴

The least one can say concerning absolutes and spheres is that, within clearly defined limits of a particular environment, boundaries are by definition absolute, certain laws are authoritative and some ultimates may be isolated. This fact is so obvious, and life is so encompassed by it, that it is difficult to understand why it hasn't been enunciated previously for the benefit of a theory of value.

Value Spheres and Psychotherapy. This holds good for

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 17.

any therapy occasion. Granted that the necessary skills for the clearest definition of environment are not yet available, there can be no question that such a definition is eventually possible. If the environment (sphere, frame of reference) was clearly delineated, there would thus be made possible the definition of some absolutes within that particular situation. The problem has been that our theories have so impressed us with generalities about the relativity of every particular occasion that we have forgotten the fine point that the particularity of each individual occasion is absolute and relative to nothing but itself. This is the very definition of particularity. We may not yet be able to diagnose or stipulate the absolutes which apply to every specific occasion, but they are there to be uncovered, and their only disguise is our present lack of analytical skill.³⁵ This is the first thing that can be said.

Second, although lack of diagnostic skill may, at this stage, prevent the identification of the "ultimate

³⁵New categories are being evolved towards the development of such analytical skills. With reference to the above scheme, it is noted that Otto von Mering, on the assumption that "because each individual is a product of his distinct biographical situation he develops his own personal hierarchy or pattern of existential, normative and idiosyncratic values," has isolated four possible value "realms." They are "simplistic value realm," "isolative-personal," "inclusive-interpersonal" and "comprehensive value realm" (Otto von Mering, *Grammar of Human Values* [Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1961], pp. 90-91).

good" resident in each therapy occasion, the confidence born of the knowledge that the "good" is there to be found will enhance our efforts towards finding it, and the effort will help isolate the "better," for there is not only a hierarchy among the spheres, but also a hierarchy of value resident within each sphere. A theory of "hierarchy" and "value spheres" can make for the reduction of the absolute-relative tension in psychotherapy.

Realistic Goals. There are some specific implications in this for the therapeutic occasion. First of all, it is necessary for the therapist to know that, within the confines of any particular occasion and the limitation of his skill, he may establish and choose some realistic goals for himself and his patient by reason of the alternative potential values resident within that occasion. The realistic choosing of goals is important to Goldstein. "To be exposed to tasks he cannot fulfill,"³⁶ is both damaging to the psychic health of the patient and frustrating to the therapist-client relationship. Many therapists object to the direct communication of "limited goals" to the patient, but Buhler states that it is necessary to distinguish between patients with "comprehensive value potential" and

³⁶Kurt Goldstein, "Health as Value," in Maslow, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

those with "limited value potential."³⁷ And these variables apply to therapists as well as patients. This brings us to the second point, but before passing to it, it is noted that realistic goals are identifiable and available in every therapy encounter by reason of the potential values resident in every situation.

Therapist-Patient Congruence. As noted above, one of the problems prohibiting a clear definition of environment is the lack of skills necessary to identify and account for all the variables inhering in a particular environment. Any reduction in the number of variables, therefore, must help the situation. The suggestion comes from Donald Glad that there should be some discrimination in the matching of patient and therapist. Although the comment is more likely to come from the second therapist than the first, it "is frequently said that some patients who make no progress with one therapist improve quickly with another."³⁸ He notes further that for the religiously inclined, "a therapist with a religious value system might be more effective,"³⁹ and that the patient who is democratic "in attitudes is most

³⁷Buhler, *op. cit.*, pp. 166, 169.

³⁸Donald D. Glad, *Operational Values in Psychotherapy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 5.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 6.

likely to benefit from the rogerian democratic client-centered approach."⁴⁰ Charlotte Buhler notes that "a cultural discrepancy between patient and therapist affects communication and identification."⁴¹ Cultural backgrounds should be matched.

The call is for more clinics with diagnostic and referral specialists in categorising patients and in patient-therapist matching. The clinic should have all types of clinicians available for referral. In addition to the obvious professional categories, there should be clergy of all persuasions, social workers, and even some relatively untrained professional associates--carefully selected, congruent persons gifted in empathic understanding and capable of unconditional positive regard for all sorts and conditions of men.⁴² The category of the "go see" (social workers, etc.) is being given increasing value. The injunction "that if a person will not come to the therapist he is not an appropriate subject for counseling" has some truth to it, but it is quite often the case that profitable first contacts can be made by "go see" specialists. The "reluctant eagerness" of some categories of patients to seek out help has

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹Buhler, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

⁴²Carl R. Rogers, *On Becoming a Person* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), pp. 61-62.

given much evidence to the writer that refusal to seek an interview is often a subliminal "request" for someone "to prove he cares enough to come see me."

The elimination of some of the variables by matching patient with therapist seems an invaluable aid towards up-grading the results of therapy as well as making possible a clearer definition and attainment of the values and goals resident in every therapy situation.

Confidence and Co-operation. Finally, even if our diagnostic skills are not presently sufficient to isolate the highest value inherent in every specific situation, at least we have some criteria and ability to distinguish between the "better" and the "worse" values in a situation. It appears that it would be to the advantage of an interview if some such confidence could be communicated to the patient. Realism, confidence and co-operation may be invited in a therapeutic interview with the words spoken at the appropriate time:

Well, these are real problems. We might not be able to find the perfect solution, but I'm sure we can find one. You have the advantage of knowing the situation from the inside and I have some experience and training. I am confident that by combining our resources we can find at least some of the answer to improving the situation. Now you said . . .

Conclusion. The conclusion of this chapter is thus stated: that absolutes may be assumed and finally identi-

fied within the particularity of any specific environment. Such environments may be referred to as spheres, and the absolutes enumerated would be the equivalent of Dooyeweerd's law spheres. Within the total frame of reference, however, every sphere except the final one is relative to others. This may be only a partial resolution of the absolute-relative tension, but the concept seems presently adequate for the structuring of being and existence and the society of man.

CHAPTER V

THE ESSENCE-EXISTENCE TENSION

What modern man has lost is himself. He searches for his own "essential self." Although many would persuade him otherwise, somehow man cannot believe he is presently all he was meant to be. The tension between what he is and what he feels he is supposed to be constitutes the essence-existence tension. It is both motivation and problem for the axiologist.

Tillich believes that man's alienation from his "essential being" is a necessary corollary of existence. He interprets the biblical myth of this alienation (the fall) as the inevitable result of transition from essence into existence.¹ Man's only wise alternative is to accept his finitude with courage. Erikson's equivalent suggestion for "coping with this metaphysical riddle of existence is the ornamenting of the inevitable with 'some special pride.'"²

To an extent, the advice of Tillich and Erikson is well taken. As the final word on the situation, however, it

¹"This is the point at which the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of the fall join . . ." (Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951], I, 255).

²Charlotte Buhler, *Values of Psychotherapy* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 38.

is not acceptable. A more reasonable assumption is that of the biblical myth, namely, that the "can be" which man intuitively as his real self is somehow possible of re-attainment. The myth indicates what man essentially once was, is not now, but can become again.³ Maslow refers to this possible "essential man" in the rare instances of its exemplification in our history. He says:

I have the clear impression that such authentic, fully human persons are the actualization of what any human being could be.⁴

And so do I.

The reasonable question whether Tillich means by "essence" what Maslow is interpreted to mean by his authentic human would take many words to resolve.⁵ It is claimed that for the present purpose this loose equation may be

³In his existential (*existenziell*) diagnosis, Tillich is able to say: "In so far as man's existence has the character of self-contradiction or estrangement, a double consideration is demanded, one side dealing with man as he essentially is (and ought to be) and the other dealing with what he is in his self-estranged existence (and should not be)" (Tillich, *op. cit.*, I, 66).

⁴Abraham H. Maslow, "Psychological Data and Value Theory," *New Knowledge in Human Values*, Abraham H. Maslow, editor (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 132.

⁵Tillich's use of the terms "essence" and "essential" is ambiguous. It is necessary to make the differentiation between "essential" as an ontological term and "essential" as a state of existential intentionality (cf. Tillich, *op. cit.*, pp. 255 ff., 65 ff.). In defence of the above interpretation of Tillich, an appeal is made to the "ontic" (*infra*, p. 111) as that dimension unifying and transcending both the ontological and existential.

assumed. This chapter affirms that the "essence" of man's being (as hereunder enunciated) can be and is meant to be realised here and now.

Freud and Tillich. It is significant that Freud, motivated for a different reason, travelling a dissimilar route and starting from different premises, arrived at a similar conclusion to Tillich's. He can be interpreted as believing that the "as if" of the natural instinctual nature of man is the norm. Any indication that man should be something other than he is Freud saw as the invalid demands of the despotic superego. He found so much evidence for what he interpreted to be the destructive tyranny of the "ought" in the superego that he was suspicious of everything that savoured of the suggestion that man *could* and *should* become something different from what he was. He felt it necessary to place the emphasis upon man's acceptance of his natural impulses and drives. The unfortunate result has been that, overtly or covertly, man is encouraged to accept the principle that he was never meant to be anything more than he feels himself inclined to be in the moment. In particular cases, especially neurotic and psychotic instances, there is some merit in this stance for the regaining of positive self-regard, when that faculty has been well nigh destroyed. But as the general truth of man's being it is not acceptable. Further, it is inappropriate to the real feelings man

has about his own self. Here is evidence that the tension between essence and existence is a real one. It constitutes problems for the axiologist.

"Essential" Man. What is the "fully human person" of which Maslow speaks? It is obvious that if a theory of human values is to be evolved there must be a norm. Leaving for the moment other questions, precipitated by the preceding paragraph, attention is turned to ask the behavioural scientists if it is possible to establish such a norm as the "fully human person."

Although Maslow says that we "know that they [fully human persons] 'are,' but not 'how' they got that way,"⁶ he attempts a definition.

Full humanness is not only in terms of the concept human, i.e., the species norm, but it has also a descriptive, cataloguing, measurable, psychological definition arising from research and countless clinical observations.⁷

He then states under ten descriptive terms a definition of his "essential" man.⁸ The existence of many similar lists tends to support the claim that there is some concept in the mind of most clinicians of what constitutes the "fully human"

Hartman has given his definition in an unpublished paper. He says:

⁶Maslow, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 126. ⁸*Ibid.*, p. 127.

The "good" man is the one who can say, "I am the one I am." And this is precisely the property I have to fulfill--I am I. Now strangely enough I find that when Moses asked God his name he answered: "I am I, I am the one I am, Yahweh." The definition showed me that I am made in the image of God.⁹

In another place, Hartman gives us an introduction to the axiology of G. E. Moore, who pointed out the importance of seeing value--or the good--not as the descriptive quality of a thing but as a thing in itself. Hartman declares Moore's thesis as

good is good and not another thing. Most philosophers from Plato on have mixed goodness up with "good" things.¹⁰

The difficulty arises when Moore admits that he doesn't know just what goodness is--"goodness only knows." Hartman resolves the problem. "Good," he says, is not even the definitive adjective we normally think it to be of particular things. If one were to say: "I have a good car outside in the street; go find it!" the task would be impossible. He concludes:

Good is a property not of objects but of concepts. One knows little of a thing in question but he must know something of the concept of which the thing is a particular instance. . . . A thing is "good" when it fulfills the definition of its concept.¹¹

⁹Quoted by Clark E. Moustakas, "Moral and Ethical Values in Education and Therapy" (address to the Merrill-Palmer Institute, Detroit, Michigan, May, 1961), p. 2. (Mimeographed.)

¹⁰Robert S. Hartman, "The Science of Value," in Maslow, *New Knowledge in Human Values*, p. 20.

This definition becomes for Hartman the axiom upon which the whole structure of his axiology is built. And it can be, but the big question remains of who is to finally formulate the definition of the concept. There is no final criteria available for the concept "more fully human." If such a "norm" could be established, one could agree to Hartman's science of values and the validity of his mathematical formulae to express the same. But the ultimate difficulty which confronts the individual who is trying to find himself, the clinician who is attempting to understand and help him, and the scientist who is attempting to formulate his axiology is, "what, finally, is 'essential humanity'?" The answers are as varied and many as those who make the attempt.

This lack of consensual validation of a norm for "essential man" constitutes one of the major problems for a theory of values.

Individual "Essence." One resolution of the problem has been the insistence of many theorists that every man is free to become himself. The "I am-ness" principle stated above by Hartman and the discussion of the peculiar "identity" of every man has emphasises this point. But this raises the same problem in respect to the question of who decides what is the "essence" of the particularity of each individu-

¹¹*Ibid.*

al. Maslow thinks that it is "true that the person himself does not know this."¹² Dewey and many others would say that the person himself is the only one who does. Dewey's realm of values or ideals is formulated by the projection of the individual's existential stance onto the "possible." Growth is the process of striving to realise that potential. It is his own "imaginative projection" from the existent to the "essence."

Maslow's thinking might be coloured by his experimental experience with good and bad choosers, but his conclusion was that the good choosers could even choose better for the bad choosers than the bad choosers could choose for themselves.

Well, who does the choosing of the individual's "essential" self, and by what final criterion is the good chooser to be determined? Another problem for the axiologist.

Realistic Selfhood Goals. It seems to be widely accepted by clinicians that there is a significant correlation between those who are able to choose realistic goals and the mental health of such persons. In this sense, each man is his own chooser. This is significant for a theory of human values.

¹²Maslow, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

According to Buhler, Hartman stresses the importance of the therapist taking into account the individual existent when holding up norms, either as goals striven for or as criteria by which health status is to be judged.

I stress that no satisfactory definition of ego strengths or weaknesses is feasible without taking into account the nature and maturational stage of the ego apparatuses [involved].¹³

Although Buhler notes that the "idea of potentials in terms of limitation is objectionable to some therapists,"¹⁴ she advocates their use. The phenomenal self seems to be "the function of the ego setting up goals as a result of the ego's outlook on reality."¹⁵

To the extent that goals are chosen unrealistically, so will the striving after their realisation be detrimental to psychic health. One cannot fail to be impressed with Horney's thinking concerning the conflicts (and, it is granted, the motivation to growth) between the idealised, actual and real selves. Freud's conclusions concerning the "superego" and its destructive "unrealistic" demand also come into focus on this question.

There are, then, these variables: The existent status of the individual which indicates to some extent what is a realistic selfhood goal; the relation of that individu-

¹³Buhler, *op. cit.*, p. 170. ¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 171.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 81.

al goal to something like Maslow's "more fully human" person as the norm--the concept of the species; the ability of the individual to choose his goal realistically; and the relative health status of the individual indicating his ability to strive for the goal--aided or unaided. Add to these the variables resident in the therapist who has to decide who is a healthy or neurotic person and to what degree; whether the individual goals are realistic or not for the individual and close enough to the societal norm for integration; what part his own value theory plays in his judgment of the above, and one can only begin to imagine the problem that confronts the axiologist who attempts to formulate any system to satisfy all contingencies.

Essential Needs and Existential Wants. There is a further complication inherent in this tension between the actual and the essential nature of man. It is the common difficulty man experiences in attempting to differentiate between his "needs" and his "wants." Some authorities have attempted to make a distinction between "value" and "valuation";¹⁶ between "values" and "needs";¹⁷ or between "demands and "desires."¹⁸ The attempt serves to indicate these

¹⁶Kurt Goldstein, "Health as Value," in Maslow, *New Knowledge in Human Values*, p. 179.

¹⁷Buhler, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

salient features of the human situation. Buhler is certain that some people are unable to clarify for themselves what they want more than anything else in the world. Nor are they able to establish a clear hierarchy of values. Nor are they able to distinguish between needs and wants--essential needs and existential wants. This adds to the tension.

Henry Margenau makes a further distinction. He identifies "factual" value and "normative" value.

Factual values are the observable preferences, appraisals and desires of concrete people at concrete times.
 . . . Normative values are the ratings . . . which people ought to give to value objects.²⁰

The same authority says that it is a unique but common error to mistake what is prevalent for what is normative. This is a live tension for the axiologist.

When Gordon Allport makes this same distinction, he introduces the terms "demand" and "desire." He uses a graphic illustration of some Vermont dairy farmers.²¹ Half of them lived up the hill from the railway station and the other half down the hill. A feud developed, until an im-

¹⁸Gordon W. Allport, "Normative Compatibility in the Light of Social Science," in Maslow, *New Knowledge in Human Values*, p. 140.

¹⁹Buhler, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

²⁰Henry Margenau, "The Scientific Basis of Value Theory," in Maslow, *New Knowledge in Human Values*, p. 39.

²¹Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

passee was reached, around the "demand" of both factions to load their milk first. The situation was resolved by a differentiation between the "demand" to be first and the real underlying *desire* not to have their milk spoilt through delay in loading. One Saturday afternoon combined labor force doubled the length of the loading platform and the basic desire of both parties was met. An early and clear differentiation between "need" and "want" would have averted the impasse. The traditional difficulty man experiences in being able to make this differentiation between the "essential needs" and his "existential wants" is a major contributory to the problems of the axiologist.

SOME SUGGESTED RESOLUTIONS

Any attempt to negate the distinction between man's actual existence and his potential essential being is repulsed by man and discredited by the facts. Man refuses to be persuaded that all he can do is to accept his finitude with courage. He will not or cannot "de-cathect" or cauterise his superego. If the human organism did just that--accept its present state and ignore the urge to be something more and better--it would also succeed in destroying that which is the peculiarly "human" dimension in man. To be striving after the "could be," even prompted by the "ought," is the very principle of growth and life. It is the motivation of the flesh and the teleology of spirit.

It is affirmed that man is meant to be more than his present existence, and that the motivation which sends him on the quest of his essential self may be trusted. In the previous chapter it is suggested that tension may be resolved by an appeal to the principle of hierarchy. The same principle applies here. "Essence" takes precedence over "existence."

What is the significance of this for the therapeutic encounter?

Goals and Goal-Seeking. The illustration of man's goal-setting and goal-seeking is relevant to the existence-essence tension. Goal setting is resident in the superego, self-ideal, the idealised self of Freud, Adler, and Horney, or in the imaginative projection of the realm of the ideal for Dewey. Although he was fiercely denunciatory of the grasping after the "super-natural" unrealities of ideal projections, Dewey was more ready to differentiate the destructive and the creative functions therein than were some of the other authorities.²²

The first thing existence-essence tension must take account of is that goal-setting and goal striving are valid functions of the human organism. The image of an "idealised self," whatever it may be particularly termed, is more than

²²See *infra*, pp. 271 ff.

likely the actual self's healthy envisagement of its essential self. The sense of the necessity to eliminate the discrepancy between actual and ideal becomes the motivation of goal striving. Buhler claims that goal setting is a normal and not necessarily a neurotic trait. She notes the danger of the claim that the *telos* (end goal) of the human organism is to maintain a functioning balance.

. . . homeostasis is not a goal but only a condition of functioning. The goal always lies beyond the here and now of homeostasis.²³

In distinction from Freud's superego and Horney's idealised self, Buhler names the "phenomenal self" as the source of the goal setting and striving function. The phenomenal self is the servant of the ego. She says:

The phenomenal self is a function of the ego which seems to set up goals as a result of the ego's outlook on reality.²⁴

So it is stated that goal setting and goal striving are necessary and healthy functions of the human psyche, as necessary to life as growth, and that although their manifestations may stimulate, in certain circumstances, neurotic and psychotic reactions, such cases must be seen as the neurotic disproportion of a healthy and normal attribute. Existential striving after essential being is a principle of growth. Tension between the two will be reduced when this

²³Buhler, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 81.

factor is recognised.

Essential Frustration. There is an inherent warning in the next point to be covered. It is as dangerous to attempt to invalidate the agents of essential being in the human psyche as it is to allow them to set unrealistic goals. We have been warned much concerning the latter, but little has been said of the former danger. We speak much concerning existential anxiety (*angst*). There is something worse and more destructive of psychic equilibrium which can be termed "essential frustration." The essential self through the superego--if we may attribute a positive side to Freud's term--is calling the actual or existent self to the goal it has set for itself. Whether this be illustrated in some specific particular from among current cultural mores like sexual morality or marriage fidelity, or higher scholastic grades, is not the point. Neither is it so important what part these have played--traditions and cultural mores--in the formulation of the goal. The important thing is that a goal has been set with sufficient significance to the particular self, so that it is held to be essential to self-esteem. It is very dangerous, therefore, for the therapist to reassure the patient that goals and goal striving in general are illegitimate.

Essential frustration occurs when the patient is encouraged to negate the essential urge to be something more.

He wouldn't be in the consulting room in the first place if his existent self would allow him to accept himself as he is. His anxiety is not assuaged, but is, in fact, driven deeper when he attempts to disregard what his essential being is saying to him from the depths. There may be distortions in the interpretations concerning the essential self, but disrespect for the essential urge will result in deeper repressions and symptom displacement.

Further, there is a logical inconsistency. To encourage someone to accept himself as he is is to ask him to accept not only his present existence, but also the presently felt call to be something else. This call is a very real part of his present self. These things can be illustrated in a number of ways. The expression of "significant surprise" is one way.

Significant Surprise. A young man comes to a therapist with the confession "I am a homosexual. Isn't that terrible?" The therapist may interpret the statement in either of two ways. He can take it as the patient's cry for help to face the situation threatening to overwhelm him; or he can interpret it as a plea from the patient for assurance that the situation isn't as terrible as he seems to think. Such an assurance, both therapist and patient feel, will assuage his destructive guilt feelings. In both events, the patient's negative thinking about the "terribleness" of the

homosexuality would be reduced by the therapist.

There seem to be two other possible interpretations. The first is that the cry is the final attempt of the goal-setting and -striving apparatus to obtain an ally in the therapist to support the essential being in its claim that the patient's existent character is non-acceptable to the patient himself and destructive of his congruity. Second, it can be the attempt of the patient to obtain the sanction from an authority figure to continue in what the patient uncomfortably feels is an illicit activity. This is the agency of tension reduction defences, and is often the case with respect to counseling in the pastorate, in view of the authority role given by the community to the minister as "keeper of the moral code."

What is the therapist's most suitable response? It has been generally supposed not to be in the best interests of the therapy encounter to express surprise or shock. In the face of genuine and realistic shame the advice is well taken. Such patients only need to be given courage and support to face criticism and other emergent consequences. Essential being through its agents is faithfully and healthfully fulfilling its task.

But there is an increasing number who do not have such feelings, whose cultural and moral relativity appears to have robbed them of any sensitivity to shame, and of any ability to diagnose the deep promptings of the essential

self. Their need is for clarification. Their only feeling is one of frustration in the face of the emotionally felt but intellectually non-analysed incompatibility. They almost yearn for genuine feelings of shame to indicate some guidelines out of the frustration. Unfortunately, guidelines and moral codes make for the possibility of guilt and shame, but the damage of these to character structure and personality development is nothing compared to what an individual and society will experience when it produces a generation who have been intimidated or romanced into excusing itself from the responsibility of structuring some standards of behaviour. To rob man of the sensitivities which produce feelings of shame and guilt is to destroy the distinction between *homo sapiens* and the animals. Man as a morally responsible being constitutes the highest form of known life. Who would desire to discredit this dignity and the functions which preserve it must proceed with caution. It seems as if the intellectual faculty can give no definition of his essential being, although at the emotional level its voice will not be stifled. When the therapist does not give his problem the respect the patient thinks it deserves, the latter experiences loss of self esteem and lack of confidence, because he himself has taken it so seriously. This contributes to the experience of "essential frustration." If the therapist tries initially to "de-cathect" the superego in its valid function in

this respect, the patient goes away less clear of the issues than before he came. He has been told by the authority figure that his existent problem is acceptable (or at least has not been given any indication of its non-acceptability), and yet the very reason he came in the first place is because his defence mechanisms would not allow him to accept the acceptability of his existent situation. Here is "essential frustration."

Acting on this theory, and feeling confident of the diagnosis of the situation, a counselor, when called to a woman who had just made her eighth suicide attempt, responded to her rhetorical question "I did a terrible thing, didn't I?" with "Yes, you did." Her eyes opened wide with surprise; after a moment she reached for his hand and said, "You're the first one who said that. It *is* pretty terrible, isn't it?" Her husband reports that she made her quickest recovery, and in the two years since has not had recourse to her favourite attention-gaining device. As likely as not, bizarre behaviour, and often confessions, are the cry to "please take me seriously!" A casual response or a negating one, on the part of the therapist, brings essential frustration.

The patient is frustrated in three ways. First, his actual self is not receiving the ego recognition it is crying for if the therapist does not show concern at the present

state of affairs. Second, the essential self is affronted if the actual self is acceptable to the therapist when the patient can't accept it himself. Third, if, by his casual approach or condoning remarks on the most extreme behaviour the patient can report or concoct, the therapist gives the impression that such activities are those of normality, the patient is frustrated in his attempt to find the basic structure of reality. Something tells him that this is bizarre and unacceptable behaviour. An authority figure seemingly encourages him to accept the opposite view. The significant other or therapist who says to a patient, verbally or non-verbally, "You are acceptable as you are," will beget the response--usually non-verbal--"But I don't want to be acceptable as I am. I can't accept myself or life like this. I want your help to become something else, not your acceptance of what I can't accept myself."

This facet of the essence-existence tension indicates to the skilled therapist a useful medium by which he can communicate acceptance and support for the patient by being appropriately surprised or seriously concerned at his confessions and behaviour.

Unrealistic Goals. Something needs to be said concerning the patient who has chosen unrealistic goals. Also, the question of the appropriate authorities or criterion for the discernment of the "realistic" and "unrealistic" quali-

fication needs to be examined. What happens, for instance, when a Roman Catholic comes for counseling whose neurosis is focused on the question of birth control? This would be the point where the above argument for "matched" patient and therapist would be relevant. A Roman Catholic therapist who has himself either been persuaded about the stand or resolved it in a mixed marriage would be the best possible referral. Either of these would be preferable to a Roman Catholic who had no respect for the authority or problem as such. He would more likely induce "essential frustration" under the above terms.

There is the real question, however, of unrealistic goals. There can be no doubt that the therapist has some responsibility to assist the patient in choosing realistic goals and interpreting the goal-choosing and goal-striving impulse. In view of the above contention concerning the validity and importance of the tension between the existent and the essential nature of man, the therapist must give due respect to the reality of the tyranny of the "ought." He will induce "essential frustration" by affirming that it has no validity. It is very real to the patient. Second, developing the best diagnostic skills, he must be able to decide what type of therapy approach is most suitable to help the patient choose and achieve more realistic goals. Insight counseling, analysis, supportive, ego-bolstering, didactic,

non-directive, or very directive counseling are among the rich resources of the available alternatives.

Depth Self-Acceptance. These are some suggestions towards a resolution of the existence-essence conflict as it applies to therapy. It is aimed at a type of depth self-acceptance. It is the validation of not only his existent self, but of his essential self as it is presented to him in the form of goals and ideals. Both his existent and essential self must cohere within this acceptance to form a consistent whole.

The tension is not reduced by the acceptance of the tension as such, but by the acceptance of the validity of the essential self and the assurance that the actual self is justified in taking it seriously. Further and perhaps most appropriate of all, the existent self needs the reassurance that it will receive assistance in making any serious and realistic attempt to satisfy the urges of the essential self. This will bolster self esteem, "de-cathect" the superego of its traumatic potency, and enable it to become an agent of health and growth towards a very alluring maturity.

This seems to point towards the state of the "more fully human" person. When he has become such a one, man may not have actualised his essential self, but at least he will have found its place in the scheme of things.

Perhaps this is all we can hope for just now.

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

Section 1 has surveyed some of the problems and suggested solutions of the would-be axiologist.

First, the problems of the axiologist are profoundly real. Any suggestion of an easy solution must be superficially founded. The reality of the problems and the difficulty of their solution is magnified rather than simplified by a deeper understanding of their ramifications.

Second, there is room for confidence, however, that, although we may not see much clarity in the formulation of science of value at present, there is a growing consciousness of its urgent necessity reflected by the widespread seriousness with which a variety of disciplines are applying their best resources and insights to the problem. The difficulty of a task has seldom deterred man in his investigations. On the contrary. It has usually stimulated him to greater effort. The formulation of a sound theory of value will be no exception.

The third significant undertone gleaned in this study is the indication by many authorities that the task of supplying some criteria for a theory of value is a most urgent one. It would be encouraging to know that this era went down in history as that one which reached the lowest point of man's uncertainty of his beliefs, and his beliefs about his beliefs, concerning himself. The age has the physical

power sufficient to self-destruction. It urgently needs the attendant intellectual, moral and spiritual power sufficient to self-perpetuation. This is the feeling which speaks with Sorokin when he says:

The moral transformation of our time, of man and the man-made universe, is the most urgent item on the agenda of our history.²⁵

It is to no less a task that this writing addresses itself. The end of the first stage of enquiry is concluded. There is a rich field of endeavour surrounding the problem, which encourages faith in the immediate future.

It is concluded, however, that this point of enquiry cannot be passed unless a pause is taken in which clearer views of the ontological intention for man as a being may be envisaged. Section 2 assumes that man is primarily a social being and that this conclusion contributes significantly to a particular doctrine of the nature of man (or personality theory) necessary to the satisfactory formulation of an axiology. Attention is now turned to an examination of the truth of this conclusion and its possible contribution to a resolution of the problem of values and valuation for man and his world.

²⁵Pitirim A. Sorokin, "The Powers of Creative Unselfish Love," in Maslow, *New Knowledge in Human Values*, p. 3.

SECTION 2

MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING

CHAPTER VI

ANXIETY AND THE SELF

Ontological Anxiety and Psychological Fear. Modern man is afraid of losing himself. This fear is motivated by many things. It expresses itself in various ways. The earlier Heidegger, for instance, identifies ontological anxiety. This is the anxiety resulting when beings ask the question, "Why are there beings and not, rather, nothing?" James M. Robinson interprets Heidegger on the matter thus:

Dasein is inevitably characterized by anxiety which is not fear of a specific danger but rather a vague dread in which the very givenness of beings seems to be a matter of course, and their contingency, the oddity that they are at all, is sensed. . . . Anxiety is not a fear of something but of nothing.¹

Tillich suggests that the whole question of being is projected by the problem of anxiety: "the question of being is produced by the shock of non-being."² He refers to this as the ontological question and notes that man alone of all existents is able to ask it. Man is the only anxious existent. He is caught in a trap. His ability to transcend his

¹James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (eds.), *The Later Heidegger and Theology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 18. See also Charles Hartshorne's comment on Kant's question "Why should I not have failed to exist?" (*Logic of Perfection* [La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1962], p. 96). Hartshorne's "dizzy feeling" response is a common one.

²Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), I, 186.

existence is also that faculty which enables him to formulate the question which produces ontological anxiety.

Man is able to take this standpoint because he is able to transcend every given reality. He is not bound to "beingness"; he can envisage nothingness; he can ask the ontological question.³

There is a second dimension to man's fear of losing himself which could be termed existential anxiety. This anxiety is best illustrated by the Heideggerian concept of "notness." According to Magda King,⁴ the key phrase in Heidegger is that of *es geht um*--it is at stake. What is at stake for man is his own existence. Man, as that being best conceived by Heidegger as Care (proper noun), can view his existence only from this standpoint. Care experiences the "at stake-ness" of the existent as such; immediately he is able to envisage the possibility of tomorrow for himself. The future holds equally for him the possibility of being or not being. Again man alone is capable of existential anxiety.

Understanding himself in the jeopardy of his being reveals to man that the being he stands to lose is solely and singly his and not another's. The "not" that can end his being threatens him alone in his own ability to be and so brings him into the uniqueness of a finite self.⁵

³*Ibid.*

⁴Magda King, *Heidegger's Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 48.

⁵*Ibid.*

When Tillich defines finitude as "being limited by non-being," we catch the basis of existential anxiety inherent in the fact of finitude itself. Existential anxiety is a major contributor to man's fear of losing himself.

There is another dimension to this fear. This is called ontic anxiety. Ontic refers to the essential individuality of the particular being under reference. It indicates the existent as such in all its radical particularity, and yet points beyond this particularity by pointing to the particular's participation in the universal. Man as a being among beings participates in being itself. It may be said that the ontic is that dimension which dissects the three dimensions linking the particular individual, through existence, with primal being.⁶ Ontic anxiety has to do with man's understanding of his own essential individuality. It is the fear he feels when he contemplates the possibility of not presently or ever realising his essential individuality. He experiences the intense compulsion to be himself and no one else. His ontic anxiety is his sense of the loss of the

⁶Heidegger's use of the terms ontic and *existenziell* is discussed by King (*ibid.*, p. 64). The present use is perhaps more closely associated with *existenziell* than ontic: e.g., "Heidegger uses the word *existenziell* primarily to characterize the understanding we each have of our concrete existence and of all that belongs to it." The term ontic is preferred in the present use because of the emphasis of the individual existent man as participant in being as a being (Heidegger's *Dasein* as discussed by King, *ibid.*, pp. 65 f.).

self he not yet is--or may not ever be.

Paul Tillich speaks of the omnipresent threat of non-being to being.⁷ The application of this threat to individuality is signified by Augustine when he takes the Platonic concept of non-being (*me on*) and calls it sin. Tillich goes further and claims that "non-being is experienced as the threat to being."⁸ Not only is man's ontic anxiety his fear of not realising his essential individuality, but now includes the fear of losing the actual individual being he has already attained. Although Tillich would protest, the threat of non-being interpreted as Augustinian sin which "resists and perverts being"⁹ seems best understood in terms of man's falling short of realising his essential individuality as described above. This is the root of ontic anxiety.

There is one other distinction of importance to make. Paul Tillich suggests it when he says:

The recovery of the meaning of anxiety through the combined endeavors of existential philosophy, depth psychology, neurology, and the arts is one of the achievements of the twentieth century. It has become clear that fear as related to a definite object and anxiety as awareness of finitude are two radically different concepts. Anxiety is ontological; fear psychological.¹⁰

It is obvious, as Tillich notes, that psychotherapy cannot remove ontological anxiety for the simple reason that it is

⁷Tillich, *op. cit.*, I, 190. ⁸*Ibid.*, p. 188.

⁹*Ibid.* ¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 190.

the corollary of finitude and psychotherapy cannot change the structure of finitude. He is confident, however, that it can

remove compulsory forms of anxiety and can reduce the frequency and intensity of fears. It can put anxiety "in its place."¹¹

It needs to be noted that the psychotherapist makes a further distinction. Karen Horney speaks of basic anxiety and neurotic fear. When she defines the former as "the feeling a child has of being isolated and helpless in a potentially hostile world,"¹² we see some connection with Tillich's anxiety above. In another place, however, she seems to mean that anxiety is the state of helplessness in face of danger, and that fear is a normal reaction without overwhelming and immobilising the experiencer.¹³ Maslow and Mittelmann note the distinctions that are commonly made, and divide them into two main categories.

Some think of it [anxiety] as a kind of by-product--an epiphenomenon that arises from the situation and floats over it like smoke over a battlefield; . . . with no more influence on the situation than the smoke. . . . But there are others who speak of anxiety in a dynamic sense, as an influence that starts things going . . . they include not only the introspection but also the neural and physiological processes which give rise to the anxiety.¹⁴

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²Karen Horney, *Our Inner Conflicts* (New York: Norton, 1945), p. 19.

¹³^KKaren Horney, *Our Inner Conflicts* (New York: 1945), p. 19.

¹⁴Karen Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* (New York:

These authors feel that the latter is the most justifiable use, and would indicate that the most common application of the terms today would be:

that fear is a reaction to something in the real world; anxiety is a reaction that seems unjustified or out of all proportion to the actual danger that is apparently involved.¹⁵

One is almost tempted to discard Heidegger's concept of Care as the description of man's being and substitute the psychotherapist's term Anxiety. Although that would be too extreme, there can be no doubt that the anxiety of psychotherapy is also aligned with man's fear of losing himself. Adler would say that it is the fear of having to admit his own inadequacy that causes man to strive to actualise his potential superiority. Freud would claim that anxiety is produced by the ego's struggle not to be overwhelmed by the instinctual drives of the id and the despotic demands of the superego; and Ruth Munroe would claim for Freud, Horney and Sullivan the generalisation that "the discomfort of anxiety *per se* is the dynamic factor"¹⁶ in psychic growth. Here is ample evidence from the vast resources of ontological con-

Norton, 1939), p. 195.

¹⁴Abraham H. Maslow and Béla Mittelmann, *Principles of Abnormal Psychology* (New York: Harper, 1951), p. 30.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶Ruth L. Munroe, *Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1955), p. 434.

cepts, clinician's theories and man's experience of man's fear of losing himself. The fear is fact.

This section pretends not only to supply some answers to this existential dilemma of man, but in the process establish something of a doctrine of the nature of man conducive to the argument and resolution of the theme of this total writing. First, it will make the twofold claim that the quest for himself (and so the fear of non-realisation) is a valid one, and it will affirm that the quest for himself is not the chief end of man. Second, it says that man is searching in the wrong direction for himself. He is looking in instead of out. He is looking down instead of up. Finally, this section suggests what the real end (*telos*) of man is, and confronts him with the fact that when he achieves that real end he is assured of having also found himself.

The Thesis. The avowed intention is the formulation of a view of the nature of man conducive to the resolution of the problem under consideration, namely, that of the tension between the absolute and the relative in theory of value as it pertains to the Christian educator and pastoral counselor. The question is, "What is that view of the nature of man congruous with the findings of contemporary scholarship on the matter, which is in accord with a Christian doctrine of man, and which contributes to the resolution

of the problem as stated?"

It is intended to convey at this point the impression that the anxiety which man intuitively feels as the fear of losing himself is likely to mislead him in his formulation of any doctrine of the nature of man. He might, for instance, be tempted to believe that his *telos*--the end and goal of his being--is to save, to find or seek himself. The thesis of this section is that this is not substantiated by modern, biblical, sacred or secular thinking, existential structures or ontological constructs, or by the very experience of man himself. Positively stated, the thesis is:

"The *telos* of man is relation." Man finds himself by entering relation. Man allays the fear of losing himself by risking what self he has in relation. Relation is not only within the realm of *homo sapiens*, but is to be seen as a construct of cosmic ramifications. For man to realise his ontic individuality, he must enter into such relation. To enter relation is not to lose individuality, but to gain it. Relation is highly respected by all the speculative and behavioural sciences, but usually as a means to the end of individuality. The order is here reversed to affirm that the real *telos* is relation and, to the extent that man becomes a relational being, so is the degree to which he attains his individuality as the accident of relation, and not *vice versa*.

By way of recapitulation, it is noted that this writing questions Professor Tillich's construct of the polar elements of being, and suggests that his concept of polar elements describes, not the ontological elements of being but, rather, diagnoses the ambivalent tensions which exist within what man has recognised as his existential predicament.¹⁷ Tillich's discernment in diagnosis is accurate, but his assumption that the tensions are as equal as they are opposite is not. This is the point of contention. To satisfy this thesis, if Tillich's terms are to be used, it must be that participation is the primary element of being, and individualisation is the accident of universality. It would appear that similar conclusions could be drawn with the other two pairs of Tillich's elements. Fortunately, that is another subject.

Further to the contention that no two poles of an ambivalent tension are equal and opposite, this work has been undertaken in the conviction that the present trend of society is more strongly attracted to the pole of individualisation, and that the only end for such a trend is infinite frustration, unless the society be recalled. The subject matter of this section is concerned with the philosophy of Christian education and pastoral counseling, and in these

¹⁷*Supra*, p. 53.

disciplines and their theological foundations the writer finds exciting possibilities for that recall.

Further, it is believed that in the biblical injunction of "whoever would save his life will lose it; and whoever loses his life for my sake and the gospel's [in relation?] will save it"¹⁸ is to be found the Christian confirmation of the thesis, as well as the resolution of the ambivalent tension between individualisation and participation. Within these New Testament guidelines Christian education and pastoral counseling may expect to find firmer foundations for the formulation of a doctrine of man more adequate to the contemporary situation.

Finally, believing that truth has never left itself without a witness, and that a unity of being would necessitate some congruence of facets of truth wherever they reveal themselves, this section seeks to understand and unite such facets drawn from the three disciplines (philosophy, psychology, and theology) having the closest relation with Christian education and pastoral counseling today. It is hoped that the result is at least the promise of such a unity.

The Topology. Theology is represented by Emil Brunner, the Swiss theologian whose median theology separates the neo-orthodox extremes of Barth and Bultmann, and who, because

¹⁸Mark 8:35.

his biblical theology orients itself around the religious perspective of the God-man relation, makes him the obvious representative of his discipline.

Martin Buber, renowned for his philosophy of relation, is the obvious choice as the representative of philosophy. It is Buber's "the extended lines of relation meet in the Eternal Thou" which suggests the topology of this section. Although the whole range of inter-psychic and intra-psychic relationships will be examined, according to Buber none of them have any significance apart from their meeting in extension and reflecting in essence their participation in the Eternal Thou. More of this later. Buber is the philosopher.

In the main, Harry Stack Sullivan is the relational psychologist. To find a single theorist in psychotherapy to represent the entire field and fulfill the requirement of being able to enter into dialogue with the theologian and the philosopher has proved impossible. Harry Stack Sullivan is the obvious choice from among the interpersonal psychologists as such, but it has been necessary to augment his work with other writers for a number of reasons. First, he was not a writing psychologist, and there is, in effect, only one book published by him. Even when he does write, his style is terse and often obscure.¹⁹ Second, he does not use

¹⁹Patrick Mullahy, *Oedipus, Myth and Complex* (New York: Grove Press, 1948), p. 279.

any religious frame of reference sufficient for the needs of this conversation and, in particular, for Chapter XI. Paul Johnson and Fritz Kunkel are the secondary authorities, with Alfred Adler seeming to hover in the background most of the time. It is nevertheless intended that Harry Stack Sullivan be considered the main representative, not only because he is the most noted and modern of the school, but because

Harry Stack Sullivan . . . brought his ideas to a higher level of conceptualization and consequently has been a more persuasively influential theorist . . .²⁰

than any other in the area of interpersonal psychology.

The first chapter is an introduction to the terms and thought of the three authorities, while the following chapters present the main argument in support of the thesis, and the final chapter (XI) draws some interim implications of the thesis for Christian education and pastoral counseling.

One last word is necessary. Although the attempt is to effect a *crasis*²¹ between the three disciplines treated

²⁰Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, *Theories of Personality* (New York: Wiley, 1957), p. 115.

²¹*Crasis* is a Greek word meaning a mingling, mixing, compounding or blending. It is not found in the New Testament as such, but is common to classical Greek usage. In grammar its function is similar to elision. When a word is compounded of two others, *crasis* takes place in the form of a vowel change, two vowels become a long one, or a letter may be dropped (Henry G. Liddell and Robert Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951], I, 391; also Friedrich W. Blass and Albert Debrunner, *Greek Grammar of the New Testament* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961], pp. 11, 257). This word is used rather than "synthe-

in this section it is also necessary to state a radical difference which divides them. Brunner as theologian is distinct. The other two approaches may affirm that man progresses towards his *telos* along a steadily inclined scale of development. Not so Brunner. There is for him a radical discontinuity in the lines of relation which extend from man to God. It is only by the divine initiative and grace that man can make the "leap of faith" (Kierkegaard) across that otherwise unbridgeable chasm and enter into relation with the Eternal Thou, and through Him to all other relation.²²

Perhaps it can be said that the peculiar contribution of psychology to this discussion on the nature of man is its anthropocentric starting point--*sitz im Leben*--while on the other hand is the theocentric one of theology. It may be said these represent the extremes in the discussion, while

sis" because crisis allows the former identity of the contracting parties to remain. Synthesis does not necessarily allow this and more likely effects a union in which such identity is lost. As a major point of the present discussion is that identity is not lost in union, so the identity of the three disciplines is respected and for pragmatic reasons preserved.

²²This is a very important distinction within the matter and will be seen as most significant to the total discussion in Chapter XI. At this point it is noted in fairness to the theologian and perhaps in anticipation of some of the final conclusions. It is not of major emphasis in this section because the purpose of the present discussion is to find what consensus and unity exist within these three disciplines. The concern here is with points of agreement rather than those of difference.

the philosophy of Buber is in the syncretistic position. This may be the reason that more than once the philosopher seems to become the major focus of attention.

At least we start with him.

CHAPTER VII

THE LANGUAGE OF RELATION

THE TWO-FOLD WORLD OF MAN

Existence is relation. Martin Buber has it that the world of man is the "two-fold world of relation." Buber uses this term in a peculiar way and is not referring to William James' claim that every individual dichotomises his universe: in the direct awareness of living, the self becomes half of the world it perceives.¹ Buber is speaking rather of the possible two-fold attitude man may have towards his world. The two-fold world is structured according to a two-fold attitude which is expressed by the utterance of one of two "primary words."² Primary words intimate the particular relation of a man with his world. "Primary words do not signify things, but they intimate relations."³

¹William E. Hocking, *The Self* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928), p. 7. Hocking concurs with James.

²The fascinating influence of Linguistic Analysis on biblical scholarship and theology is noted and relevant to Buber's point. The uttering of the "primal word" becomes something of the reality for which it stands, e.g., "The meaning of a word is identical with its use," in the work of Paul M. Van Buren, *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 16.

³Martin Buber, *I and Thou* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 3.

I-Thou and I-It. The two primary words are "I-Thou" and "I-It." Each primary word is a compound word in the singular. "I" and "Thou" are not two entities. A primary word is in the singular because that which it expresses is a unity. It is the unity of relation. The "I" and the "Thou" become peculiarly co-joined. This merging of the plural into the singular of relation is common to both primary words. It needs to be noted, however, that there is a world of difference in depth and meaning between the uttering of "I-Thou" and "I-It." Both are in the singular of relation, but only the "I-Thou" can remain in the singular without separation. The "I-It" is in danger of breaking the relation because in this utterance self and world become mere objects--"its"--without subjective cognition or response on the part of either. Total lack of cognition and response is not possible, but when "I-Thou" is attempted to be uttered by less than the "whole" being, it has degenerated to the "I-It." The word of separation has been spoken.

The philosophy of Dürer is not easy to follow at this point and, as the significance of the difference between the two primary words will be examined later, nothing further will be said at this stage. One can readily observe, however, that for Dürer man and his world are in the indissoluble union of relation. Whatever man's attitude to his

world, he is bound to it in relation. He is presented with two alternatives, but both lead to relation. There is no other way. Relation is given, but on his choice between the alternatives of "I-Thou" and "I-It" rests man's destiny.

This is the language of Buber. It is the language of relation.

THE TRUTH WILL SET YOU FREE

This New Testament injunction provides the guidelines for the theology of Brunner. The quest for truth is as old as man himself. The truth of Brahma-Atman for the Hindu Brahmin brings the release from *maya*, and the peace of *nirvana*. From the famous "Know Thyself" to the modern search for "Self Identity," the quest has been the same. Through his history, man has sought for the secret of life; the truth concerning himself and his environment which would bring the fulfilment of his being. Such fulfilment, he intuited, was possible but rarely actualised. Try as he might to mythically "grasp" it, no language could hold it. Pilate's question, "What is truth?" has been a perennial one.

The personification of this truth for the Christian theologian is Jesus Christ. Here is truth. This is the truth which sets men free.⁴ How is this truth apprehended?

⁴Note the comment of Van Buren: "The Christian Gospel is the news of a free man who did not merely challenge

It is known only in relation. Truth is not discovered in a subject-object transmission of knowledge. The truth which sets men free is found in face-to-face encounter. Man can only know the truth about himself and his world in relation. Communication of such truth is not communication of "something," but of "someone." Brunner establishes this premise as the basis for his whole theology. There has always been the danger of the "subjective-objective antithesis" on the part of truth seekers. The Church has not been free from the error of objectifying the faith in dogma and creeds, and the subjectifying of the believer as mere subscriber to such objects of faith. According to Brunner, this erroneous doctrine is the reason for the failure of the Church in many instances to communicate truth.

Brunner's "faith-knowing" epistemology is conceived within the framework of the "divine-human" relation, but is prepared to admit that "the analogy is to be found in the encounter between human beings, the meeting of person with person."⁵

men to become free; he set men free" (Van Buren, *op. cit.*, p. 169), and his interesting concept of the freedom of Jesus as that "being-for-others" experience which became Easter for the Disciples. Van Buren quotes Bonhoeffer's words as suggestive in this respect. "The experience of transcendence is Jesus' being-for-others" (*ibid.*, p. 132). Transcendence is synonymous with freedom.

⁵Emil Brunner, *The Divine-Human Encounter* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1943), p. 85.

Further understanding of Brunner's language of relationship calls for the clarification of some terms associated with the relational theology of this scholar. These terms are: "divine-human encounter" and "principle of personal correspondence."

The Divine-Human Encounter is the title of one of Emil Brunner's most popular works, and the term has been commonly attributed to him. It is the present writer's conviction that the term is not an adequate vehicle to convey the more significant concepts of the theologian, and does not properly convey the meaning of "relationship" as interpreted by him. A good cause may be made in support of the contention that it is not even a Brunnerian term. In the said book it is only used once, and is not listed in the index of same or any other writings of this scholar. When Brunner uses the term it is to emphasise the divine confrontation of man, or the divine initiation in the relation between God and man. This, it is conceded, is a very important theme of Brunner's, but he uses other terms than that one under review to elaborate upon it.

The objection to the term is noted merely to draw attention to a distinction, fine but significant, in Brunner's theology of relation. The objection is based on three different aspects. The first is that the term "encounter"

connotes a much stronger emphasis on the spasmodic, periodic, confrontative meeting, rather than the continuous relation which is the peculiar emphasis of the theologian. The second reason for objection is that the term "encounter" emphasises the divine initiative in the meeting more than Brunner intends. The thesis of the above book is precisely that a continuing relation from man's side, as from the divine side, is the very basis of truth perception. The theologian speaks to the point himself. Although in every relation one partner must take the initiative, "it is a two-sided happening . . . and the 'yes' of man is as precisely necessary as the 'yes' of God."⁶ In the third place, the term "divine-human encounter" has the nuances of a "once for all" event, which is not the connotation of the theologian's language of relation.

Personal Correspondence is the term which Brunner uses. It is listed as being used over thirty times in his book, *The Divine-Human Encounter*. Indeed, the avowed thesis of the book is that the principle of personal correspondence is the only medium of truth. It will be readily appreciated that this term communicates more precisely what the theologian is intending to convey concerning a continuing relation. Some of the deeper implications of this continuing relation

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 148.

will be examined at a later stage, when the principle of personal correspondence will be more thoroughly explored.

In the meantime, this is the language of Brunner, and it is a language of relation.

RELATION OR DEATH⁷

This graphic comment of Professor Eitzen expresses the conviction of an increasing number who are both clinically and theoretically concerned with the study of the normal, and the cure of the abnormal, personality. The definition of personality according to Sullivan shows good reason why his theory has become known as "dynamic inter-personalism."

Personality is the relatively enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations which characterize a human life.⁸

Patrick Mullahy interprets Sullivan as asserting the organism's thorough-going dependence upon its environment for survival.

If we could be absolutely isolated from the physical and mental world in which we have our being, our life on earth would be a matter of minutes. . . . The process

⁷David D. Eitzen (lecture, Southern California School of Theology, Fall semester, 1962).

⁸Harry Stack Sullivan, *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry* (New York: Norton, 1953), p. 110. Also note that the dynamic interpersonalism of this school has come under some criticism. Charlotte Buhler sums it up by asking the question, "Where is the Individual?" (*ibid.*, p. 65).

of becoming a person is synonymous with the process of acculturation with the "significant others" or their surrogates.⁹

In support of "dynamic interpersonalism," Paul Johnson declares that "the desire for a basic relationship remains the primary need of human life."¹⁰ Johnson would add further that such relationship is so essential that "if a person is disappointed in one relationship, he is likely to seek more ardently for another significant relationship,"¹¹ and that if no such satisfactory relationship is established, "it is simple for the . . . pathological case through many disappointments to pass beyond the point of no return."¹² Commenting on the damage done to the developing personality by relationships, Sullivan makes his now famous statement which he has heard from the lips of so many victims of neurosis, namely: "Once upon a time everything was lovely, but that was before I had to deal with people."¹³ Both of these men are impressed with the mounting evidence of the disintegrating effect of loneliness (lack of meaningful relation)

⁹Patrick Mullahy, *Oedipus, Myth and Complex* (New York: Grove Press, 1948), p. 280.

¹⁰Paul E. Johnson, *Personality and Religion* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1957), p. 129.

¹¹*Ibid.* Note also Johnson's use of the Sullivan term "significant" here as the indication of the widening influence of the "dynamic interpersonalism" of our main authority.

¹²*Ibid.* ¹³Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

of the developing personality. Sullivan gives a great deal of attention to loneliness and, in disagreement with Freud, states:

If one overlooks his experience with loneliness he might well think that lust is the most powerful dynamism in interpersonal relations.¹⁴

Johnson goes so far as to say that "separation is exactly what death means to a living person."¹⁵

This is the strong language of relation.

Harry Stack Sullivan has made an unusual contribution of terms to the language of relation. It is necessary to note some of these by way of introduction. Others will benefit from a fuller examination at a later stage.

The Participant Observer is a term coined by Sullivan and now widely used to express the empathic relationship of the counselor to the counselee. The connotation is much wider than this for Sullivan. It is the role played by the parent towards the child; the teacher towards the pupil; the priest towards the parishioner; if any meaningful, productive and helpful relationship is to result. The psychiatrist, if he is to be therapeutic at all, must enter into a relation with his patient, and not merely observe the facts of the case from "atop ivory towers."¹⁶ Sullivan will go so

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 266. ¹⁵Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

¹⁶Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

far as to state in one of his papers:

The theory of interpersonal relations lays great stress on the method of participant observation, and relegates data obtained by other methods to, at most, a secondary importance. This in turn implies that skill in face-to-face, or person-to-person, psychiatric interview is of fundamental importance.¹⁷

This is the language of relation.

The Significant Others is another relational term used by Sullivan. The "self-system"¹⁸ of any personality involves at its most fundamental level a number of significant others. In the development of the personality they play a most strategic role. We will discuss later that it is at this point where Johnson, in addition to Buhler, criticises Sullivan for not giving enough emphasis to the "I" as an individual entity in the developmental process. But this is the language of Sullivan. In the early stages of personality development the most significant other is mother. Then follow in a varying hierarchy parents, family, friends, then teachers or employers or other authority figures. In later life they become husband or wife, one's own children and intimates. According to Sullivan, significant others inhere in any "self-system." Any understanding of self is

¹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 380-81.

¹⁸Equivalent to "person" in Sullivan. One cannot help notice here the presence of the Adlerian concept of "personalized subjective self system" (*supra*, p. 48).

dependent on an adequate understanding of that self's "significant others."

The Surrogate is another important concept in Sullivan's theory. He attaches great importance to the effect of mother surrogate in the prototaxic¹⁹ period of development. The surrogate in this early period of life is not merely a substitute by transference, but rather any other person who performs "the mothering functions"²⁰ and who in the prototaxic experience is undifferentiated from the mother. Such a person--nurse or sibling--becomes a part of the "mother" to the child. If there is any contradiction between the relationship to one person and that to the other, then the basic security of the child, who "knows" these two as one, is threatened, and a degree of anxiety induced. Sullivan would give greater attention to this phenomenon as that which has greater effect on the developing personality than the "wonderful array of rumor and data . . . of an inscrutably complex heredity"²¹ which is usually compiled in the attempt to understand neurosis. The maturing personality, in recognition of the need for an authority figure to replace that of a healthy parent relationship, will appoint a

¹⁹This term will be dealt with later. It is the earliest state of euphoric and undifferentiating experience of a new baby.

²⁰Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p. 115. ²¹*Ibid.*, p. 114.

surrogate for this purpose. Erik H. Erikson has given a classic example of this in the story of *Young Man Luther*. Although Erikson considers that the young Luther suffered from a father-figure complex, in later life he was able to take his spiritual mentor, Dr. Staupitz, as his surrogate.²² The difference between a "surrogate" and the Freudian "father figure" appears to be in the validity of the former and the invalidity of the latter. It would appear also that the surrogate, as Sullivan envisages it, is not necessarily a substitute for any other significant other, but a natural and valid relationship of support and intimacy necessary for healthy personality development.

This is the language of Sullivan. It is the language of relation.

²²Erik H. Erikson, *Young Man Luther* (New York: Norton, 1958), p. 37.

CHAPTER VIII

RELATION AND SELF

It is relation from which the self evolves and to which it returns. This is the necessary process before the self can become truly itself. It is the thesis of this chapter. The chapter will also affirm that at those points of its development where the self would seek or cling to itself, apart from relation, it is risking the loss of itself. This is in contradiction of the concept that "one must first learn to love oneself, and then he may love others."¹ Respect is paid to the subtleties of this conclusion, but the proposition of this chapter is that the premise and structures of this narcissism are fallacious. The following is part of the attempt to substantiate the contention.

THE SELF

It would appear that from the bliss of birth to the maturity of old age, it is relation which precedes the forming of the self, and not the forming of the self which precedes the relation. The immediate reaction to such a contention is the thought that the process is surely a comple-

¹Paul E. Johnson, *Personality and Religion* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1957), p. 226.

mentary one of interaction between the self and its environment. Paul Johnson may be called upon for some clarification. He says:

Personality is an intricate system of relationships whose focal center is a conscious "I" (Person), the subject of the experience . . . and this theory of personality we call "dynamic interpersonalism."²

It is noted that Johnson here distinguishes between "person" and "personality." It is not easy to discover which of these Johnson would equate with the "self" as an organismic entity. It cannot be the "I" he distinguishes as "person," because this appears by his later definition to be nothing more than the conscious perceiving "I" at the centre of a four directional dynamic field of personality. We will return to Johnson's graph of personality in a moment.

The term "dynamic interpersonalism" which Johnson uses above is clearly that of Sullivan. It is the term Sullivan coined to describe his "self-system." Here again some difficulty is encountered in discovering whether Sullivan is prepared to distinguish the "self" as an organismic entity from its immediate environment of relation. It is precisely at this point that even Johnson, who clearly classes himself as an interpersonal psychologist, would criticise Sullivan for not giving sufficient respect to the

²*Ibid.*, p. 233.

"inner content of the person"³ as that which is able to enrich and enlarge the events which take place within the dynamic field of relation. It is an open question whether this is a fair criticism or not. Hall and Lindzey suggest that, to Sullivan, the distinction made between "person" and "personality" is not one relevant to the study of the human organism. They interpret Sullivan as believing that:

Personality is a hypothetical entity which cannot be isolated from interpersonal behavior, and interpersonal behavior is all that can be observed as personality.⁴

Sullivan was not intending that his view of personality be taken to be a formula or a methodology in the study of the human organism.

It is vacuous, Sullivan believes, to speak of the individual as the object of study because the individual does not and cannot exist apart from his relations with other people.⁵

³*Ibid.*, p. 235. Also note the interesting point made in Paul Tournier's *The Meaning of Persons* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957) when he makes the distinction between "person" as the real self, and the personage as the public self and that it is well nigh impossible to separate the two. "Our personage clings to our person by dint of long schooling which has made us what we are" (p. 33), is how he puts it in one place, and in another, "Life, the Spirit, the Person are not substantial realities which we can hold in our hands . . . we cannot reach the person either by means of introspection or by objective study" (p. 119). Tournier has a solution other than these two latter alternatives and with which this writing agrees.

⁴Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, *Theories of Personality* (New York: Wiley, 1957), p. 134.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 135.

It would appear then that Sullivan cannot be forced to make any distinction between Johnson's "person" and "personality," and it is certainly true that he does not ever speak of the "I" or the "ego," or even the "self," as an entity, but ever persists in referring to the "self-system." To a study of this term attention is now given.

The Self-System, for Sullivan, "is a dynamic center of various processes which occur in a series of interpersonal fields."⁶ The three principal processes are called dynamisms, personifications, and cognitive processes. Each of these processes can be examined to support the thesis of this chapter.

The Dynamism of personality is the cell, the ultimate entity or the smallest useful unit which may be employed in the study of the self-system. Sullivan's definition is:

the relatively enduring pattern of energy transformations which recurrently characterize the organism in its duration as a living organism.⁷

A habit is the best observable phenomenon of a dynamism. Both overt and covert behaviour are included in Sullivan's definition. In both cases, however, whether overt and pub-

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 137.

⁷Harry Stack Sullivan, *Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry* (New York: Norton, 1953), p. 103.

lic, or covert and private, "the dynamisms which are distinctively human in character are those which characterize one's interpersonal relations."⁸ For instance, if a child is afraid of strangers or the unknown, this is a dynamism of fear; if one seeks out promiscuous relations, this is a dynamism of lust; habitual hunger could be the dynamism of greed. Hall and Lindzey note that:

A dynamism usually employs a particular zone of the body, such as the mouth, the hands, the anus and the genitals, by means of which it interacts with its environment.⁹

It is suggested here, however, that the dynamism not only employs these means of interaction, but that indeed it is the interaction upon which the dynamism depends for its very development. For instance--

when the nipple is brought to the baby's mouth it stimulates the sensitive membrane of the lips which discharges impulses along nerve pathways to the motor organs of the mouth which produce sucking movements.¹⁰

The question may be posed whether the baby would suck without the initial nipple environment stimulation. Many a mother testifies to the initial difficulty encountered in nursing the newborn infant until the instinctual hunger pangs have *once* experienced their relief by the sucking-nipple relationship. It needs to be stated that Sullivan's

⁸Hall and Lindzey, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

⁹*Ibid.* ¹⁰*Ibid.*

"dynamisms" are not to be equated with "instincts." The instincts may be served by the dynamisms, and the dynamisms receive their impulse from the instincts, but the behaviour patterns of personality, peculiar to each personality and which "create" each different personality, are the "signs" of dynamisms. Therefore the dynamism of greed could hardly have evolved if environment and organism had not combined in the experience of the first hunger satisfaction. Nor would the dynamism of lust or fear have developed in a personality unless the instincts of sex and preservation had found expression in relation for the first time. This dynamism, it is contended, could not have existed apart from relation.

Personifications. This is the second term Sullivan used to identify a process in personality structure. By this Sullivan means the image that

an individual has of himself or another person. It is a complex of feelings, attitudes, and conceptions that grow out of experiences of need-satisfaction and anxiety.¹¹

The primary personification is that of the mothering agent. The conflict that arises when two inconsistent persons fulfill this function in early childhood has already been noted. Personifications arise from relationships. If the

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 139.

interpersonal relation is a satisfactory one contributing to the state of euphoria, then the personification is of "good-mother" and of "good-me." If the opposite is the case and anxiety is produced, then the personification is of "bad-mother" and "bad-me." The importance of the extremes of anxiety and euphoria in personality development will be developed at a later stage. Sufficient to note here that the self-system in experiencing these personifications learns to shrink from anxiety states and to gravitate towards euphoria states. According to Sullivan, if in infancy the developing self-system is not able to handle these conflicting personifications (too numerous contradictory agents or too much anxiety-producing personifications), then they are likely to develop "the peculiarly inefficient and inappropriate interpersonal relations which constitute problems of mental disorder"¹² in later life.

Here again is to be seen the important function relation plays in the process of developing the "self-system."

The Cognitive Processes. These are the third in Sullivan's series. According to Hall and Lindzey, Sullivan makes a unique contribution in his postulation of the three modes of cognition. They are the Prototaxic, the Parataxic and the Syntaxic.

¹²Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

The Prototaxic mode is the earliest "experience" of the newborn infant. According to Mullahy this is the mode in which

all the infant "knows" is momentary states, the "before" and "after" being a later acquirement [and] . . . the infant vaguely feels or "prehends" earlier and later stages without realizing any serial connection between them.¹³

Sullivan's own definition is that it "may be regarded as the discrete series of momentary states of the sensitive organism."¹⁴ Hall and Lindzey find the parallel to this mode in William James' "stream of consciousness."¹⁵ It is the state of raw sensation when self and other than self are undifferentiated in the primitive "blob" of mere sensate being.¹⁶ It is the state of utter relation.

The Parataxic mode of experience is the stage of being able toprehend some causal relation between events which are closely connected, spatially and temporally.

¹³Patrick Mullahy, *Oedipus, Myth and Complex* (New York: Grove Press, 1948), p. 286.

¹⁴Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p. 140. ¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶One cannot fail to be impressed with the correlation here of Sullivan's thought with Cassirer's "physiognomic experience." This is the "expressive" stage of the developing consciousness of the race and individual when the environment of a subject is possessed as a series of physiognomic experiences. The datum of the environment is transparent with the inner life of the subject, not exterior. It is an extension of the subject himself (Paul A. Schilpp (ed.), *Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer* [Evanston: Library of Living Philosophers, 1949], p. 298).

The eminent Czech writer, Franz Kafka, portrays an interesting case of parataxic thinking in one of his short stories. A dog lived in a kennel surrounded by a high fence and while urinating one day had a bone thrown over the fence to him. The dog thought, "My urinating made that bone appear." Thereafter, whenever he wanted something to eat he lifted his leg.¹⁷

This is the state of the necessary next stage of growth, and it means the beginning of the breaking of the pure relation of the prototaxic mode. The similarity of this stage to that described by Buber in his state of separation of the "I" from the primitive "I-Thou" prior to entering the more meaningful later state of "I-Thou" is very noticeable. The most significant note is that this is a very common state of regression into which the mentally ill retreat for protection from too painful relation. All men are prone to its use to an extent. It is the state of separation. A valid state in healthy development of personality, but an invalid state on all other occasions, because it is the state of separation from relation.

The Syntaxic mode of experience is the third stage of development in the cognitive process. It is noteworthy that "syntaxic" and its two companions are etymologically related to the grammatical terms of sentence construction.¹⁸

¹⁷Hall and Lindzey, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

¹⁸"Parataxic" refers to the arranging of words or clauses without connectives--conjunctions, etc.--to show any interrelation.

A syntactic sentence is one that has given due regard to the arrangement of words and clauses in agreement and harmony. It is the concord of relation which defines the syntactic sentence. The syntactic mode of cognition is able to take the hitherto unrelated events of experience and find a harmony of meaning in their union.

Language plays a very important part in this third mode. Language develops and implements the signs by which things in the environment are prehended, and by which the meaning of things are communicated. Through language the new world of relation is signified and realised.

The child gradually begins to catch on to patterns of relationships. . . . There is a more discriminating realization of the other fellow, the responder. The child now more clearly realizes, for example when he cries "dada," the other person responds in a more or less characteristic fashion . . . so learns to anticipate the responses of others.¹⁹

Because he comes to trust the connection between sign and response he perceives the consensual agreement upon the meaning of the signs in language. It is this "consensually validated" meaning of signs (now also in forms of non-verbal communication--gestures, facial expression, etc.) from which the signs themselves evolve. It is the prehended meaning in the response to the sign which encourages the second experiment, and so on until a meaning is validated by

¹⁹Mullahy, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

consensus. Relation makes possible both the meaning and the sign. In Sullivan's three modes of cognition is found support for the thesis that the self is ever emerging from, and being developed by relation.

Dynamic Interpersonalism. Before leaving this point, notice is given to Paul Johnson's personality theory. He has used the "dynamic interpersonalism" of Sullivan as the basic for his personality theory, but because of his criticism of Sullivan's lack of respect for the significance of the focal center "I," makes a distinction between "person" (as centre of the neglected "I") and "personality." By means of a graph (Fig. I) he sets the "I" at the centre of a four directional dynamic field of personality. The direction beneath the "I" is indicated as "Me," the one above as the capitalised "Thou," the one to the left as the "We," and the one to the right as the "It." The "I-Me" relation is that of the mind and the body--"As I perceive myself there is more than the subject perceiving, there is the Me."²⁰ The "I-It" is the relation of the centre to the environment of Lewin's "Life-space of the dynamic system of associated meanings and interests."²¹ The "I-We" is to be equated with the "Primal-We" of Fritz Kunkel, and appears to be in agreement with that writer's view that "the lost

²⁰Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 235. ²¹*Ibid.*, p. 241.




Figure I
Johnson's Personality Theory²²

²²The graph is a reproduction of that shown in Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 274. The inner circle is representative of the author's Personality Theory from the psychological frame of reference, while the second circle represents the philosophy of Life, which most naturally follows in that particular direction, and the outer circle represents the philosophy of Being, related to that field. One would infer that Johnson believes that the properly integrated personality is the dynamic field which holds all these in proper balance.

paradise of the old childish Original-We"²³ seems to persist through all stages of personality development. It is significant that Kunkel is not as certain as Freud in interpreting the catatonic foetal position as a manifestation of regression to this primal We. Kunkel recognises that this could be non-neurotic reflection of the primal status, as well as a sign of psychotic regression, for the "after effects of the Primal-We persist until old age."²⁴

While recognising the validity of both these hypotheses as proven in clinical and everyday observations of human behaviour, this chapter nevertheless suggests a third explanation. The two above may be described as first a regression and second as a reflection. Both have to do with the remembering of the past. A third pattern of normal development is here suggested as anticipation of the organism's normal growth and fulfillment. It is a looking forward to that for which it has come thus far in preparation. It is a teleological attraction. Growth is its motivation and life its medium. It is not unhealthy regression but healthful progression.

The hypothesis is that that element of human growth

²³Fritz Kunkel, *Character, Growth, Education* (New York: Lippincott, 1938), p. 16.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 17.

identified by Kunkel as "full absorption into the 'We,'" is an antological element, and so is elemental to the structure of beings. Man feels he was made for this.

It is only necessary to return to Johnson's personality theory to note that, although there is not complete harmony between Johnson's "person" and Sullivan's "self-system," and that there are other differences distinguishing the various theorists in the school of interpersonal and social psychologists, there is sufficient unanimity in this area of research²⁵ to agree with Johnson's:

The "I" does not stand alone in self-sufficient independence, but emerges out of the living relatedness of the "we," and will need again and again to return to the group for creative awakening as well as for emotional and moral sustenance.²⁶

This is in accord with the thesis of this chapter.

²⁵The Adlerian School, as noted above (p.). Cf. Horney's chapter on "Culture and Neurosis" (Karen Horney, *Our Inner Conflicts* [New York: Norton, 1945], pp. 168 ff.) and her criticism: "How little weight Freud ascribed to cultural factors is evident also in his inclination to regard certain environmental influences as the incidental fate of the individual instead of recognizing the whole strength of cultural influences behind them" (p. 170). In addition, it is noted that Mullahy (*op. cit.*, p. 238) brackets the names of Fromm, Kardiner, Franz Alexander, Horney, and Sullivan as those who have taken full account of the advances in sociology and anthropology to the study of human behaviour. Cf. also Hall and Lindzey's chapter on "Social Psychological Theories: Adler, Fromm, Horney, Sullivan" (*op. cit.*, pp. 114 ff.).

²⁶Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

IN THE BEGINNING IS RELATION

The affinity of this quotation with the first verse of Genesis is not accidental. Relation, for Buber, is not only the beginning, but the continuing and the ending. All life is relation. But there is degree in relation. There is a degenerate relation and there is an ideal one. The beginning is not the continuing and both are distinguished from the end. The beginning, however, is of special significance. It is true that the primary word of "I-Thou" can only be spoken with the whole "I," but the whole "I" does not come into being until the "I-Thou" is uttered. There is a difference between the former "I-Thou" and the latter, but as a category of being they both qualify.

In the beginning is relation--as a category of being, readiness, grasping form, mould for the soul; it is the *a priori* of relation, the inborn thou.²⁷

There is no such thing as an "I" in the beginning. It begins only as "I-Thou," and both of what is later known as "I" and "Thou" are apart from the primary word of "I-Thou." Indeed neither the I nor the Thou could be produced unless the original "I-Thou" relation produced them. The ability to recognize that which is over against him as a "Thou" is based on the *a priori* of relation. Even then, if Friedman

²⁷Martin Buber, *I and Thou* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 27.

interprets Buber correctly at this point, the developing person only "through this meeting with the Thou is enabled eventually to take cognizance of the I."²⁸ When at last the "I" is objectified and the world of "I" is spoken, then the word of separation has been uttered. This event is not synonymous with the "I-It" relation but must precede it. Only when the "I" of relation steps forth and takes on conscious existence, can it experience itself as separate from the things of the world and the things of the world as separate from each other. To utter the "I" apart from relation is to experience "I" as an "It," and all other "Thous" as "Its." The first utterance of the "I" becomes the first possibility of speaking the primary word of "I-It."

However, it must be noted that the I of this primary word is only a partial I, for until this newly emerging I can again utter "I-Thou," it has not become the whole "I."

A Priori of Relation. It is his "inborn Thou," the *a priori* of relation, category of being, which calls every partial I to become whole. This is the latter state of "I-Thou" infinitely more profound than the original relation. It is as though the separated "I" has to be spoken; that the objectifying of the I and the Its of its world has to be ex-

²⁸Maurice S. Friedman, *Martin Buber* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 60.

amined

with the magnifying glass of peering observation [as the I] bends over particulars and objectifies them, or with field glass of remote inspection objectifies them, and arranges them as scenery [and] isolates them in observation without any feeling of their exclusiveness.²⁹

This is the picture of the separated state. It is the state of the separated I. It is the I making of itself an It, even as it has made an It of every other Thou. But it has to be.

Within this middle state of "I-It" at least dialogue can take place. Out of dialogue between the separated Its of I and Thou, can arise relation. Dialogue is still within the "I-It" relation. It is a subject-object state, and

unlike the subject-object knowledge of the "I-It" relation, the knowing of the "I-Thou" relation is neither subjective nor objective, the emotional or rational, but "in the between"--the reciprocal relationship of whole and active beings.³⁰

From the dialogue of the "I-It" to the relation of the "I-Thou" is the process to the whole I. Who can describe it? It is the state of the between. It is the place where I and Thou meet and are I and Thou no longer.

Identity and Mutuality. And yet they are, for each remains himself. It is the disinterested self of devotion

²⁹Buber, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

³⁰Friedman, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

which each remains. It is the relation of mutuality, yet not a mutuality which means simple unity or single identity. Neither is it empathy.

Though "I-Thou" is the word of relation and togetherness, each of the members of the relation really remains himself, and that means really different from the other. Though the Thou is not an It, it is also not another "I." He who treats a person as "another I," does not really see that person but only a projected image of himself. Such a relation, despite the warmest "personal" feeling, is really "I-It."³¹

When he attempts to describe the "I-Thou" relation, Buber becomes his most mystical and difficult to understand and one cannot help but draw the striking parallel between his thought and that of the mystic poets of the Hindu Gita.³² Their quest, too, is man's timeless search for himself. The ways suggested are many, but the Gita has Arjuna, the warrior Prince, persuaded by Krishna, the incarnation of the great God, that the yoga of devotion is the superior way to achieve nirvana through the union of his "self" atman, with the ultimate being Brahman. This is the ultimate relation. It brings peace, and in that peace man comes to himself. Yet it is the losing of self in relation. It is a forgetfulness of self in the relation of devotion. Yet it is the

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 61.

³²Bhagavad-Gita, Mahabharata (*The Song of God: Bhagavad-Gita*), tr. Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood [New York: Mentor Books, 1951], a portion of the Hindu sacred writings.

discovery of the fullness of self. There is present here the note of disinterested non-attachment to self, which characterises the "I-Thou" of Buber's primary word. It is something of what Buber says concerning the primary word of the whole "I-Thou" relationship.

The Three Stages of Man. It is clear that Buber has three stages in the development of man. The first is anthropologically, psychologically, and biologically³³ the original state of "I-Thou."³⁴

Already in the original relational event he speaks the primary word of "I-Thou" in a natural way which precedes what may be termed visualisation of forms--that is, before he has recognised himself as "I."³⁵

This is in harmony with the thesis of this chapter.

Secondly, the other primary word of "I-It" is made possible and indeed necessary by the emerging of these "forms" in consciousness. This is the emergence of the "I," the state of separation. The first relation is of cosmic congruence. This second of natural necessity, so that:

the mystical saying of the Jews, "in the mother's body man knows the universe, in birth he forgets it," reads

³³Buber (*op. cit.*, pp. 18 ff.), spends considerable time in examining the development of the race and its dawning primitive consciousness and equating this with the biological and psychological processes of the newborn baby.

³⁴Buber's original state of "I-Thou" is indistinguishable from Kunkel's "Primal-We" (*supra*, p. 147).

³⁵Buber, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

like an imperfect decipherment from the earliest times.³⁶

Third, man may enter the state of the whole "I-Thou." This state only follows the speaking of the separated "I"--the partial I--until it can again speak the whole "I-Thou" of the third state. It is noted that this third state of "I-Thou" is not a regression to the original "I-Thou." It is that which calls him from before: the necessity to fulfill an ontological insistance.

And it remains indeed in man as a secret image of desire. Not as though his yearning meant a longing to return, as those suppose who see in the spirit, confusing it with their intellect--a parasite of nature, when it is rather (though exposed to diverse illnesses) nature's best flower. But the yearning is for the cosmic connection, with its true Thou, of this life which has burst forth into spirit.³⁷

These are the three stages of life, and it is surely more than coincidence that so many of the interpersonal psychologists distinguish three similar stages with Buber. The We-I-We stages of Kunkel are significantly parallel, while the three cognitive modes of Sullivan--prototaxic, parataxic and syntaxic--bear parallel similarity.

In the beginning is relation, and at the end (*telos*) also.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 25. ³⁷*Ibid.*

THE PRINCIPLE OF PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE

If man is to know anything concerning the quest to find himself, he must go to the end--and there find the beginnings. This is the different approach of Brunner the theologian. The end of the quest for man is a revelational event. Within this event the truth which sets man free to become himself is given him. That revelational event is the divine-human relation. This is the beginning of the quest for man as far as Brunner is concerned.

The theologian speaks from a peculiar frame of reference. The divine-human relation is unique and his conclusions are drawn within this context. But, although he takes pains to stress that no human relations are analogous to the divine-human relation, they are most certainly illustrative. Man knows "in the between" in both cases.

The setting is not at all foreign to some of the best thinking in educational psychology. An illustration is drawn for us by Harrison Elliott:

The very essence of a developmental process is comradeship between the more mature and the less mature . . . and comradeship with God seems to be the possibility which religion offers. This does not mean equality, for the parent or teacher who assumes that he must make himself like one of the children, or assumes that the children have reached his level of maturity denies the very comradeship which the developmental process provides.³⁸

³⁸Harrison S. Elliott, *Can Religious Education Be*

The principle of personal correspondence is the term Brunner uses to describe the relation in which man comes to the truth concerning his being. To a study of this principle attention is now directed, in an attempt to understand what the theologian has to say concerning the subject of this chapter, namely, relation and self.

The Truth Seekers. Man's search for truth is the indication of his longing to find himself. Brunner develops his theology of relation round the insatiable search of man for himself because he believes this search for truth is the quest to find the meaning of himself and from thence the meaning behind all meanings. These two are bound together. There is no discovering the one without finding the other. This truth is only revealed in relation.

There is a distinction between "truths" and the "truth." In his *Theology of Crisis*, the theologian makes this significant distinction.

If you were to ask a man of average education today what he understands by truth, his answer would be something like this: "Truth is a series of statements which correspond with the facts and are capable of proof." He thinks that truth is in terms of science.³⁹

Such a one is concerned with partial truth, and his life be-

Christian? (New York: Macmillan, 1940), p. 159.

³⁹Emil Brunner, *The Theology of Crisis* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), p. 23.

speaks preoccupation with the superficialities of visible and tangible things.⁴⁰ The truth of the technician is valid only in so far as its limitation is recognised. Such recognition ensures that the search for the truth which alone makes men free is not jeopardized.

There is a second realm of truth, however, "which lies beyond immediate experience and must be approached in a different kind of way from that of science."⁴¹ It is in the realm of pure thought. The partial truth of the technician, the truths of science, the truth of man's pragmatic experience, the facts of his hopes and ideals, may be integrated into a meaningful *Weltanschauung* for man. He lives his life on the premise of this world view. This is the more inclusive truth of the metaphysician. But, this, too, is only partial truth with the inherent limitation and dangers of all its antecedent partial truths. Man in both these cases is a spectator from afar. Truth to such a seeker is an aesthetic object, arrived at without passion, "and what may be the same thing, without personal decision."⁴²

⁴⁰This is the equivalent of Buber's world of It. He, too, as will be noted later, agrees that this world has a valid place, unless it is mistakenly allowed to assume ultimate importance.

⁴¹Brunner, *The Theology of Crisis*, p. 24.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 25.

The third seeker of truth is the real seeker, and his the real truth.

It is the quest of the one who passionately feels the import of the question: "What is Truth? I must know or I die." One no longer seeks with philistine concern, for practical values. . . . with cool scientific objectivity or with a serene aesthetic outlook upon the world, but with the passion of a drowning man, who desperately cries for help.⁴³

Elsewhere the proposition is stated in another way. The two forms of man's question have been: "What is truth?" and "How can he become possessed of such truth?"⁴⁴ The Christian tradition has been unceasing in its attempt to give the answer to both. It was almost inevitable that this tradition should fall into the "subject-object antithesis" error of the Greek method of truth seeking. The fallacy of this method is best illustrated by the objectifying of the Faith (Credo) and the subjectifying of the believer's faith (credo) by the Roman Catholic tradition in its theology of the Church, the Sacraments and the Word. Brunner unhesitatingly places this type of "faith-knowing" under the two former categories of truth seekers above, and claims that real "faith-knowing" is not the perception of an objective

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴Emil Brunner, *The Divine-Human Encounter* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1943), p. 15. It is worth noting that the same author conducts a more comprehensive theological discussion of the "subject-object antithesis" in his book *Revelation and Reason* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1946), pp. 3-17.

truth by a subjective perceiver, but is that which happens "in the between" of God and man, analogic to "in the between" of man and man.⁴⁵ This may not be the *certainty* of objective verifiable facts, but it is the *certitude* of

⁴⁵It needs to be noted that Brunner agrees with the doctrine of relation of analogy (*analogia relationis*) spelled out at such great pains by the early Barth. Barth had been inclined to set his *analogia relationis* in opposition to the Thomist *analogia entis*, relation of being, until persuaded by Balthazar in 1950 that Aquinas' concept was not contradictory to his. Barth was adamant that the relation of man to God was not a relation of being but rather a relation of analogy. The analogy was man's relation to man. The theological assertions of Barth with respect to human epistemology and divine revelation demanded that the human relation which was analogous to the divine-human one was itself thoroughly dependent on the grace of God both in its actuality and in the possibility of man's recognition of the analogy. Barth insists that analogy is not identity but a likeness with a difference, "a real likeness with complete unlikeness" ^a(Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* (Edinburgh: Clark, 1952 -) IV: 3, 533). Barth also uses this theme to recognise the *imago dei* in man, and to justify his assertion that all "Dogmatics must fundamentally be Christology and only Christology" ^b(*Dogmatics*, I: 2, 872). Man is only able to enter relation with man because he has already entered relation with God, a relation only known by man through God's self-revelation in the God-man, Jesus Christ. Cf. Aquinas ^c(*The Pocket Aquinas*, ed. V. J. Bourke (New York: Washington Square Press, 1960), pp. 166 f.) for the Thomist theory of "Analogy between God and Finite Beings"; and Arnold B. Come, *Introduction to Barth's Dogmatics for Preachers* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963), pp. 143 f., for the discussion of Barth's "Method of Analogy"; and note also the affinity of this whole discussion with Brunner's statement to the effect that "Man alone has an 'I,' or, rather, is a Self, but this Self is not itself ultimate reality; it is not based upon itself, it does not possess aseity, but I am 'I' only because and in so far as God addresses me a 'Thou'; therefore, the distinctive quality of my existence, responsibility, only consists in the fact that I am addressed by God" (Emil Brunner, *The Divine Imperative* [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947], p. 153).

faith.

Fellowship and Lordship. What Brunner means by "in the between" is best understood in the two main biblical themes--fellowship and lordship. These exist in a polar relation. When man comes to a knowledge of these two themes he comes to a knowledge of the truth about himself. Both fellowship and lordship are only apprehended in relation.

The biblical concept of the lordship of God is best described by stating the truth that:

the God of the Bible is always the God of man, and man in the Bible is always the man of God--therefore, not less but much more human than the man of the philosophers.⁴⁶

The Bible is the story of what happens between these two.

The theme of lordship demands that the relation "although two-sided does not have equal or interchangeable terms."⁴⁷

The one is the Creator as Lord, and the other is creature as man. Because of this the relation is

more correctly one-sided in that it originates from God . . . and only in a very secondary way does man have any initiative in it at all.⁴⁸

This is not a formal theological concept, because there are not any formal theological concepts in the Bible. The God of the Bible is the God who speaks, and the word of

⁴⁶Brunner, *The Divine-Human Encounter*, p. 48.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 49. ⁴⁸*Ibid.*

the Bible is the Word of the God who speaks. Any doctrine of God and man contained in the Bible therefore, is only implicitly formulated from this authority of the speaking God in his address to man, and the response of man who answers God. Relation between these two cannot be conveyed by abstract definition, not described in formal terms. It can only be experienced, and the experiencing only communicated to others in a "narrative." "The thought of the Bible is not in the substantive but the verbal, historical and personal."⁴⁹ God is the One who steps into the world of man, acting for, and with and sometimes against him but always acting in relation.

From man's side the lordship of God becomes significant to this relation in the verbal language of obeying or disobeying, of loving or hating, of accepting or rejecting God as Lord. The recognition of lordship in the divine-human relation is the prerequisite to the apprehension of the truth which sets man free to become himself. It is only in the verbal acting of relation that this truth may be apprehended.

The Imago Dei. The relation of Creator to creature in the lordship theme has something to say concerning the *imago dei* in man. This concept of Brunner contributes sig-

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 47.

nificantly to the study of relation and self, so a closer examination is justified.

The first thing to be noticed is that the meeting of the Creator in relation impresses the fact of man's creatureliness upon him. Creatureliness is not to be interpreted as a state of weakness, or subservience. On the contrary, it is the knowledge of his creatureliness which links man in relation to the Creator. To recognise the Creator of creatures as divine is to enhance man's own dignity. Man, of all creatures, is able to take cognizance of his creatureliness. It is his hallmark of quality--the maker's impression. Here is the image of his God upon man.

The second thing is that knowledge of creatureliness implies that man is a self-conscious subject in the midst of an environment of other creatures. He is able to distinguish himself from all other objects. The more profound this possibility, the greater the danger that man will be tempted to equate his spirit with that of God. Those who succumb to this danger (from Heraclitus on) deny man his destiny in Creator-creature relation. It is only relation "in the encounter with the Living God which eliminates this error."⁵⁰ To encounter the lordship of the Creator is for man to encounter his creatureliness. This eliminates the

⁵⁰Emil Brunner, *Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press [1952]), p. 54.

possibility of man's identity of his spirit with that of his God. It is not his corporeality which impresses the fact of his creaturehead upon man. The spiritualist would dispose of the body as the prison of the real spirit of man. On the contrary for the Christian theologian, the consciousness of creatureliness brings respect for the body as a valid part of man, not alien to his essential being or to the fulfillment of that being. It is not corporeality which contradicts man's aspirations to fulfillment of himself, but his lack of recognition of his relation with the Creator as Lord

who claims his wholly for Himself. As a creature "I" belong wholly to God; I am not independent and free, but I am a being who is derived from, and made for, God. . . . What it means to be a creature does not deny that we have freedom, but it springs from the fact that our freedom is founded in God, and is limited by that.⁵¹

It is "freedom" which introduces the third thing of significance. This is the mark of God in man. This image is best illustrated as that freedom which allows man to respond as creature to the Creator. All other things of creation merely "reflect" their relation to their environment. Man alone is able to respond to the Word of God with his own word. This is his magnificent and radical freedom. The Creator who wills man to be a free creature, wills to love him in his freedom.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 55.

Only thus can His love really impart itself as love. For love can only impart itself when it is received in love. Hence the heart of creaturely existence of man is freedom, selfhood, to be an "I," a person. Only an "I" can answer a "Thou," only a self which is self-determining can freely answer God.⁵²

The Old Testament called this ability of man to respond to, and not merely reflect, the Creator; the spiritual quality which distinguishes man from all other creatures, the image of God in man. The formal quality is man's freedom to say "no" or "yes." This ability which man has in common with the divine is the image of that Divine within him, the *imago dei*.

While the New Testament took this formal image for granted in every man, it reserved the title for those whose quality of response bore certain marks of distinction. When the response of "yes" was given to relation then was the image reflected. The New Testament states unequivocally that the image established in the original relation has been completely defaced, and cannot be restored until the essential relation is re-established. The unique freedom of man is to stand before the evaluated alternatives with his own "yes" or "no." The dignity of humanity is to have the image restored in affirmation of his "yes."

This is the doctrine of lordship. Its corollary is the doctrine of fellowship. The Lord as Creator created man

⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 56.

as creature in His own image that man might live in fellowship with Him. Fellowship is the affinity of two beings. It is not a *unity* where the creature-man is absorbed into the Creator-God. The relation is one of fellowship, not union. The relation is between a God-person, and a man-counterpart who is able to stand "over against Him--indeed the power to keep his own being face to face with Him."⁵³ This truth, which proclaims to man his freedom, is only apprehended in relation. It is a peculiar relation possible only within a framework of lordship and fellowship. In the face of lordship, the fact of fellowship stirs man to the depths of his being so that he can exclaim with Barth: "God has time for *me*?"⁵⁴

Instigation and Response. Brunner repeatedly states that in the divine-human relation God is the instigator. There are two significant questions. The first is, "What is man's part in the process?" and second, "What is the result when man fulfills that part?"

The answer to the first question is clear. It is that man's only possible response to God is faith (*pistis*), perhaps better termed "obedience in trust." The expression of such faith is man's word in response to the Word of God.

⁵³Brunner, *The Divine-Human Encounter*, p. 53.

⁵⁴Barth, *op. cit.*, I, 2, 45.

The Word of God is the only medium of the communication of the love of God. It is this Word which "breaks through the infinite strangeness and silent seclusion between persons."⁵⁵ It is only this Word which can put God's intention of love

before man in such a way that He is acknowledged as a Person, and that man can react to it; can answer it in a personal way--that is to say in the way of decision.⁵⁶

This is to say, of course, that both knowledge and revelation do not exist outside the "between" of relation. God's Word and man's word are each essential before either or both eventuate, and neither is heard without the other. In this respect Brunner's doctrine of revelation and knowledge in relation is akin to Buber's primary word of "I-Thou." "I" and "Thou" are not two words--unless they become two objects separated and out of relation. "I-Thou" is not two words but one. It signifies the "between" without which there cannot be "I" or "Thou," and the "I" and "Thou" without which there cannot be the between.

Conclusion. It will be readily appreciated from this

⁵⁵Brunner, *The Divine-Human Encounter*, p. 68.

⁵⁶*Ibid.* Also cf. the same author's statement in his *The Christian Doctrine of God* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1950), p. 23, concerning the biblical concept of "Emmanuel, God with us. God Himself, not only a word about Him, is here now."

discussion that the principle of correspondence is not one of any static, once-for-all significance, but is concerned with the continuing dynamic of a growing and repetitive relationship. This is relevant to the answer to the second question. The result of man's word of faith in response to the address of the Word of God is the *creation of the "new man."*⁵⁷ It appears from the preceding discussion that this Pauline term could coincide with that of the *imago dei*. It is not difficult to observe the similarity between them and the concept of the emergence of the "self,"⁵⁸ about which this thesis is concerned?

Brunner warns that theology has made a common mistake in misinterpreting Luther at the point where Word and Faith create the new man, by thinking in terms of a "forensic righteousness" based on the biblical doctrine of the "new status of sonship and adoption." The Bible does not stop at merely announcing and revealing the new man within the

⁵⁷See another discussion of Brunner on "The New Man" as created and claimed by God in his *The Divine Imperative*, pp. 152 f.

⁵⁸Or for that matter Jung's "individuation" (Carl G. Jung, *The Integration of the Personality* [New York: Norton, 1963]; or Erikson's "self-identity" (Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* [New York: Norton, 1963], p. 60); or Maslow's "more fully human person" (*supra*, p. 88); or the numerous other concepts that denote the fulfillment of personality or at least the health of the human psyche which is the avowed intention of all systems of thought to identify and therapy to actualise.

divine-human relation, it declares that the relation actually *creates* him. Brunner reminds us that a theology--and it might be added, a philosophy or a psychology--formulated in the "subject-object antithesis" method of truth seeking never created a new man. The whole self of the new man is the creation of an encounter with the Creator-God.

The case has been stated for "the truth which makes men free." It is truth revealed in relation. It is freedom perceived in relation. Truth and freedom actualised in relation create the new man.

SUMMARY

It may be concluded then that the three fields of enquiry support the contention that the development of the self as an entity proceeds from the relational context of otherselves, and that the process of normal personality development is exemplified in Sullivan's prototaxic, parataxic and syntaxic modes of experience; from Buber's I-Thou, through the partial I to the complete I-Thou, and Brunner's concept of the new creature perceived and created through a relationship of personal correspondence which reveals the truth about man's creatureliness in the biblical themes of lordship and fellowship, which in turn creates the climate for man to come to himself. Here is some substantiation of the fact that out of relation emerges and continues to

emerge the selfhood of man.

But first--relation.

CHAPTER IX

RELATION AND WHOLENESS

It is the intention of this chapter to establish the definition of the "whole" person, as understood by each of the three disciplines under consideration, and to examine what relevance relation has to those "that are whole and need not a physician." The attempt thus far has been to establish the essential contribution of relation to the development of human personality, and to substantiate the premise that the self emerges out of relation, and not *vice versa*. It has been suggested that out of the primary relation of "We," the objectified and objectifying "I" develops, and that rather than this being the end of the cycle of development, the third phase of another "We" relation has been projected as the real *telos* of man. Something of the difference between this primal "We" and the final "We" has been intimated already. This chapter attempts to be more explicit in elaborating that difference, and its importance to all those "physicians" burdened with the concern and responsibility of assisting to "wholeness" those who still progress towards it in the developmental task, those who have regressed to the primal "We" or have been prevented from achieving at least some approximation of the third state.

Normalcy and Wholeness. It is necessary to say that the state of "wholeness" is not to be distinguished from a state of normality. This is a nondescript term with reference to human personality. If that difference which distinguishes man from other creatures is his ontic individuality, then to affirm "normality" as a criterion for "wholeness" produces a contradiction of terms. One cannot be considered truly himself while being the same as everyone else, or a composite of the total, or an average of the species. The etymology of "normal" exposes the fallacy. "Norm," according to Webster, is "a rule; a pattern; a model; . . . in biology, a typical structural unit." If normalcy is the *telos* of personality development, then conformity is the ideal behaviour pattern. Healthy personality development is not to be realised by aspiring to a "norm" or common pattern, or else men aspire to become mere replicas of each other. This would result in the negation of being's attempt at ontic self-affirmation. Such a state would create the world of "its" in the objectifying of all others and even self. It is the world of regression or arrestation in the second developmental stage, that of the "I-It" world whose only *telos* is that of impersonal identical emulation.

Imitation and Selfhead. This fallacy of normality is not limited to the secular disciplines. Christian edu-

cation has often succumbed to a *telos* of the "imitation of Christ," when such imitation is motivated to produce mere carbon copies of an esoteric image of Christ.¹ There is a second concept of the imitation of Christ which is not only valid in its context, but also nearer to what we are striving to define as wholeness. It is that imitation of Him to the extent of being truly oneself and He is truly Himself. One needs to be warned of the dangers inherent in this ideal also. Too often the criterion of "being oneself" is used to justify anti-conformist and destructive behaviour. Such pseudo forms of self-affirmation, as argued above,² only prove the opposite of their avowed intent. The necessity to "prove" one's individuality bespeaks rather the compulsion of the neurotic defence mechanism (reaction formation) designed to cover the ego's anxiety in

¹A peculiar connotation of the "imitation of Christ," however, is the valid goal of the Christian educator. The difference is that "Christ" in this latter case is an individual and variable, and not a normative image. This oversimplification will be elaborated later. The "imitation" of Assisi and that of Luther are illustrative and best described in Luther's own words: "I will give myself as a sort of Christ to my neighbor as Christ gave himself for me. . . . I must even take the sins of others as Christ took mine to him . . . each one should become as it were a Christ to the other that we may be Christ to one another and Christ be the same in all, that is that we may be truly Christian" (Roland H. Bainton, *Here I Stand* [New York: Mentor Books, 1956], p. 179; and cf. Martin Luther, *Martin Luther, Selections from His Writings*, John Dillenberger, editor [New York: Doubleday, 1961], p. 76).

²*Supra*, p. 62.

face of the serious doubt it has concerning its own ontic self-definition. One does not have to be in radical non-conformity to be "being himself."

Self-at-Present. Another danger inherent in the doctrine of "being-one's-self" as a definition of wholeness is that of being satisfied with self-at-present as though the present self was *telos* in and of itself. This state of self-satisfaction would be more degenerate than the first superficial state of imitative, dogmatic, christological fixation. It is the state of no growth, of stultification and eventually death. It is a turning in upon the self where all motivation for growth is stifled by a denial of necessity or desirability of change. Unfortunately such a state is only too common a phenomenon among all types and conditions of men.³

³This is not to be taken as a denial of the validity of what has been variously referred to as self-esteem, self-acceptance, self-regard, etc., as a necessary corollary of personality development. Allport claims that "ego recognition" which includes "a broad motivational category that includes credit for work done, economic security, praise and many other means of building self-esteem" (Gordon Allport, *Personality and Social Encounter* [Boston: Beacon Press, 1960], p. 171) is the demand of the healthy human organism. Tillich can speak of the "divinely demanded human self-love . . . wherein man loves himself as the eternal image in the divine life. . . . Man can have other forms of love towards himself such as simple self-affirmation, *libido*, friendship, and *eros*. None of these forms is evil of itself. They become evil when they are not under the criterion of self-love in the [above] sense of *agape*" (Tillich, *Systematic Theology* [Chicago: University of Chi-

A definition of "wholeness" is the question of this chapter. The following chapter will turn to the even more urgent question of, "And, how may one attain such a state?"

THE STRONG EGO⁴

It has been extremely difficult to discover a term

cago Press, 1951], I, 282). Also compare in support of the above comment, Allport (*op. cit.*, pp. 46 and 74-75) where he discusses Stirner's thesis that the human ego is primitive selfishness, and the various theories which include the necessity of the teleological attraction (McDougall's "forward memory"; Goldstein's "self-actualization"; James' "fighter for ends"; etc.) which, while dependent on present self-esteem for any actualisation, does itself--the teleological possibility--promote the initial self-esteem. This is the point of the polemic above.

⁴This term is chosen from among the alternatives for two main reasons. First, the concept is implicit in classical Freudian analytic therapy, and, second, because it serves to emphasise the point of this chapter. The term and its definition here stated emphasise what this writer considers to be the inadequacy of psychoanalytical theory to take into account the third mode of personality development. This statement calls for some qualification. In Section 1 of the present work (*supra*, p. 86) cognizance is taken and due deference is certainly given to the masterful and sincere attempt to arrive at a delineation of the "fully human person" by Maslow with his ten descriptive terms of the same. But we are not here concerned with such analytical delineation and indeed will conclude that the *telos* state (relation) in this third stage somehow defies all analytical description. Maslow himself comes close to this conclusion when he says: "We know that such persons [fully human persons] are but not *how* they got that way" (Abraham H. Maslow, "Psychological Data and Value Theory," *New Knowledge in Human Values*, Abraham H. Maslow, editor [New York: Harper, 1959], p. 132). Full recognition and respect is afforded this attempt to find a more satisfactory definition of wholeness, and it is further noted that the specificity of the depth psychologist in this respect cannot be equalled by the moral philosopher or any other specialist. In support

of the contention above that ego strength is implicit as the criterion of health in the Freudian tradition, the following may be said. Freud's structural approach to the human psyche in terms of id, ego and superego (Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id* [London: Hogarth Press, 1927]) was formulated in 1923 and in semi-popular manner presented as an established theoretical unit in 1932 (Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* [New York: Norton, 1933]). But there are problems in making a clear definition of the status and function of the ego. Munroe (Ruth L. Munroe, *Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought* [New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1955], p. 86) claims that "Freud's account of the *ego* is never very clear, although his isolation of this structural aspect of the personality may be held as one of his most brilliant achievements, . . ." or that "Freud's description of the dynamics of the ego is ambiguous." She attempts a definition herself, however: "The ego is defined by Freud as the precipitate of the learning process of the individual in his encounter with the external world of people and things. It is not inborn as the *id* is inborn . . . its major function is continued maintenance of the organism *vis-à-vis* the demands made upon it by the 'three harsh masters'--external reality, the *id* and the superego" (*ibid.*). Anna Freud is quoted: "The ego is victorious when its defensive measures . . . enable it to restrict the development of anxiety and so to transform the instincts that, even in difficult circumstances, some measure of gratification is secured, thereby establishing the most harmonious relations possible between the *id*, the superego and the forces of the outside world" (Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense* [London: Hogarth Press, 1937], p. 48). Erikson, considered by some to be the leading contemporary psychoanalytical theoretician of classical Freudianism, interprets the function of the ego thus: "Between the *id* and the superego, then, the *ego* dwells. Consistently balancing and warding off the extreme ways of the other two, the ego keeps tuned to the reality of the historical day, . . . employs 'defense mechanisms' . . . unconscious arrangements which permit the individual to postpone the satisfactions, to find substitution, and otherwise to arrive at compromises between *id* impulses and superego compulsions" (Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* [New York: Norton, 1963], p. 193). In accord with these interpretations, this chapter heading uses "ego strength" as a term to denote the strong functioning of the ego structure to maintain a balanced functioning of the organism. This chapter indicates that this is not an adequate criterion of health or wholeness and, as in the previous sections, rejects the concept of polar tensions as necessary elements of equilibrium. It will attempt to demonstrate that there is a more satisfac-

from the area of psychodynamics to describe the "whole" person.⁵ The reason for this is no doubt because the discipline as such has drawn most of its case histories from the study of the abnormal personality, and its particular intent has been to restore some degree of so-called "normality" to its patients.⁶ This movement may be likened to that of the

tory concept of wholeness which allows for the integration of all "proprium" functions (Allport) without conflict and tension and not essentially demanding sublimation, etc., for health, but of their own nature expressing a teleologically oriented unity. That *telos*, of course, is relation. For different ego theories and summaries of the rejuvenation in contemporary "ego psychology," cf. Allport, *op. cit.*, Chapt. 5, entitled "The Ego in Contemporary Psychology"; Munroe, *op. cit.*, Chapt. 3, entitled "The Terms of the Organism"; Donald H. Ford and Hugh B. Urban, *Systems of Psychotherapy* (New York: Wiley, 1963), Chapt. 6, entitled "The Ego Analysts"; and especially the works of Heinz Hartmann, David Rapoport, Anna Freud, Erik Erikson, Kris and Lowenstein. These names are those usually regarded as being in the mainstream of the Freudian tradition in contemporary "ego psychology."

⁵Allport (*op. cit.*, p. 155) asks the question, "What is a normal, sound, healthy personality?" as though the three terms were synonymous, and later states: "We should make a deep obeisance in the direction of moral philosophy and gracefully concede that psychology by itself cannot solve the problem of normality. No psychologist has succeeded in telling us why man ought to seek good health rather than ill or why normality should be our goal for all men and not just for some. Nor can psychologists account for the fact that meritorious creativity may be of value even if the creator himself is by all tests an abnormal person" (*ibid.*, p. 164).

⁶A common criticism of the Freudian tradition, taken up and shared by the new "ego analysts" in the most constructive way, is reported by Ford and Urban. "As a group they concluded that the classical Freudians had neglected the direct study of normal or healthy behaviour. Freud's ideas about normal behaviour extrapolations and inferences

development from Sullivan's prototaxic mode into the parataxic mode, from that of the noncommunicative undifferentiating mode of being to that of the differentiated "I" and the "not-I." The smooth transition from one mode to the other is no mean accomplishment and society does well to appreciate the understanding and skills developed by psychoanalytic theory which assist such a transition and to be excited about the future prospects which such understanding and skills make possible.

However, it has already been anticipated that this is only a partial journey. That condition of psychic health denoted by the term "ego strength" is to be regarded as that of functional "health." It may be analogous to a state of physical health sufficient for hospital and medical discharge. It is a transitional stage with a certain autonomy but it is far from that dimension men call vigorous full health. In the realm of the *soma* man is hardly satisfied to recognise the state of convalescence as *telos*. It is a stage of transition and not an end in itself. In the realm of *psyche* it is the same. Man yearns for something beyond a mere functional state. It is the "fulfillment" state. It is the state of the "whole" man, about which we are enquir-

from what he had observed in the disordered behaviour of his patients" (Ford and Urban, *op. cit.*, p. 181; cf. also, *ibid.*, p. 201).

ing.

Before we pass on to the little that Sullivan has to say on the subject it is necessary to state a simplified version of ego strength as the criterion for health. It appears that Freud would recognise a state of health, say, when the executive conscious *ego* maintained the polar forces of the unconscious *id* and the subconscious *superego* in reasonable equilibrium so as to enable the organism to deal constructively with its environment.⁷

Harry Stack Sullivan's "self-system" would admit to a similar equation, although that authority would ask us

not to bog down unnecessarily on the problem of whether my "self-system" ought to be called the superego or the ego. I surmise that there is some noticeable relation . . . between what I describe as the personification of the self and what is often considered to be the ego, . . . but I am not at all sure. . . .⁸

Although he insists that the dynamism he has described as the "self-system" is not a "thing, a region, or what not, such as the superegos, egos, ids, and so on,"⁹ it is to be

⁷Two helpful, simplified discussions of these concepts are contained in Patrick Mullahy, *Oedipus, Myth and Complex* (New York: Grove Press, 1948), pp. 36-43; and Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, *Theories of Personality* (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 41-44. In the latter, Freud is quoted in support of the above in saying that psychoanalysis is "a dynamic conception which reduces mental life to the interplay of reciprocally urging and checking forces."

⁸Harry Stack Sullivan, *Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry* (New York: Norton, 1953), p. 167.

⁹*Ibid.*

most certainly understood as a center of interrelated energies, which, unless they maintain reasonable balance between the extremes of anxiety and satisfaction, will effect neurotic and psychotic results. Here again, the emphasis is on a center of balance between two polar relations to establish sufficient equilibrium so as to enable the personality to deal functionally with its environment. Though Sullivan would object to the use of the term "ego" on the above grounds, what he describes as the desirable goal for personality development is what is termed above "ego strength."

It would appear that this concept of the whole man is not satisfactory to the theologian and philosopher. The psychologist may claim that these two disciplines when they go beyond this point begin to delve into the realm of speculative mysticism and that by very definition his own discipline is limited to facts which can be pragmatically and empirically validated. To a certain point this charge is substantiated. It is also true that the theologian and philosopher could claim that what the psychologist has labelled "the mythic" may be validated by empirical consensus as that area where man lives a considerable amount of his life.¹⁰ The thesis of this chapter claims that it is

¹⁰The epistemology of Cassirer speaks to this point. While not subscribing specifically to a "recapitulation theory" of learning (phylogeny repeats ontogeny), Cassirer submits that an understanding of the evolution of the idea-

peculiarly in this dimension that man comes to himself. It is the dimension of relation.

To substantiate this contention it is necessary to turn now to a more detailed examination of what Buber and Brunner mean by the "whole" I, and the "new" man.

THE SPARK OF LIFE

The spark of life is found in the inherent Thou of every It, according to Buber. The whole I does not come to "wholeness" within the I, but in the "between" of the I and Thou. It is necessary that man in search of wholeness must quest for the Thou in every It. The only one who is able to bind Thou into the world of It is the "whole" I. To live in the state of "I-Thou" is impossible in the perpetual world of It, so to be living in the "wholly" I means to be

tional process of the race enlightens the understanding of the process in individual progeny. Beginning with the primal dawning of consciousness in the mythico-religious "noticing and signification" perceptions of momentary deities, through the modes of "denoting," "differentiating" and "objectification" in "symbolic forms"; onomatopoetic "expression" and analogic "naming"; the stage of signs and symbols; communication and apprehension of "meanings," until the attempt to realise the meaning behind all meanings brings man into the state of the inexpressible--the mythico-religious dimension again. The depths of reality and meanings cannot be named. The utter complexity of the unity of all meaning for man can only be expressed and communicated in the realm of myth. This does not mean, however, that the ending is the same as the beginning. "We have progressed from the realm of mere indeterminateness to the realm of true generality" (Ernst Cassirer, *Language and Myth* [New York: Harper, 1946], p. 15).

in a state of oscillation between the world of It and the world of Thou. The whole I is the one who can live in oscillation between two worlds. This oscillation is not an end in itself but merely the pragmatic necessity demanded by the actual world of "Its" and the idealistic goal of having to transform the world of It into the world of Thou. The ever present danger is that man should lose himself in the world of It, forgetting the call of his being and the reason for his environment. In every culture there is the continual tension between the two worlds which call to man. The culture may remain healthy only as the world of Thou predominates, for "evil only results when the world of Thou has abdicated in favour of the world of it."¹¹

Experiencing and Using. It is precisely at this point that the philosopher becomes his most pessimistic and declares that modern man more than any other in history has abdicated in favour of the world of It. The difficulty lies in the fact that the more "civilised" his culture becomes (the process continues through each succeeding generation) the more detached and objective man becomes through *experiencing* and *using* his world, through his necessarily acquired skills of manipulation. "In proportion to the extent of the

¹¹Maurice S. Friedman, *Martin Buber* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 62.

world of It, ability to experience and use it must grow."¹²

The two terms "experience" and "use" are significant. Both belong to the world of It. Although Buber never elaborates, this is obvious--they both belong to It. The latter is more obvious than the former. "Use" is the term to describe the attitude one has towards things. It is the action of "use-ing" the whole environment for one's own "self" ends. In the attitude of "use" the partial I stands at the center of the universe and all else is "used" to enhance the I. There is no Thou in the world of using. To use a Thou is to make it a thing, an object, an It. The world of using is merely a functional world--a world of manipulation. In such a world only the "partial" I can live.

The term "experience" is not so obvious. Apparently it is not used in its cognitive aspect, as is common to modern usage. There seems to be a clue in its generic sense. It derives from the Latin *experiri* meaning to "try, to put to the test"¹³ and it is the root from which "experiment" is derived. This gives some light. To experiment is to objectify. To put to the test is to separate subject

¹²Martin Buber, *I and Thou* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 40.

¹³*Webster's New International Dictionary* (third edition, unabridged; New York: Merriam, 1961).

and object. It is the act of "thingifying." To experiment, to test, to seek proof of the reality of something is an act of nonacceptance of that which presents itself as it is.

This is a word of separation and alienation. I sense another undertone in Buber's use of the term. This is its meaning in the cognitive apprehension of a matter or thing. To be cognizant of something is to objectify it. The act of "experiencing" is to take to one's cognitive self that which is separated from one. It is this dimension of separation and objectification that Buber means by "experiencing." From the beginning it has been stressed that the "I-Thou" experiences neither the I nor the Thou, but each has been lost in the meta-consciousness of relation, which is neither I nor Thou, but I-Thou. To experience them as two is to objectify them and to make of them both Its.

It is necessary to return to the "whole I" which in oscillating between the world of It and Thou is able to bind the world of Thou into the world of It. Here is ground for optimism. Although our culture "has more than any other abdicated before the world of It,"¹⁴ man's uniqueness lies in his ability to respond to the challenge to bind Thou into the world of It. Not so for him who has come to

¹⁴Friedman, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

terms with the world of It, for

instead of freeing [it to become Thou], he suppresses;
instead of looking, he observes; instead of accepting,
he turns to account.¹⁵

Nevertheless, men are able to bind Thou into It. To illustrate this process of the redemption of the world of It, Buber uses three realms--knowledge, art and action.

Knowledge, Art, Action. In knowledge, "being is disclosed to the man, . . . as he looks at what is over against him."¹⁶ This is the process of objectification. It is a necessary process, for only as an It can a fact enter the structure of knowledge. There appears to be a state prior to that of objectifying and classifying the things perceived because

when he first saw it, it was no thing among things, no event among events, but exclusively present. Being did not share itself with him in terms of law that was afterwards elicited from the appearance, but in terms of its very self.¹⁷

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 63. ¹⁶Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 40.

¹⁷Whitehead's "presentational immediacy" surely. A helpful discussion with many parallel distinctions in the epistemological process is taken up in this term by Whitehead. "The unravelling of the complex interplay between the two modes of perception--'causal efficacy' and 'presentational immediacy'--is one main problem of the theory of perception. The ordinary philosophical discussion of perception is almost wholly concerned with this interplay and ignores the two pure modes which are essential for its proper explanation. The interplay between these two modes will be termed 'symbolic reference'" (Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* [New York: Harper, 1960], p. 185). Cf. also in the same work the whole discussion in pp. 185-197,

Following the objectification of any appearance, man may free himself and it from this shackle of separation, and once again look on it in the "present moment" of being with him.¹⁸ This is when "man fulfills the nature of the act of knowledge to be real and effective *between* men."¹⁹ This is the epistemological dimension of "I-Thou." Knowledge may remain, however, in the incarcerating world of It. It is mere knowledge experienced and used, "appropriated for the undertaking to find one's bearings in the world, and to conquer it."²⁰ Man must choose between these two realms. One is freedom, the other bondage. One is death, the other life.

In *art*, the world of It may constitute total appearance to the artist. He may portray nothing more than the mere "form" of what he sees. It may only seem to him a thing of this and that structure. He may with skill analyse its qualities and form. With dedication he may communicate its form to men. But, both he and his public have not apprehended the real world when they have some aesthetic experience of its form. Real creativity is not present in such art. It dwells in the world of men, not of the gods. It is the world of It. The world of spirit--Thou--is there

255-279, and 474-508.

¹⁸Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 40. ¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 41.

²⁰*Ibid.*

to be released if the artist would once forget the world of mere structure and enter himself into spiritual relation with his art. Art and artist become one in relation. The Thou is always there but Its cannot see it. The sleeping Thou takes the attention of the artist spirit to awaken it. Buber tells the story of the Chinese poet whose flute held no charms for the ears of men, until the gods bent to the tune, then all inclined to hear.

It is not as though the world of science and aesthetic understanding were not necessary; they are necessary to man that he may do his work with precision and plunge it in the truth of *relation*, which is above the understanding and gathers it up in itself.²¹

Man does not live in the world of the "whole I" until the world is thus transformed for him. Such transformation arises in the dimension of the aesthetic "I-Thou" relation.

In *action*, the highest realm of the three, man responds to the Thou with his whole life. It is the action of a disinterested person, without arbitrariness or self-will. It is the action in decision and commitment. It is decision and commitment to openness. It is openness to Thou with complete abandon of self-interest and with no reservation. It takes little account of statistics, form, status or the advantage of the Thou with whom it meets. It presents immediate availability to the Thou which confronts it in any

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 42.

moment; not availability in the realm of "thing-ness" but of spirit. It is not a meeting of accounting but of accepting. It is not a relation of gaining, but of giving; not of question but of answer. It is more than openness and willingness to accept the Thou which confronts it. It makes positive advance and does not passively wait, but *acts*, acting simultaneously with its contemporary Thou. At this point Buber tends to the mystical and opaque. It seems that the Thou which he refers to is the Eternal Thou of his later emphasis, and yet it is more. It is the Eternal Thou, but it is all the thous and its of the whole world of man which stand confronting him for his decision. Only as he acts does he know himself at one with his environment, and in unity with whatever one interprets as standing behind that environment. Buber is critical of those who have tried to pin this configurate Thou to a point in history and

secured his words in the library. They have codified in exactly the same way the fulfillment or the breaking of the law. Nor are they niggards with admiration and even idolatry, amply mixed with psychology, as befits modern man. O lonely Face like a star in the night; O living Finger laid on an unheeding brow, O fainter echoing footsteps!²²

This third realm is the depth encounter of I meeting with I, and becoming one in the relation of effective action. Here, Buber the existentialist acclaims the highest

²²*Ibid.*, pp. 42-43. Ouch!

realm as the present-ness of *action*. It is the action of commitment to his confronting universe of relation that man discovers *act* and *being* become one.

Now that it is clear that there is a world of difference between the I-It and the I-Thou relation, and that the latter is to be extolled as the real intention of being for beings, it is necessary to make some qualifying statements. Not only does the "whole" I oscillate between the world of It and Thou but the progression appears to be necessary. Every Thou by its nature is fated to become a thing, or at least to continually re-enter into the condition of things. "The It is the eternal chrysalis, the Thou the eternal butterfly,"²³ or as Friedman would interpret the philosopher, "the I-Thou relation interpenetrates the world of I-It without being determined by it, for meeting is not in time and space, but time and space in meeting."²⁴ It is also important that the world of It is not to be interpreted as unqualifiedly evil, or that the world of Thou is unconditionally good. The It is the "chronicle of solid benefits of the world of communication,"²⁵ and the Thou has its

moments of strange lyric and dramatic episodes, seductive and magical, tearing us away to wild extremes, [and it may] leave more questions than satisfaction, and shatter the content of a well tried context . . . ,

²³*Ibid.*, p. 17. ²⁴Friedman, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

²⁵Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 34.

and in all seriousness of truth hear this: without It man cannot live, but he who lives with It alone is not a man.²⁶

Splitness--Institutions and Feelings. A fuller examination of what the philosopher means by the partial I is significant to the study, as Buber's delineation of the partial I appears to spotlight the limitations of what the previous section has defined as "ego strength." Of such a one, Buber comments, it may be said that he appears to be living in the wholly I only in so far as he is successful in *splitting* his life into two tidily circled off provinces. These are the provinces of *institutions* and *feelings*, the one the outer life and the other the inner world of man. The one belongs to the world of It. The other belongs to the world of the limited I.

Institutions are all "outside," where all sorts of aims are pursued, where a man works, negotiates, bears influence, undertakes, concurs, organises, conducts business, officiates, preaches. They are the tolerably well ordered . . . structures, in which, with the manifold help of men's brains and hands, the process of affairs is fulfilled. . . . Feelings are "within," where life is lived and man recovers from Institutions. Here the spectrum of the emotions dances before the eyes.²⁷

Man appears to be bound by his institutions and a slave to his feelings. The one is the necessary structure of his society, the other the essence of his sensitivity. But he dares not put them together. The secret of living in the

²⁶*Ibid.* ²⁷*Ibid.*

limited I is to keep these two apart. The partial I could not live with the tension of these two, so they must remain in isolation from each other.

Institutions cannot fulfill the needs of the outer world of public life. Even these they shackle.²⁸ Feelings cannot fulfill the man. Both are inadequate for

the separated It of Institutions is an animated clod without a soul, and the separated I of Feeling is an uneasily fluttering soul-bird. Neither knows man.²⁹

The erotic literature and art which promises so much to man from the inner world of feeling deludes him. It is merely concerned with one person's enjoyment of another. This makes Its of both partners to such a relation. Disappointment in this most intimate area of the feeling mode cannot be assuaged by flight to the institutions. The attempt to do so stifles life both in the outer and inner world, for the innerworld of feelings which had become something of a "boudoir rich in ever-changing interests,"³⁰ betray him in this latter state to "despair." Even despair is no exit because it becomes only another interesting feeling. The only solution to the ambivalent dilemma posed by private and com-

²⁸Cf., H. Emil Brunner, *The Scandal of Christianity* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1951), p. 71, to the effect: "It is one of the most harmful aberrations of our time that it gives far too high an importance to public life and has forgotten that the truly human is not to be found in public, but in the private and intimate spheres."

²⁹Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 44. ³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 43.

munal life is their sublimation in relation with the Eternal Thou. This is the subject of later study.

Causality, Self-Will and Fate, Individuality. Three things remain to be noticed from the world of the partial I. They are the impositions of *causality*, the polarities of *self-will* and *fate*, and *individuality*. This touches the central thesis of this chapter. In their pure forms these three delineate the partial and limited I.

Causality, according to Buber, "has unlimited reign in the world of It."³¹ The partial I is completely bound by this otherwise important aid to scientific analysis and achievement. But such analysis must be limited to the world of It. It is the world into which man must enter but unless he enters it with spirit from the world of Thou, he is tyrannised by causality. Such occasions are the times of sickness when the world of It not encountered, impregnated and fructified by the world of relation--the world of Thou, completely overwhelms and sweeps man along in the stream of causality. Causality lives in the past. There is no decision to shape the future. It admits of a teleology of sorts, but it is merely the end of the continuum of causality. It only looks back. It has not the light of hope and destiny in the eyes of a forward look. "A future to be

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 51.

chosen" is unknown, and life is motivated from the past. It is bound by the past and there is no freedom of present-ness in it. Only decision can break the bond, but decision in the world of It is only possible when one dares to enter relation with some Thou. This is to discover a new dimension unknown to the causal and analytic world of It. Freedom to decide is exclusive to this dimension. It becomes the freedom of one who has a destiny. The chain of causality is broken by destiny and once broken man is able to oscillate from one world to the other without fear of losing what he has already gained, because

what is called necessity here [in the world of It] cannot frighten him, for he has recognised there [in the world of Thou] true necessity, namely, destiny.³²

Fate and *self-will* are the opposites to freedom and destiny. It seems significant that the philosopher has linked self-will with fate. Does he suggest that the will bent to self-interest is bound to fate and causality? Is it inferred that self-will, not daring to venture outside the security offered by causality, can never have freedom necessary to find itself? This is the contingent one who merely *reacts* to his environment and is never able to *respond*. Fate believes in fate and dares only trust in fate. This is fate indeed, but "prediction from objectivity is valid only

³²*Ibid.*, p. 53.

for the man who does not know present-ness."³³ Present-ness is relation, and relation demands a stripping of the *things* of the partial I. If the partial I would aspire to the whole I it must strip off the masks of self-will it has forced upon it, and destroy the garment of fate and turn its back on the shelter and security these two provide. The Its of job, and status, and purse, and property must fall away until he dares stand naked before a confronting Thou, and a decision. Again it is decision which breaks the power of fate and self-will.³⁴ Decision requires freedom and freedom is the antithesis of fate. Decision defies causality and negates contingency. Decision is affirmation of freedom to decide. It is the affirmation of a new self. It is no longer a self bounded by Its but a self affirmed by Thous. The new teleology of relation overwhelms his faith in fate, his belief that there was no freedom. To destroy man's belief that there is no freedom is to set him free indeed.

³³*Ibid.*, p. 58.

³⁴Tillich, *op. cit.* I, 84, speaks to the point: "The word 'decision' like the word 'incision' involves the image of cutting. . . . The person who does the 'cutting' or 'excluding' must be beyond what he cuts or excludes. . . . Our destiny is that out of which our decisions arise; it is the indefinitely broad basis of our centered selfhood; it is the concreteness of our being which makes our decisions *our* decision." Undoubtedly *Ich und Du* was in the hands of Tillich as he formulated his systematic theology. I dare suggest that the similarity between his formulations of the polar elements, especially "freedom and destiny," and this German poem is not coincidental. The Christian theologian seems

This is the potency of commitment. "If there be a devil it would not be one who decided against God, but one who in eternity could come to no decision."³⁵ The state of non-commitment is the state of the limited I, and he who dares commit his partial I to relation knows "Freedom and Destiny solemnly promised to one another"³⁶ in the resultant whole I.

Individuality is the state of the partial I. Individuality is the middle state of objectification, the differentiation of the I from every other "thing." The objectified I is the partial I. The antonym of "individual" is "person." The individual uses and experiences other things, and its purpose is to live, "that is dying that lasts the span of man's life."³⁷ The person lives by entering into relation,³⁸ and lives eternally, not fragmentarily and finitely. The individual is limited to the "my"--my race, my task, my genius, etc., and has no experience of reality because it is a thing separated, not participating in the reality of the whole. "Know thyself" for the individual is to know his "particular kind" of being; for the person it means "know thyself to have being." The person may say, "I am."

particularly indebted to the Jewish poet-philosopher.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 52. ³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 53. ³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 63.

³⁸In anticipation of Brunner one might say that the person lives only by the individual's willing death to rela-

The individual only says, "I am such-and-such."

The whole I of the I-Thou relation is the person. Because the person is in relation, he "shares in a reality which is neither belonging to him, nor merely lies outside of him--a reality which cannot be appropriated but only shared."³⁹ But it is the sharing which makes him whole.

One more word needs to be said. There are not two kinds of men while they remain men--the individual and the person, but there are rather two poles of humanity. Every man lives in the world of the two-fold I.⁴⁰ However, there are some men who are so defined by person as to be called person, and some so defined by individual as to be called individual. It is according to his saying of the word "I" that a man can be defined. Thus it can be decided where he belongs and the way his path leads. "So listen for this word."⁴¹

The more a man, humanity is mastered by individuality the deeper the "I" sinks into unreality. In such times the Person is man and humanity leads . . . as it were, a cancelled existence--till it be recalled.⁴²

And for this to happen man "must go to confront the Eternal

tion.

³⁹Friedman, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

⁴⁰In Martin Buber, *To Hallow This Life* (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 117, the author says: "Both relations together, I-Thou and I-It, build up human existence."

⁴¹Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 65. ⁴²*Ibid.*

Thou."⁴³ To this study we return in the next chapter.

DYING TO SELF

It has been demonstrated that there is some affinity between the three disciplines concerning the importance of relation and a parallel between some of their concepts and terms regarding the developmental process. To the point has been the discussion of Buber's principle of oscillation between the world of It and the world of Thou. Lewis J. Sherrill, professor of Christian education, and Erik Erikson, the noted cultural anthropologist and psychoanalytical theorist, represent the conviction of their disciplines in their attention to the significance of this oscillation process. Sherrill says, "there must be a We before there can be an I, . . . as true of religion as it is of psychology."⁴⁴ Erikson has become famous through his theories of crisis precipitation which marks the developing personality. He paints the whole picture of

human growth from the point of view of the conflicts, inner and outer, which the healthy personality weathers, *emerging* and *re-emerging* with an increase . . . in capacity to do well, according to the standards of those who are significant to them.⁴⁵

⁴³Friedman, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

⁴⁴Lewis J. Sherrill, *The Struggle of the Soul* (New York: Macmillan, 1952), p. 23.

⁴⁵Erik H. Erikson, *Identity and the Life Cycle* (New

There is a degree of unanimity here but it is possible to allow Brunner's use of the term "dying to self"⁴⁶ to describe this process.

DEATH OF A SELF

The contemporary behavioural sciences, with some justification, theoretically and clinically, have made strong objection to what they have understood as theology's doctrine of self-abnegation. The term under scrutiny seems to be paradigmatic of the whole doctrine. This section intends to use the term, so it must be asked in all seriousness, "What does Brunner mean?"

Non-being and Death of Self. First to be noted is what Brunner does *not* mean. The death of self does not mean the passing of the "self" into non-being, nor that it loses its identity in overwhelming relation or absorption into being itself. A study of some of Tillich's thinking will help reveal what Brunner does not mean by "loss of self."

Parmenides "wrestled with the question of non-being" with some fascination because

he realized that in speaking of non-being one gives it some kind of being which contradicts its character as

York: International Universities Press, 1959), p. 51.

⁴⁶H. Emil Brunner, *The Divine-Human Encounter* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1943), p. 150.

the negation of being.⁴⁷

Parmenides therefore excluded the concept from rational thought. Tillich cannot be thus content. The "very structure which makes negative judgments possible proves the ontological character of being."⁴⁸ The contradiction of affirmed being is this sort of non-being. The disappointment experienced when things don't eventuate as anticipated and man does not become what was expected of him, all point to the real (*de facto*) possibilities⁴⁹ which are in continual dialectical relation with the actualities. It is this relationship of non-being with being which seems to establish the ontological significance of non-being and forces the philosopher to take account of it. So, there is non-being which is the negation of being and has no relation with being at all. Then "there is non-being which has dialectical relation with being."⁵⁰ The Platonists distinguished between the two terms--"*me on*" and "*ouk on*." The Greek word *me* is the stronger of the two direct negatives in that language. It could be said that it is the more positively negative of the two negatives "*me*" and "*ouk*." Therefore when the Greek philosophers wanted the stronger term to

⁴⁷Tillich, *op. cit.*, I, 186. ⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 187.

⁴⁹Whitehead's "eternal objects," *infra*, p. 252.

⁵⁰Tillich, *op. cit.*, I, 188.

express that non-being for which they had the stronger feelings, the one whose promise and threat was omnipresent to them, they chose *me on*. The other non-being which cannot be envisaged they relegated to the weaker *ouk on*. About this non-being nothing more can be said. The significant thing is that the Platonists, and later Augustine, gave this dialectical non-being (*me on*) the positive power to resist being. More significantly Augustine called "*me on*" sin. Recent existentialism has "encountered nothingness" (Kuhn) and "annihilating nothingness" (Heidegger) in a most profound and radical way.

Yet contemporary man experiences it as threat instead of promise; he responds more with fear than with hope. The negating power of *me on* affirms negation rather than affirming affirmation. This need not be. This must *not be*, for when non-being is in the ascendancy man's response is fear amounting to dread in face of annihilation, and such dread contributes to this latter possibility.

Existential Anxiety. Tillich sees the dialectic between these two--being and non-being--as that of polar contraries. They are as equal as they are opposite and the tension of their contrariness is of the essence of finitude. "Being, limited by non-being, is finitude."⁵¹ Awareness of

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 189.

finitude produces ontological anxiety. Ontological anxiety is not psychological fear.

It has become clear that fear as related to a definite object and anxiety as awareness of finitude are two radically different concepts. Anxiety is ontological; fear, psychological.⁵²

Psychology can alleviate fear and "action can conquer fear"⁵³ but anxiety is irremediable, for "no finite being can conquer its finitude."⁵⁴

This paper has already questioned whether Tillich has identified ontological structure with his polar elements, or diagnosed a mode of man's existential predicament. It is hoped that the latter is closer to the truth of the matter. Anxiety may have an ontological root--this is believed, but that "ontological anxiety" is the necessary corollary of finitude is not so acceptable. It is posited here that the ontological stimulus of man's existential anxiety is his state of separation, alienation and estrangement from being itself.⁵⁵ It is the frustration man experiences when his

⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 191. ⁵³*Ibid.* ⁵⁴*Ibid.*

⁵⁵Tillich would assert that "the state of separation and alienation and estrangement from 'being itself'" is itself an attribute of finitude. Creation seems to be equated with the "fall" for Tillich. Creation is the fall from essence into existence. This writing cannot accept Tillich's conclusion and is able only to posit as an alternative the categories of Whitehead which rather than asserting that man is separated from being itself in finitude, asserts that being itself (or rather God in his consequent nature) is bound to those same categories. "God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles invoked to save

inherent inclination to harmonious relationship with being is thwarted.⁵⁶ This is the basis of man's existential anxiety. It is not necessary because within finitude it is possible to know such relationship. If such anxiety is not necessary, it cannot be an ontological characteristic.

What is the import of this for Brunner and the death of self? Just this. Because man does not correctly identify the basis of his existential anxiety as that of his alienation from being itself, but knows with certainty the threat of being overwhelmed by non-being in his present state, his reaction is to cling fearfully to what little edge he has on being, that is, his partial self. This is his natural existential reaction. The reaction finds him in the dilemma of the Indian monkey who jeopardises his whole life for a nut. His open hand enters the gourd easily but a fist closed about a nut is too large to be withdrawn through

their collapse. He is their chief exemplification. . . . The completion of God's nature into a fullness of physical feeling is derived from the objectification of the world in God. . . . It is as true to say that God creates the world as that the world creates God" (Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, pp. 521, 523, and 528).

⁵⁶Cf. Barth, *Church Dogmatics* (Edinburgh: Clark, 1952-), III, 2 and 276, for a discussion of the author's doctrine of *menschmitkeit* (people-with-ness) which claims that human nature is basically social. Humanity is not merely capable of entering relation, it is already in relation. This basic "covenant capacity" of man with man is *analogia relationis* to God's covenant relation with them through Jesus Christ.

the neck of the gourd in which the enticing nut had been placed for this purpose of capturing him. If only he knew enough to let go he would be free. If only he cared less for a nut he would have more of life. So it is with man. If only he knew enough to risk his partial self he could know the freedom of relation with infinite being. In clinging to self, man persists in the act of separation and is more anxious than ever.⁵⁷

This is an interpretation and not in terms as he would use them of what Brunner means by "dying to self." It is the letting go by a conscious exercise of the will all the fascinating and powerful claims of the partial I to a realisation of the whole "I." Buber the theologian does *not* mean by his call to the "death of self" a loss of identity, or the passing into non-being of the I, but rather commends the method by which the full identity may be realised. Now it is possible to return to Brunner's language for an examination of his positive concept of "dying to self."

The Positive Analogy. Brunner's term, "dying to self," is analogous to the death of Christ. Brunner's the-

⁵⁷There is an affinity here with the Buddhist doctrine of *Tanha*. Gautama--the original Buddha--became the "enlightened one" (Buddha) through the insight that *nirvana* was denied him because of his intense "craving, thirst, desire" (*Tanha*) for the wrong things "arising out of the carnal will-to-live-and-have" (John B. Noss, *Man's Religions* [New York: Macmillan, 1963], p. 176).

ology is based on the premise that man's chief end (*telos*) is relation with God, and that until he enters such relationship man's essential humanity is unrealised. As previously noted, in any movement towards reconciliation God is the initiator. Man's part is nevertheless an essential facet of the completed act. Just

as on God's side a death is involved, so it is also on the side of man. The old man must die, he must be put off, he must be annihilated.⁵⁸

These strong terms are inspired by the radical example of God in the death of His own "Self." Second, the term "death" is applicable because of the "traumatic"⁵⁹ radicalness of man's "letting go" of self. This act seems to contravene all his natural inclinations of clinging to his partially assured area of "being." Nothing but the most intense exercise of the resisting will can effect the transformation from the mode of "clinging to self" to that of "letting go in relation." Such an act calls for a strong term. Third, "death" is a reasonable term because the mental and psychic duress involved in such an act of self-surrender is analogous to the agony of death. The act is always an act of faith and faith by definition knows no *a priori* certainty only *posteriori* certitude. Prior to the leap of faith one only experiences the awful agony of inde-

⁵⁸Brunner, *The Divine-Human Encounter*, p. 150.

⁵⁹A non-Brunnerian term, of course.

cision and uncertainty. This is especially true if partial advances have been undertaken towards relation, and have been fascinatingly disappointing. Such partial advances, while always a disappointment, still inherently contain the call to commitment to the total "I." The fourth requirement of relation is that the commitment be total. "The whole"⁶⁰ person must surrender himself; hence the expression 'death' is the right word."⁶¹ A final mark of this "death" is that it must be entered by the willful volition of the chooser. The agony and the uncertainty of this leap of faith are aggravated by a demand for the free and willful decision "of the whole man and with his whole self to go to his death."⁶² This is not a suicide of life. It is the suicide of death. To cling to the partial "I" is to cling to death. The death of a self is the death of death.

We have seen something of Brunner in the positive uses of the term "dying to self." The death of God in Jesus Christ and the death of man in self is the death in a resurrection to fullness of life. It is death to separation. It is the death of exclusion. It is the life of inclusion in

⁶⁰It is necessary to make the distinction between the psychologist's "whole" meaning "integrated," and the theologian's definition of "whole" as "total."

⁶¹Brunner, *The Divine-Human Encounter*, p. 151.

⁶²*Ibid.*, p. 150.

relation. It fulfills the prerequisite for the union of those who from the beginning of time were intended for each other and when it happens the whole cosmos nods in approbation.

Repentance and Relation. The language of relation, man with God, is analogous to that of man with man as already noted. The significance of the death of Christ is wider than this particular focus, however, and the next chapter speaks to this limitation. It is necessary to make one more note before we leave the theologian. It is concerning an important prerequisite to relation which he characteristically terms "repentance." Brunner has defined repentance as "despair of self, despairing of self-help in removing the guilt that we have brought upon us."⁶³ Within the context of this discussion we may interpret "guilt" as the guilt of exclusiveness, of separation, of clinging to self out of relation. This is the theologian's "sin," the state of alienation and separateness. Repentance is the first movement of the turning again from isolation to relation; the first step towards the death of a self, that self may live.

The new life released by such a death is energised in depth and meaning by what the theologian terms the power

⁶³Brunner, *The Theology of Crisis* (New York: Charles

of the Holy Spirit. It is this additive of the Spirit of God to the spirit of man which seems to be the distinctive contribution of religion to the present discussion. He is not merely advanced to health, he is enhanced to holiness. Man is more than "fully human," he becomes partially divine. Not only is integration promised to him but ecstatic union. The dimension of the ecstatic⁶⁴ not only stands him out from himself, but sets him more fully within himself than ever before. It is the ecstatic union of inner and outer and other. This is not to be discarded as mere poetic mysticism. It happens not only within the realm of the so-called theologian. The philosopher and psychologist know it too, as men. Their disciplines generally have no word for it, neither do they dare give it a term. It cannot be analysed nor objectified. The analyst as analyst or the metaphysician as metaphysician cannot know it. Only the mystic, the theologian, and men as men can speak of it. Brunner does.

Conclusion. The theologian summarises this section:

Scribner's Sons, 1931), p. 57.

⁶⁴In the generic meaning of the term "standing out of." Cf. Tillich when he says: "Although the ecstatic character of the experience of the Spiritual Presence does not destroy the rational structure of the human spirit, it does something the human spirit could not do by itself. When it grasps man it creates unambiguous life. Man in his self-transcendence can reach for it, but cannot grasp it unless he is first grasped by it. Man remains in himself" (Tillich, *op. cit.*, III, 112).

What stands in the way of the Pentecost Spirit? One does not *wish* to change; one wants to go his *own* way; one does not want to repent and believe in the Lord Jesus Christ. It *costs* too much; *it costs one's self*.⁶⁵ And when you yourself so lack the Holy Spirit, then you should not complain to God; you should not even say that one must wait until God gives it. The Apostles did not answer the people from Jerusalem--"Wait until it pleases God to give you the Holy Spirit." Rather they said, "Repent, and be baptised; then you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit."⁶⁶

It may be concluded that if Brunner does not mean by "death of self" a sinking into non-being and a loss of identity; and by his other term of "despairing of self" a rejection of self; then there is at least sufficient basis for dialogue if not consensus within the three disciplines. It is equally certain also that Buber and Brunner as representing their disciplines would claim that the "whole" I and the life of the Spirit is a different phenomenon than that implied in the "more fully human" or "the strong ego."

This chapter has not been an attempt to elide the three concepts but rather the opposite has been the intention, namely to highlight their distinctive contributions, functions and, where it applies, their limitations.

⁶⁵Italics mine (author).

⁶⁶H. Emil Brunner, *I Believe in the Living God* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961), p. 123.

CHAPTER X

RELATION AND THE ETERNAL THOU

It has been stated that it is Buber's "The extended lines of relation meet in the Eternal Thou" which dictate the topology of the writing. The time has come to explore the significance, the truth and the implications of Buber's statement from whatever frame of reference each of our disciplines will allow. A beginning is made with the psychologists.

FOLLOW THIS SIGN

The "Eternal Thou" as such is not part of the psychologist's vocabulary. It appears, however, that this discipline is providing an abundance of signs, which if faithfully followed will lead to an Eternal Thou. This section is an attempt to designate and follow some of these signs to their conclusions.

In so far as the psychologist as psychologist uses the term God, it is to describe a social and client phenomenon encountered in his clinical relations. To use the term in any other sense by definition of his discipline, the psychologist must shed his professional cloak and don that of amateur theologian or as a layman. Kurt Lewin is quoted as saying that believed "the ultimate reality of God . . . [to

bel beyond psychological knowledge, but the social reality of God is undeniable."¹ Freud's attention to religion as clinical phenomenon is as easily documented as it is unwelcome in most religious circles. Despite the fact of an intensified and almost exclusive study of religion in the latter years of his life, his final conclusions were as negative as the earlier ones. Freud saw religious striving as a

compulsive regression to childish dependence rather than a forging ahead in one's own strength to assert the heroic thrust of individuality.²

Johnson says that

One may be able to distinguish between Freud's healthy and neurotic religion, but he [Freud] does not. There is only neurotic religion as far as he is concerned.³

It is accepted then that by definition this discipline is not concerned with the religious quest for God as such, nor can it concern itself with the question of the objective reality of a divinity. It is an empirical science and as such can only deal with man where he is. It is the intention of this section to document some empirical evidence for at least a sign which points towards the Eternal Thou of Buber and the God of Brunner. These signs we will attempt to follow.

¹Paul E. Johnson, *Personality and Religion* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1957), p. 66.

²*Ibid.* ³*Ibid.*, p. 254.

Dependency. The concept of dependency with its attendant dangers has received a great deal of attention from the psychodynamic theorists and pastoral counselors.⁴ The interpersonalists, because of their interest in relation, have had to deal with the problem. None deny that when dependency becomes a neurotic crutch it has most undesirable and destructive manifestations.⁵ Freud correctly calls for "heroic independence" to break such suicidal symbiosis, and Horney rightly holds up "inner dependence" as the healthy alternative.⁶

⁴Cf. Howard J. Clinebell, Jr., *Understanding and Counseling the Alcoholic* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1956), pp. 196 and 197. This statement of the alcoholic character by Clinebell serves to illustrate the extreme tendencies and dangers of dependency. "Almost without exception, alcoholics have attached themselves to persons upon whom they can lean . . . usually members of the family. . . . An alcoholic's strong dependency needs, coupled with a Minister's tendency to go out of his way to help people and the role of father-image into which he is cast by the immature, all make it easy for an unconstructive dependency relationship to develop."

⁵Erik Erikson allows for one type of dependency which is not necessarily neurotic. He says: "Ego bolstering . . . remains a legitimate therapeutic approach in individual cases of acute ego strain, i.e., whenever the individual is too physically weak or emotionally young to meet a situation bearable to the mature or strong; or even if the situation is too extraordinary to be met even by the relatively adequate ego" (Erik H. Erikson, *Identity and the Life Cycle* [New York: International Universities Press, 1959], p. 47).

⁶Karen Horney, *Our Inner Conflicts* (New York: Norton, 1945), p. 250. Horney distinguishes between masochistic, narcissistic, and perfectionist dependency, and from her study of the phenomena, according to Ford and Urban (Donald H. Ford and Hugh B. Urban, *Systems of Psychotherapy*

However, there is an ambivalent tension inherent in the psychodynamics of personality development. The interpersonalists speak of the dilemma confronting the human organism in the alternatives of relation and separation, independence and dependence. The warning is "relate *or* die." The threat is "relate *and* die." There is a clue to the resolution of this dilemma in the concept of "loneliness." Loneliness as a manifestation of separation will of itself lead to the seeking of relations even in "the face of the severest anxiety."⁷ The implication is that loneliness is the manifestation of a frustrated personality need. If anxiety is the result of frustrated basic and instinctual needs of the organism, then it may be said that "loneliness" is indeed a more severe form of anxiety than some of the "severest" forms, as Sullivan states. If Sullivan is correct in assuming that loneliness is that particular form of anxiety produced by the frustration of the need for relation, then it may be concluded that relation is indeed one of the basic needs of the human organism.

But to enter relation is to be relative. To be relative is to be relatively dependent. The degree of the in-

[New York: Wiley, 1963], p. 506), formulates "inner dependence" (as the healthy alternative to outer dependence, it is assured) as one of the goals of personality development.

⁷Harry Stack Sullivan, *Interpersonal Theory of Psychology* (New York: Norton, 1953), p. 261.

timacy of the relation is the degree of the dependence. The most intimate relation is that of love. This depth degree of intimacy makes the participants dependent even to the level of their emotional reactions to environment. The meaning of any moment or circumstance for the lover is radically affected by the presence of the beloved. Maslow indicates the depth and reality of this type of dependence when he says that ". . . love . . . means letting . . . defenses drop and becoming vulnerable to hurt."⁸ The ascetic response to an object of art is dependent upon the art object. Every act of participation and relation is an act of interdependence, and participation and relation are universal.

The astute reader has detected a distinction between what has been termed "dependency" with its negative developmental manifestations, and what has been referred to above as "dependence." To recognise the distinction is not difficult. To spell out the distinction is not easy. The psychologic difference is even more subtle than the etymologic similarity. Perhaps it is hardly possible to have one without the omnipresent threat of the other, but one is healthy and the other pathologic. How are they to be distinguished?

⁸Abraham H. Maslow and Béla Mittelmann, *Principles of Abnormal Psychology* (New York: Harper, 1951), p. 6.

The distinction which is to the point of this section is as follows. When relation is entered to the exclusion or negation of another or any other proper relations, then it is correctly diagnosed as dependency. When relation is entered to the enhancement and inclusion of all other relationships, then this could be termed "healthy dependence" and the whole relation that of "creative interdependence." The humourists have made much of the lovesick young man who can give his thoughts or attention to nothing else but the subject of his adoration with the most ludicrous impairment of his otherwise efficient and methodical grasp of reality. This one relation appears to demand the exclusion of all others with the resultant paranoiac loss of a sense of the reality and value of the whole.

It will be immediately objected that the degree of intimacy of any relation will surely indicate the degree of exclusion. How is it possible to enter real relation without exclusion of something other. The only resolution of this dilemma is to regard all relations as the partial aspects or manifestations of one all-inclusive relation. Then no particular relation is an entity in itself and exclusive of any other but a special aspect with its own individual degree of intimacy and significance as a particular instance of the total attitude of relation.

The fact appears to be that real relations cannot be

entered into with one other being exclusively. It is partial if this is so. Real relationship is the result of a state of mind, or an attitude of relation and respect to the *total* environment. For man to enter exclusive relationships is to make of himself and the others "Its." Such attempted exclusive and complete relation with an "It" has long been intuited as idolatry. Dependence and worship are akin. True relation, and therefore the safeguard against idolatry and dependency, can only be found in a much wider frame of reference. This wider frame of reference is variously called environment, the cosmos, being itself, God, the Eternal Thou. They are the same. Relation with this one is the only one that can be totally exclusive because it is the only one which is wholly inclusive. The extended lines of any specific relation must meet in and emanate from this pivot, the one who, as Buber will say in a moment, is the only Thou who by His very nature can never become an It.

It is submitted, then, that this is the resolution of the relation and dependence dilemma. Man must affirm himself in creative dependence, not heroic independence, in the Eternal Thou, and so define by the life that he lives the distinction between neurotic dependency and healthy dependence. Man is indebted to psychology for its warning of the dangers of dependency, and providing a new sign of dependence which points to the Eternal Thou, His relevance

and His necessity.

Ultimate Meaning and Value. The need of an *ultimate meaning* and *value* in life has been specified by psychology. Erik Erikson declares that the final requirement for the successful negotiation of the crises of identity is the formulation of an ideology, to understand the past, to interpret the present and in some measure give security to the future.⁹ Gordon Allport says that religion

is a man's audacious bid to bind himself to creation, . . . it is his ultimate attempt to enlarge and complete his personality by finding the Supreme Context to which he rightly belongs, . . . it is the search for the value underlying all things, and as such is the most comprehensive of all possible philosophies of life.¹⁰

It would appear that this basic personality need identified through the empirical research of psychology may become another sign. Johnson says that although some human relations are deep and meaningful

none prove constant enough to satiate or extinguish this human need . . . [for ultimate meaning and value in life] and in the end of this quest, all roads lead to Thou, when pursued to their ultimate.¹¹

The Goal-Seeking Drive. This is another facet of human personality which psychology has ascertained to be of significance for man's understanding of himself. It is the

⁹Erikson, *Identity and the Life Cycle*, p. 158.

¹⁰Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 80. ¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 257.

early expression of this drive which projects the first difficulties of living in relation. The art of sharing goals is one of the most difficult. If man is both a goal-seeking creature and an individual who must live in relation, which indicates shared goals, it appears at first glance that the antinomy is without resolution. The point will be raised again.

Not all psychoanalytic theorists place "goal seeking" in the same hierarchy. Gordon Allport questions the conclusions of Freud, Lewin and Sullivan, "that the human quest is primarily to reduce tensions," and himself inclines to the view that it "is actually to maintain the tensions that keep us moving towards ideal goals."¹² He continues on this theme to state that religious motives cannot be explained as being pushed from behind by instincts,¹³ or as unconscious complexes, but have a more adequate explanation as "intentions" motivated by the goal-seeking-drive. The goal in this case is that of higher values and meanings.¹⁴ Johnson is convinced that "religion is a social experience and its

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 128.

¹³A point made above, *supra*, p. 52.

¹⁴It appears to this writer that Tillich draws together the two personality drives: that of goal seeking and that of meanings and values in his concept of "ultimate concern" (Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951], I, 12-14). Also cf. Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

direction is outward bound to the ultimate relation with God,"¹⁵ and quotes Boison in support, to the effect that healthy development of personality requires a "definite reaching out to ever higher values and larger loyalties."¹⁶

Fritz Kunkel provides the most persuasive premises for the conclusion that the lines of relation converge in an Eternal Thou. Under a discussion of "Why a man acts the way he does,"¹⁷ he declares that before one can understand this question, he must ask two more. The first question is: "What is the state of actuality he is trying to reach?" and the second: "Whom does he wish to benefit by this actuality?" The answer to the first question supplies the "value" and the answer to the second Kunkel terms the "value-bearer." The value is entirely dependent upon the value-bearer for its signification. A toy has no value at all, it would appear, when the child's attention has been drawn elsewhere. Let another child come into the room and begin to play with the "valueless" toy and the story is different. Now there are two aspirant value-bearers and one value. The resultant foray is what Kunkel has termed "mutually exclusive goal seeking." This situation arises whenever one thinking, acting, willing being has to share his environment with another

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 220. ¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 218.

¹⁷Fritz Kunkel, *Character, Growth, Education* (New York: Lippincott, 1938), pp. 13 ff.

thinking, acting, willing being. Such a situation may be resolved only if there is an entering into relation by the value-bearers to allow the mutually exclusive goals to become a "unified goal." The difference is that between two starving boys finding an apple at the identical moment, and a baby-mother feeding relation. It is this latter example of a mutually satisfactory goal which Kunkel terms a unified goal.

Some deductions are now possible. It is obvious that a unified goal is dependent upon relation. There is a further necessity. A unified goal demands the inclusion within itself of the self-interests of the participants. It is obvious that there is no frustration of the goal-seeking drive in the developing personality as long as there is only one existent to an environment. As soon as an environment becomes a shared existence, then any "same goal" must be mutually exclusive unless the two criteria above, namely, relation and self-interests, can be satisfied. Society which is not merely existence shared by two individuals but a complex of multitudes, must necessarily constitute an ultimate enough same goal which will allow the two criteria to establish a unified goal. It has been suggested above that some sort of ultimate philosophy or loyalty is necessary for individual identity. Here it is suggested that some such ultimate philosophy or loyalty is a necessary safeguard

against the identity diffusion¹⁸ of any society. It would appear that the only solution is an implicitly recognised hierarchy of proximate goals each in harmony with its superior and all with the ultimate.¹⁹ For instance, the same goal of family interests will be a unified goal for the members of that particular family, but as another family enters the environment with the same goal, the principle of mutual exclusion applies. The conflicting same goals of family could only be resolved by appeal to a higher unified goal established by the two criteria of relation and self-interest's satisfaction. A unified goal could be that of national interest. While this may be a unified goal for all the members of that nation, it becomes a source of mutual exclusion when another nation enters the relation with the same goal. When all mankind is included with this basic need of goal seeking to be fulfilled, where can an ultimate enough goal be discovered to satisfy the demand of a unified goal? The only answer is implicit in "the extended lines of

¹⁸This is Erikson's alternative to the successful fruition of the developmental task in personality identity (Erikson, *Identity and the Life Cycle*, p. 88).

¹⁹The question, "What is the relation of proximate goals to the ultimate goal?" has been partially answered. The process is somewhat of an induction from pragmatically dictated proximate goals to a tentative ultimate unified goal, and then a feedback of testing and validation until, and as long as, the above conditions of mutual satisfaction are fulfilled.

relation meeting in the Eternal Thou."

Security. Psychology has held up *security* as a basic personality need. A great deal of attention has been focused on the hollow and superficial security many have made of religion. In their flights from reality to their distorted image of the Eternal Thou some find temporary and unstable refuge in a neurotic dependency. But there is much more to be said than this. If security²⁰ is a basic personality need, how will it be met? Is there anything in the religious concept of the Eternal Thou which is realistic, dependable and ultimate enough to allay man's existential and ontological *angst*, and provide meaning for his specific and psychological insecurities.

Paul Johnson records that a religious concern appears to be the corollary of man's striving to work out the deep problems and meaning of the total life situation. From a total of 173 patients,

74 admitted that prior to their psychotic state they had no religious concern, 89 moderate concern, and 10 of them were very religious, but at the onset of illness most of the patients became intensely interested in religion, spending much of the time in bible reading and prayer, and worship services.²¹

²⁰Cf. the concept of "basic trust" in Erikson (*Identity and the Life Cycle*, pp. 55 ff.): "For the first component of the healthy personality I nominate a sense of basic trust, which I think is an attitude towards oneself and the world. . . ."

Before turning a more critical eye to this report and its implications, it is noted in support that one need only come to the sickbed or bereaved home, the scene of sudden tragedy or to the other extreme of happiness in the birth of a child or the solemnity of marriage vows, to know how, in the high moments of life, men are commonly amenable to the invoking of the presence of their "Eternal Thou." It is as though man at his extremities of "heavens" and "hells," has the cataract of finitude removed to catch a brief glimpse of the *urgrund* of the ultimate.

To return to Johnson's statement, it is possible to make much of such psychological insights as "projections" (objects of wish fulfillment), "transference" (the good father), "regression" (the enfolding mother, Church) and "dependency" (the rock of faith) to invalidate much of its implications. But in spite of all these possibilities Johnson makes the assessment that generally,

this religious seeking is not a flight from reality, but rather the serious attempt to find a reality by which to cope with the threat to ultimate values and loyalties.²²

A sense of basic security, it seems, cannot be found by man through all the vicissitudes of this finite existence unless it be of finite quality which nothing, not even the threat of the loss of his physical and present existence can re-

²¹Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 219. ²²*Ibid.*

move from him. "To be really happy, man must find that which cannot be lost at all"²³ is the testimony of Johnson to this effect.

None of this has been intended to "prove" the existence of God. And indeed it doesn't. Such data are only signs, and like all signs, do not prove the reality to which they point until the enquirer of the sign "comes to" the place of their pointing. Not even the theologian aspires to being more than a sign maker, for man only "knows" God as he only knows man--in relation. This outline is a very limited attempt to show that the modern discipline of psychology with its increasing mass of empirical evidence points the way along many roads, which if followed faithfully and logically, finish most satisfactorily in the mystical "just this side" of *knowing* that which men have always called by some such name as their "Eternal Thou."

I-THOU AND A TREE

The point is now reached when attention may be focused on the oft quoted quote: "The extended lines of relation

²³One could succumb to the temptation of invoking the much maligned "ontological proof" of the existence of God at this point with the so-called "signs" as forming some sort of premise for the conclusion to Anselm's "that than which no higher can be thought," but it would be to no more avail than Anselm's original doctrine, nor Aquinas' "cosmological proofs." These can be only "signs" as indicated above.

meet in the Eternal Thou." To elicit the richness of Buber's thought it is necessary to return to his idea of the I-Thou relation with a tree. It is not easy to grasp the philosopher's intention in this image, but we will try.

There are two primary words: I-Thou and I-It. Each of these moves in *three spheres*. We limit ourselves to the three spheres of the primary word I-Thou.

The Three Spheres. The first sphere is that of *nature*. This means that man may enter "I-Thou" relation with the natural environment. It is possible to have I-Thou with a tree, or a stone or what men usually term any-"thing." The second sphere is the sphere of *man*. We have spoken at length concerning this sphere. The third sphere is that of *spiritual beings*. With respect to the first (which is that of our present concern) and the third sphere, the relation "sways in the gloom, beneath the level of speech."²⁴ Of this, at the moment, we can be sure.

Nevertheless one *can* have an I-Thou relation with a tree. If I see a tree, says Buber, I can look at it in many different ways. I can see it as a picture. I can see it as movement--breathing, living, growing--as I. I can see it as category of species, structure and mode of life. I

²⁴Martin Buber, *I and Thou* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 6.

can see it merely as expression of law, bound and shackled. But, I can see it as *tree*, all of what I looked upon when I knew it as an it, and more. This Thou is part of me, the stars, the natural intercourse of the universe is the intercourse of I and Thou, a whole, all present in a single whole.

The tree is no mere impression, no play of my imagination, no value dependent on my mood . . . and let no attempt be made to sap the strength from the relation: relation is mutual.²⁵

Does this suggestion mean that the tree has consciousness? Buber replies that the question has broken the spell and once again disintegrated that which cannot be disintegrated and remain. "I encounter no soul or dryad of a tree, I encounter the tree itself."²⁶ There is more than a suspicion that Buber, in the way of a philosopher, is teasing the reader, or baiting him to thought or tempting him to read further. One can only conjecture and read on.

How can it be? One may surely appreciate a tree, enjoy it for itself and even love (in a manner of speaking of love) what is termed an inanimate object. This is understandable, but how can such as a tree relate back to me? Is Buber careless in his use of the term "mutual?"

A boy with his first bike, and a girl with her new doll, can project so much of themselves and their affection

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 8. ²⁶*Ibid.*

upon it, that it is veritably believed to relate back. The adult with a new car, the engineer with his newly tuned machinery, can also know the spirit of relationship, not that of the heartless "using" of an instrument, but a "feeling" of mutual respect and affection,

when for instance, a compositor tells that he has understood the machine's humming as "a merry and grateful smile at me for helping it to set aside the difficulties and obstructions which disturbed and pained it, so that now it could run free."²⁷

Yes! But it seems not for long. Let the doll be old, the car superseded, the machine inefficient, and they become discarded. This is human projection and self speaking to self. But man is not so attuned to such relations as to maintain it when the object loses its pristine glory, but sometimes, before that happens, "within the gloom, beneath the level of speech," we have known the experience.

This is something of what Buber means, but there is more. The projection of man and his appreciation are all that he can contribute from his side of the relation. If such a relation is indeed to become mutual, it must be extended through the lines of relation to the Eternal Thou, and from thence to be returned. This is Buber's point.

A genuine homespun philosopher clarified the situation for the writer. J. Allen Boone, who lays claim to dia-

²⁷Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 37.

logue with the ants and gophers, although he knows not the name of Buber and is vaguely aware of that of Albert Schweitzer, has evolved a philosophy of "reverence for all life" akin to that of these two. In a fascinating public address Boone takes a saucer from the table in front of him and says something like:

You can speak with anything in the world if you have the right attitude to life and existence. You can even have a conversation with this saucer, for behind everything that is, stands the Creator of it all. One goes beyond the creation to the Good Creator and in the ensuing conversation knows that all things are "good"; that they have as much right as me to exist; that the same One who made me, made them, and with this right attitude of respect, I take off my hat to this saucer, and all things beside, and the one who always stands behind His good creation, bows to me, through the object of my respect for Him.²⁸

To hear this homey homily was to grasp a little of the more profound--"the extended lines of relation meet in the Eternal Thou."

Before leaving the point, it is worth noting that in *Kinship with All Life*,²⁹ J. Allen Boone relates that he can discover no record of a "rattler" ever striking an Indian, as compared to the many instances of such attacks upon white folk. The reason, according to the writer, is that the Indian has this basic respect for all life, and meeting a

²⁸J. Allen Boone, public address given at the First Methodist Church, South Gate, California, February 12, 1962.

²⁹J. Allen Boone, *Kinship with All Life* (New York: Harper, 1954), pp. 91 ff.

rattler in the path, will respectfully pause, mentally bid him the time of day as an equal and pass unmolested on his way. The white man is not sufficiently educated in understanding and respect, or sufficiently in tune with his universe to be able to enter such mutual relation with its immunity from hostility and discord with his environment.

Albert Schweitzer adds authority to the point when he says:

As a being in active relation to the world, [man] comes into a spiritual relation to it, not by living for himself alone, but feeling himself one with all life that comes within his reach.³⁰

Consummation of the Thou. Buber appears to support the assumption above when he says that while it is perfectly true that everything may be addressed by the primary word "Thou," and thus realise the inborn Thou within each of them, it is of supreme importance to realise that it is only in so far as the Eternal Thou is addressed through them, that the Thou is consummated. Indeed such consummation is effected only by direct dialogue with the Eternal Thou.

The inborn Thou is realised in each relation and consummated in none. It is consummated only in the direct relation with the Thou that by its nature cannot become It.³¹

³⁰Albert Schweitzer, *Out of My Life and Thought* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1949), p. 268, cited in Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

³¹Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 75. Cf. also, "All things

It is this direct dialogue which is of ultimate importance. Nothing is gained without it. All is lost apart from it. Buber makes some of his most emphatic assertions to this point. Man must enter into dialogue with God. He cannot afford to be afraid of making an It of the Eternal Thou for that is impossible. Here there is an implicit contradiction of the many inferences drawn from Paul Tillich's discussion of the god of theism and the God above god. Even though it must be admitted that God is always more than man can imagine, and that even to speak the word God is to sacrilegiously limit His Being, nevertheless man must not desist, because when man really utters it as "Thou," he truly speaks the name of God.

We cannot cleanse the word "God," and we cannot make it whole; but, defiled and mutilated as it is we must and can raise it from the ground and set it over an hour of great care.³²

So this Thou is to be spoken and it can never become an It. All men address this Thou, even by him who calls himself atheist, for such a one is addressed whenever man "gives his whole being to addressing the unlimited of his life."³³

become objects of our thoughts, and fitted into our system, save one thing only, and that is God himself" (H. Emil Brunner, *God and Man* [London: S.C.M. Press], p. 58).

³²Martin Buber, *Eclipse of God* (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 8 f. Note also that in his *To Hallow This Life* (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 84, Martin Buber says: "He who refuses to limit God to the transcendent, has a fuller conception of Him, than he who does so limit Him."

It is in direct relation with his Eternal Thou that man becomes attuned to the universe. In this moment of meeting he becomes attuned to himself. It is the presentness of this I-Thou, that he knows nothing is isolated anymore. Everything is included, and this I-Thou interpenetrates the world of I-It without being determined by it any longer. Time and space are no longer the categories of being but are overwhelmed by being in the present meeting, for such "meeting is not in time and space, but time and space are in this meeting."³⁴ One who experiences the Eternal Thou in such meeting knows full well that He is not to be found by searching, but only in the present moment alone. He is not to be found in objective temporal experience; or spatially located in the transcendent beyond, or the immanent within, but in the here and now of presentness. Such presentness can only be in meeting, in direct address. God cannot be addressed as He, for the third person only speaks of allegory. Only in the second person of address, when "we say Thou to Him, then mortal sense has set the unbroken truth of the world into a word."³⁵

In the meeting state of presentness, God is Barth's "wholly other" and Otto's "mysterious tremendum," but for

³³Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 78. ³⁴*Ibid.*

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 99.

Buber He is more correctly "Wholly present--the mystery of the self-evident, nearer to me than I."³⁶

This is something of what Buber means by the extended lines of relation meeting in the Eternal Thou. In the conversation of this meeting all other relation participates, and from it all other meeting receives its value and meaning. Above all hear this:

relation with man [of man] is the "real simile of the relation with God," for in it "true address receives true response." But in God's response all the *universe* is made manifest as language.³⁷

THE MEDIATOR

The extended lines of relation which meet in the Eternal Thou must pass through Jesus the Christ--the Mediator. This is the radical contribution of Brunner, the Christian theologian, to this discussion. Only in Jesus Christ has God been personally present.³⁸ This is the Living Word of relation, and apart from Him the lines of no other relation are able to meet in the Eternal Thou. Because Christ is so emphatically important in Brunner's theology, we must turn to a brief examination of his christolo-

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 79.

³⁷Maurice S. Friedman, *Martin Buber* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 74.

³⁸H. Emil Brunner, *Revelation and Reason* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1946), p. 93.

gy in order to understand his contribution to the subject.

Christian faith is most simply expressed as "faith in Jesus." This is not merely belief in Him as Lord, but "obedient faith" to Him as person. It is not belief in Him as fact, but acceptance of Him in relation.

In this simple confession [faith in Jesus Christ], the nature of the Christian Faith appears with complete clarity--it is trust in and obedience to the personally present Lord.³⁹

In answer to his own question of why Christ is necessary at all, and why isn't personal correspondence with God possible without Christ, Brunner states that, contrary to the Greek concept of abstract truth, Jesus Christ confronts man as Truth come into being. This is a stumbling block to the wise. The Greeks knew well enough that truth "is that which is timeless, the changeless which is subject to the eternal."⁴⁰ It is an utterly absurd contradiction of terms for truth to *come into being*. But, this is exactly the core of the Biblical message. The revelation in Christ is that:

Truth is something that *happens*, which God *does*, Truth and Grace are spoken in the same Word: Truth like Grace is *encounter* between God and Man; Truth and Grace come into being in Jesus Christ.⁴¹

Here is truth personified. Truth is apprehended, as already stated, by the entering of relation between persons. Grace

³⁹H. Emil Brunner, *The Divine-Human Encounter* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1943), p. 139.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 140. ⁴¹*Ibid.*

too is personified in that Jesus Christ is God's unveiling of Himself where none have seen.⁴² This is the divine initiative in the act of reconciliation. It is the act of love, the act of God in self-sacrificial communication. The act of reconciliation is unmerited grace to man and voluntary gift from God.

The Incarnation is the exhibition of the loving condescension of God in the only way sinful humanity could understand.⁴³

The Word is the term Brunner uses for this act of self-revelation. Brunner's Word is inclusive of, but has a much wider connotation than the Greek *logos*. The *logos* as the immanent reason principle

while it is necessary for the understanding of all . . . that is human, ignores the real human element in life. Equally it ignores the real God.⁴⁴

There is no meeting of the immanent logos of man with the transcendent rational logos principle of the universe. The meshing of these two because of their continuity and likeness is not the true conversation of God and man. This

⁴²Cf. Lewis J. Sherrill in his book *The Gift of Power* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 75, says: "To believe that Christ is the Word of God is to believe that what God has communicated is not a proposition, not a doctrine, but a Person. Grace and Truth are disclosed as a concrete individual Person which can be seen, heard and responded to."

⁴³H. Emil Brunner, *The Mediator* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1947), p. 491.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 211.

metaphysical principle would make man and God common subsidiaries of equal status. The theologian does not speak in such terms or the Christian live within them. There is a radical discontinuity between God and man. Instead of the immanent logos, the theologian refers to the image of God in man. In the New Testament the *imago dei* has been destroyed.

The breaking of man's relation with God means that the image of God in man has also been broken. This does not mean that it no longer exists, but that it has been perverted. . . .Hate does not mean that love has gone but that love has been turned into its opposite.⁴⁵

The fact is that man in primal relation with God had the freedom to destroy that relation, but once destroyed he has not the freedom or the power to reinstate himself.

The real situation is that the perversion of man's relation with God carries with it the perversion of his nature as it actually is.⁴⁶

The restoration could only come from "the other side."

Jesus Christ as His word of forgiveness and reconciliation is God's initiation of restoration. This Word is the *between* of restored relation.

The Incarnation does not merely mean the removal of a physical taint (sin), but the restoration of the original image of God, and with it the original relation to God, and this not in a magical way, but by means of the renewed knowledge of God, and the faith which is determined by this.⁴⁷

⁴⁵H. Emil Brunner, *The Mediator* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1947), p. 491.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 135.

But how?

The Redeemer and Relation. How is the relation restored? Through the work of the Redeemer. Brunner believes that the main tradition of the Christian Faith has erred in its central emphasis on the Incarnation. The most significant thing in the restored relation is the *work of redeeming*. The verb is the main figure of speech in the language of the Bible. It is not the substantive but the verb. Christ did not merely exist; He came acting in redemption. The very person of Christ is His work. He is the *act* of God and it is always an act towards man to the end of restored relation. One can say

He is the *act* of God, even as He is the Word of God.
 . . . In Him, not only through Him, does God do something to us. In Him, God reveals Himself; in Him, God reconciles the world to Himself; in Him, God redeems us.⁴⁸

The priestly office of Christ is significant. This too is in the verbal. There is a twofold sacrificial aspect in this office. He is both the priest who sacrifices and the Lamb who is sacrificed. God in Christ fulfills both of these functions. They are both functions of giving, never receiving. This fact must be reiterated in contradiction to the satisfaction theory of the atonement. It is not the sacrifice of appeasement to an angry God. This doctrine gives no

⁴⁷Brunner, *The Mediator*, p. 491.

⁴⁸Brunner, *The Divine-Human Encounter*, p. 143.

depth of meaning to the atonement. To give satisfaction to a demanding God or objective Principle was not the purpose of Christ's sacrifice. In Christ is seen most dramatically, both in the role of Lamb and Priest, the willing act of Giving in self-communication towards renewed relation. He is not a demanded appeasement. He is the gift to fellowship. God's will to fellowship with man is never more strikingly and dramatically displayed than in the person and work of Christ. In Him is seen the clearest and most complete unveiling of the acting and participating God.

Sacrifice to Relation. As on the one side it is said by Brunner that Christ's sacrifice is not to be thought of as a sacrifice to God, it may be conjectured that it is also not to be considered as a sacrifice to man. It is the sacrifice to *relation*. There are two sides to relation so there are two sides to the sacrifice. As on God's side there is the death of a self, so on man's.⁴⁹ This aspect discussed in the previous chapter is excitingly appropriate here. Both God and man are involved in the total sacrifice, neither to the other, but each to reconciliation. In restored relation both God and man are completed.⁵⁰ In His

⁴⁹Brunner recapitulates the point in *The Theology of Crisis* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), p. 66: "Self-will is God's greatest opponent in this world. Only when self-reliant ego is dethroned and Christ is Lord, can one do that which is well pleasing to God."

priestly office, as sacrifice to relation, Christ mediates the "lines of relation," and enables them to meet in the Eternal Thou. "On this Good Friday event depends the fundamental biblical category: Personal Correspondence."⁵¹ This is Brunner's term for relation.

Person and Mediator. Jesus Christ as the divine person becomes the real Mediator. The theologian's concept of "person" unites the divine and the human natures of Christ.⁵² Person here means much more than personality.

⁵⁰The writer accepts responsibility for the suggestion that God is incomplete without man. This whole concept will be dealt with in Section 3. This is not Brunner's thought. Brunner may allow it, Barth never. Barth called Tillich to task on just this point. He claims that Tillich's method of correlation, as applied to the divine-human relationship, makes the Godhead partly dependent on man. In his *Systematic Theology*, I, 61, Tillich replies: "Although God in His abysmal nature (Calvin's 'in His essence') is in no way dependent on man, God in His self-manifestation to man is dependent on the way man receives His manifestation." It might be added that such "dependence" is self-imposed by the nature of God, which is holy love.

⁵¹Brunner, *The Divine-Human Encounter*, p. 147.

⁵²Traditional orthodox christology in its debates on the two natures is superseded by this insight of Brunner. Pellican, writing on "Bonhoeffer's Christology" (Martin E. Marty [ed.], *The Place of Bonhoeffer* [New York: Association Press, 1962], pp. 145 ff.), strikes a similar note when he claims that Bonhoeffer "found it impossible to make the traditional notion of the two natures in Christ the basis of his lectures . . . instead he took his start from the 'for me' (*pro me*) in the doctrine of the reformers. . . . 'Christ for me' is matter neither of dogma or research . . . but of the Church's experience" (*ibid.*, p. 147).

Personality belongs to the human and historical figure of Christ.

Let us on no account make an 'historical personality' an object of reverence. . . . An 'historical personality' means a vessel for the redeeming power of God, but it is not itself the redeeming content. . . . If we are to be merely concerned with His personality, all we mean is summed up in His own words: "Why callest thou Me good? There is none good save one, even God."⁵³

There is more than "personality" involved in Christ. He represents an "idea" in the mind of God. He is the idea become Word from God. The "function of personality is simply to illustrate and 'form' the Idea."⁵⁴ From the human side of perception there is a separation of "form" and "idea." "Person" as a concept is the combination of these two. But conceptual knowledge is always limited knowledge. For Brunner, there is another depth dimension to "knowledge." It is the "knowledge" of relation in personal correspondence. This is revelation. Christ is the Word from the other side. He is not merely the "vehicle" of a "partial" revelation, as were the prophets before Him,⁵⁵ He *is* the revelation. He is not the messenger. He is the *message*. As the Word, He is not merely the bearer of an "idea."⁵⁶ He is not merely an

⁵³Brunner, *The Mediator*, p. 265. ⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 267.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 222.

⁵⁶Pellican (in Marty, *op. cit.*, p. 149) paraphrases Bonhoeffer in support of this point: "Christ as Word is God's address to man. The Word as idea can be passive and dormant, but the Word as address is possible only in rela-

historical personality. In *person* he becomes both of these together. He is Himself the "Authority, the most intensely personal Word of God."⁵⁷ But, Christ as person in this sense can only be apprehended by faith,

. . . for here "Person" means simply the Divine personality, the personal God. The personal God is He who is only recognized as God in the personal revelation, the God who is known . . . [and] apart from this revelation God is only known impersonally, . . . He is only known on the basis of an Idea.⁵⁸

The person of Christ, as the union of the divine and human, is proleptically the highest elevation of man's dignity. He too may become person. Man does not become person in the same sense as Christ is person. Christ is "naturally" God in Himself. Man is created anew in the image of God. Nevertheless, the new man is worthy to be called "Person," for as he is able to re-enter the relation of personal correspondence, that which "separation" had destroyed, is fully restored--namely, the image of God in man. He now inherits the promise made to him from the beginning of time--to become a person.

A "Person," in the full sense of the word, is not an entity which exists in its own right; one becomes a person through the call of God, "heard" in the decision of faith.⁵⁹

tionship; the Word as idea is timeless truth but the Word as address takes place in time and history."

⁵⁷Brunner, *The Mediator*, p. 267. ⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 268.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p. 270.

That person is the man who has found himself. That is the person who has lost himself in relation. And that seems to be the way to the Eternal Thou.

CHAPTER XI

RELATION AND EDUCATION

The *telos* of man is relation. It is relation as a means to find himself. To establish "self-identity" is not the *telos* nor is it to find some exchatological meaning and purpose to life. *Telos* is relation. All other things come into proper perspective when man achieves this end.

All education, all growth, all life is dependent on and participates in process to the end of relation. To those who give themselves to the formal education of man, as well as those who have to do with the informal nurture of persons at the critical stages of the developmental task, is given a heavy responsibility. The Christian educator has the additional burden of a peculiar authority, and the additional credentials of an experience in "The Way." He is not merely a medium of knowledge. He is something of a witness to his subject. He does not deal primarily with facts. His business is relation. His teaching has not so much to do with preliminary cares but with an ultimate concern. He is not especially qualified to speak of *finis*, but has some authority to tell of *telos*. For specific ends he may use his skills. For the general end he must use his life. And sometimes he tends to forget.

This section has been concerned implicitly with the

matter of Christian education. The previous section lent itself to some applications in pastoral counseling. This section as naturally gives itself to evolving some explicit tenets of a philosophy of Christian education. To this end attention is now directed.

TRANSFERENCE AND RELATION

According to Horney, the most valuable of all of Freud's discoveries is

his finding that one can utilize for therapy the patient's emotional reactions to the analyst and to the analytical situation.¹

This is the classical concept of transference. The relevance of the theory of transference to education is significant. The reason this basic psychoanalytic theory has not been given prior attention is because the theory as such is not accorded a formal place in Sullivan's thinking. It may be claimed that Sullivan is only adapting this Freudian concept when he speaks of "parataxic distortions," in which the patient attributes to others the traits of childhood significant others.² Other Sullivan concepts of "fantastic personification" and "stereotypes" or "false personifica-

¹Karen Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* (New York: Norton, 1939), p. 154.

²James A. C. Brown in his book *Freud and the Post-Freudians* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961), p. 168, makes this exact equation.

tions³ are also modes of transference phenomenon. The acceptance of the principle of

acting out of troublesome motivations--in or outside of the therapy situation, and usually both--with little or no awareness of the meaning of the performances⁴

is an additional mode of transference as reflected by Ruth Munroe.⁵

As the theory of transference has an accepted role in all major schools of psychoanalysis, it may be conceded that it has some relevance to the educative process. A closer examination is justified.

Early in his analytic experience Freud notices that the patient not only talked about his problems past and present but became emotionally involved with the therapist. This involvement often assumed fantastic proportions of exaggeration and an irrational dimension. Munroe reports that:

Freud observed that his patients tended to ascribe to him the attributes of God Almighty--a phenomenon initially acceptable enough to his ego. The patients also showed a tendency, however, to react to him as though he were the devil incarnate--to a point at which he was glad to conclude that he could not possibly be as bad as their accusations implied.⁶

³Harry Stack Sullivan, *Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry* (New York: Norton, 1953), p. 137.

⁴Harry Stack Sullivan, *Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry* (New York: Norton, 1940), p. 222.

⁵*Infra*, p. 250.

Clara Thompson reflects Freud's early concept of transference when she states that

Freud soon defined transference more precisely as a repetition of the attitude towards parents at one particular period in childhood, the period of the Oedipus complex. With almost monotonous regularity at some stage in every analysis, the patient began apparently to neglect his problem and concern himself with the analyst.⁷

Transference became a great therapeutic tool, the master allowed, when it became the medium whereby the patient could relive and so relieve the repressed memories of childhood in his "acting out" with the therapist. Freud was appreciative of this analytic resource but warned that "acting out" was not of itself therapeutic and should always be used only within the analytic encounter.⁸ The essential analyst posture throughout was that of "a benign, authoritative objectivity, . . . and detachment," not only as safeguard against the counter-transference of the therapist but also to encourage the process of transference in the patient, the objectivity necessary for skilled analysis and interpretation and the befitting image of confident authori-

⁶Ruth L. Munroe, *Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1955), p. 305.

⁷Clara Thompson and Patrick Mullahy, *Psychoanalysis: Evolution and Development* (New York: Grove Press, 1950), p. 99.

⁸Donald H. Ford and Hugh B. Urban, *Systems of Psychotherapy* (New York: Wiley, 1963), p. 172.

ty necessary for the "faith" of the patient.⁹

The post-Freudians have broadened the concept. Ranke limited transference to mother transference and in his emphasis on the present therapy encounter rather than the past childhood experience would not allow himself to accept the Freudian theory that transference was a "reliving" of the past by the patient. He emphasised that it is the present therapist relationship which is the source of the hostility and therapy takes place in the handling of the present situation.¹⁰ Horney also accentuates the importance of the patient's present experience and claims that transference phenomenon is not a "carbon copy" of the child's experience of father at four years, but rather the end result of circular accretions to a concept of authority which may have had its beginnings at that early age.¹¹ Munroe refers to Adler, Horney, Fromm and Sullivan when she claims that Freud's original concept

has been broadened to the point at which transference means any relationship to the analyst determined by the basic attitudes of the patient regardless of "reality."¹²

⁹Munroe, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

¹⁰Thompson and Mullahy, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

¹¹Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, p. 164. Also, Thompson and Mullahy, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

¹²Munroe, *op. cit.*, p. 518.

Five Modes of Transference. Munroe distinguishes five modes of transference which are of particular significance for the discussion concerning pedagogical relationships. In her opinion the concept of transference is relevant to relationships of all kinds. Munroe plays down the use of transference and substitutes the "as if" terminology of Sullivan because in fact

the patient sees all people, including the analyst, at all times through the glasses of his own personality. So does the healthy person, though his image may be somewhat less distorted. . . . The "real" analyst is "real" only in so far as he is no more distorted than other associates the patient encounters outside the analyst's office.¹³

It needs to be noted however that when the term "transference" is used it usually is in reference to that particular relationship of the therapist to the patient. In the five modes now under examination Munroe gives credit for various of her groupings to Mittelmann and Horney.¹⁴

The first broad category is that of the *repetitive phenomena*. This was an early observation of Freud and is supported to some extent by Sullivan's theory of "selective inattention." Early childhood tends to block out any threatening interpersonal relationships with significant others. It seems necessary to Sullivan that these experiences be worked through with the analyst. In both cases

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 525. ¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 524.

there is some repetition of early childhood experiences as part of the transference phenomenon. This applies to the pedagogical role assumed by the teacher as an early authority figure in the life of the child. The educator is in an admirable position at an early stage of development to use most constructively the catharsis of the cathectic representations of unresolved and disappointing early significant other relationships. A teacher conscious of the negative roles of the parents can play them down in his own relationship with the child and support the more positive ones. The informed teacher is grateful to the psychoanalytic insight of the repetitive mode of transference and with skill uses it to the benefit of pedagogical relation. He is also warned concerning the dangers of counter-transference so that he may avoid them in the classroom.

The second category is that of *expectation of magical support*. Feelings of helplessness on the part of the patient, and the therapist conceived by him as the "last hope" for health, combine within the therapeutic interview to magnify the illusion of the omnipotence of the therapist. Freud encouraged such positive transference. In analysis the patient is asked to relax all his previously guarded defenses and controls. This demands faith in the therapist and encourages regression to the feeling of dependence of childhood. Freud agrees that abreaction is more likely un-

der such conditions. Horney stresses the dangers of this interpretation and that of over-dependency in the relationship and calls for more respect for the phenomenon in the present situation with both its promise of growth and health or the threat of continuing exacerbation of the vicious circle of disappointing relationships. The warnings are applicable to the educator as well as the promises. The magic authority ascribed to the teacher is a commonly observed occurrence. The teacher who is able to use this transference manifestation to give emotional support and elicit motivation for learning without attendant over-dependency has a valued pedagogical tool at hand. The Christian educator has an additional safeguard ready at hand against unrealistic ascription of omnipotence to himself, by his pupils, by his ready witness to the fact of his own existential dependence upon that One whom he worships in common with the pupil.

The third category is that of *analysis as a threat*. Because the illness of the neurotic is the creation of the defense patterns against what have been interpreted as unacceptable impulses, any attempt of transference which would tend to drop those defenses is felt as a threat by the organism. Analysis attempts to uncover such defenses in the attempt to reconstruct a healthy basis of personality. The process is felt as risk by the patient and often

the disturbances caused by the ambivalence of the process get worse before they get better. Horney has

pointed specifically to a kind of rhythm of partial relapse after major gains in insight have been achieved.¹⁵

As long as the patient has been forewarned about the possible deterioration before recovery his confidence may not be impaired. This category is not readily applicable to the educator and properly belongs to the realm of the depth psychologist. An understanding of the dynamics of the process involved, however, helps the teacher to understand and accept some of the less acceptable behaviour patterns of defensive children as they traverse this mode of transfer with the teacher. The symptoms of mild reaction formations of rebellion or withdrawal or overcompensations of many types could indicate real progress in establishing good teacher-pupil rapport.

The next category of transference is that of *fear of exposure; shame and humiliation*. Patients are not as comfortable in "telling all" as the posture they sometimes assume would indicate. The practice is contrary to all social convention and foreign to the feelings of inner security which are often dependent on a camouflage of the "shameful" facts not known by others about the patient.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 526.

The impulsive or even reluctant divulgence of these "secrets" in the process of therapy are subsequently regretted. The resultant feelings of defenseless exposure, shame and humiliation serve to cathect the transference emotions. The therapist should not only be sensitive to this symptomatology but also, as advised by Horney, deal tactfully with the data and the process as it presents itself.

Perhaps the parallel in the pedagogical relationship is the "finding out" by the teacher in pupil's tests or exams or papers. The embarrassment of having not only the class but more especially the teacher know that the pupil could not answer the question asked in class, is a mild form of shame. The teacher sensitive to this mode, like the sensitive therapist, will be able to use such occasions to strengthen and not weaken the relationship so essential to emotional and intellectual growth. The Christian educator by careful explanation and his own confession displays his own healthy imperfection and his confidence of his acceptance in spite of them, as he joins with his pupil in worship of their common God. This indicates to the insecure pupil that it is not as threatening to examine his defences as he imagined and that it may even be advantageous in certain circumstances to drop some of them.

Another category of significance to this discussion

is that of *working through* the stages of analysis. Munroe claims that the working through to abreaction and new insights with the resultant character changes are manifestations of the transference phenomenon. These processes of "working through," as Freud clearly saw it, not only occur within the consultation but are also effective and effective in the outside and "real" relationships of the patient.

Thus there is a constant irregular to-and-from movement between analysis of the transference to the analyst at the various levels here suggested, of the past as it clarifies the origin of the transference attitudes or as the release of the repressed (dissociated) attitudes, and, finally, of the current life of the patient.¹⁶

When the patient is "functionally" able to work through his relationships outside as well as inside the therapy hour then it may be supposed that he has returned to psychic health.

The attentive teacher will observe the discrepancies between the ways in which a pupil relates to teacher and to his fellow students. Differences of untoward magnitude could be construed as the failure of the classroom situation to meet the emotional needs of the pupil. It is possible that bad peer relations indicate a "working through" of unresolved authority figure conflicts which are too threatening to be worked through in the teacher-pupil relations. Any discrepancies could therefore indicate the lack of a

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 529.

realistic dimension in transference relationships with authority figures. This is of special significance to the Christian educator because in general the child who is able to relate as naturally to peers and authority figures alike has the best basis for entering into good religious relation with God also.

THE SINGLE ONE

To substantiate the thesis that relation does not negate the peculiar identity of the individual, a brief study will be made of what Buber calls "the single one." The term "individual" is too heavily endowed with the nuances of separation to be acceptable to either Brunner or Buber. Each in his own time has substituted the term "person" and enriched immeasurably thereby the concept of man's uniqueness as a being. In this instant, however, it is the term "single one" which Buber employs as the "form" of his "idea."

In contrast he uses the "solitary one" of Kierkegaard and the "unique one" of Stirner. Buber's "single one" is distinct from Stirner's "unique one" who is "the present, individual, exclusive 'I,' the bearer of his world."¹⁷ Stirner leads his unique one out of the blind

¹⁷Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 41.

and dark alleys of shackling conformity and obedience, discarding all excess baggage of ideological ballast, into the open country "where each is the unique one and the world is his property."¹⁸ Truth to him is "*his truth*," not the *ethos* and *religio* of any other. "The solipsist" is an apt caption for Stirner's unique one, and given an enhancing frame, presents a very compelling picture of "magnificent man." It is the picture of man who stands in the face of the whole universe of his own existence in defiance of his contingency. It is an extreme sample of the "courage to be." It is the picture perhaps needed in times of adversity, when man is in danger of being overwhelmed by the predicament of his existence. But it is not the whole picture. It is partial. It is the stance of the "partial I."

The "single one" is not the individual detecting his existence, and taking his stance in spite of it (*trotz*) in the center of his universe. It is rather the person finding himself¹⁹ as a meaningful "entity-part" of that universe. Buber's person has come to know himself as an individual whole, because he is part of the "super-individual whole."²⁰ He is not the single one by the shaping of an individuality through severance of the self from the world,

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 49. ¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 42.

²⁰Andras Angyal, *Foundations for a Science of Personality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941).

from the ontic otherness of things and lives, so that they may only serve as "nourishment of his selfhood."²¹ Such a one as this cannot enter conversation with his environment. He has separated himself from it. Stirner's "unique one" cannot say "Thou." The single one can converse. This is why he must be a single one. He is single but not separate. He is unique because he is unified not because he is isolated.

This is Buber's single one.

The "solitary one" of Kierkegaard is closer to Buber's "single one."²² The solitary one knows responsibility not known to Stirner's unique one. Its mould for the soul is "obey the Lord." In this mould the "solitary one" becomes the "category through which, from the religious standpoint, time and history and the race must pass."²³ It participates and does not withdraw from existence as such. However, to become responsible and obedient and the focal point of the here and now of meaningful existence, the

²¹Buber, *Between Man and Man*, p. 44.

²²The liberty has been taken here to use the term "solitary one" (a Kierkegaardian term) for what Buber presents as Kierkegaard's concepts, and the "single one" for his own. A reading of the source will show that these terms are not those consistently used, and that Buber has no specific term to distinguish his views. The present writer accepts responsibility for the use of these terms to make the distinction for which he is not, of course, responsible.

solitary one must "withdraw from the crowd."

The crowd is untruth. . . . No one is excluded from becoming [the Solitary One] except him who excludes himself by wanting to be crowd,²⁴ [and] being in the crowd either releases from repentance and responsibility or weakens responsibility . . . because the crowd leaves only a fraction of responsibility to [the Solitary One].²⁵

The solitary one is not to be equated with the "single one" of Socrates, for his goal is not the "right" life, but to enter into relation, "that relation for whose sake man exists."²⁶

Buber's "single one" is different. First, his obedience is not merely that of the "ancient, misused, desecrated, outworn, inviolable 'obey the Lord,'" but of free and willing volition to unity with his being. The single one lives with the "body politic" (the crowd), not because he is bundles along with it, but because *he* has bound himself to it. He is mindful of the dangers, but takes responsibility for them as much as he blames the crowd. The single one does not renounce the crowd. He accepts some responsibility for it and enters into relation with it. The single one always questions the decision of the crowd. The crowd gives direction but direction is never a substitute for decision. Every situation demands

²³Buber, *Between Man and Man*, p. 42.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 59. ²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 46. ²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 50.

decision from the single one, for he is responsible to answer.

Buber again stresses that he is not speaking of the "individual" or of "individualism." "The Individual is not the starting point or the goal of the human world."²⁷ It is rather the human person who stands at the center of the world. He is at the center of the movement of the world away from or towards the ultimate relation--God. This is the movement which takes place within groups not between them. The single one knows he is bound to his Lord with his total being and that includes his group life. This binding of himself alone makes him free to community. "Only those who are bound and free in this way can still produce what is truly called community."²⁸

The single one enters relation. But it is not to the exclusion of any or all other as it is with the "solitary one." Kierkegaard's renunciation of Regina Olsen was in fact a renunciation of impersonal being, not a particular being representing people in the foreground and the crowd in the background. Exclusive love of God must be all inclusive because God is God of all. God's creation is not a hurdle on the way to Himself; it is part of the path to the end and something of an end in itself. For those who

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 70. ²⁸*Ibid.*

tread such a path know the Regina Olsens as person and not impersonally any longer. God is not the successful rival of other things (Regina included). All other things are included in the relation with Him. All others are seen as "single ones" through the eyes of a single one, because they are bound together in relation.

God is not, indeed, Cosmos, but far less is His Being minus Cosmos. He is not to be found by subtraction and not to be loved by reduction.²⁹

The relation of the single one is not union. Identity is not lost in relation. Only by remaining a single one can one enter relation at all. Only as the single one can man stand before God. As the single one he must stand over against God or else worship degenerates to the self-worship of pantheism. The single one contradicts the error of pantheism. Relation is fellowship for the single one and not impersonal union. This is real meeting.

The Educator and the Single One. When the Christian educator looks at his pupil he must seek for the single one. He must communicate to him his infinite worth and dignity, not with partial words of "individual" and "selfhood," but with the whole terms of "single one" and "personhood." These are the terms of relation. It is not a language of indignity and loss of identity, but the reminder of man's

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 58.

supreme dignity and infinite identity.

There is a most practical application of Buber's philosophy to Christian education. It is illustrated by his concept of "I-Thou" relation with a tree. This is possible only as the lines of such relation meet in the Eternal Thou and are reciprocated in personal and intimate response. Such relation belongs in the classroom. It may even be said that the only I-Thou relation possible with one teacher in front of a class is of this kind. The efficacy of relation in the education process is now widely accepted, but the question of *one* teacher to a large number of pupils constitutes a new impossibility for one-to-one classroom relationships. How is it possible to have "I-Thou" relationships with a whole class,

a conglomeration of faces which greet the educator's early morning glance. Faces, animal faces, empty faces, and noble faces; the misshapen and the well proportioned, indiscriminately flung together.³⁰

It is impossible for a teacher--finite being--to embrace them all continually in the genuine "I-Thou" relation. It is only as he has a "cosmic" attitude through the extended lines of relation that enables the teacher to "accept them all--the faces, in his first glance." The non-verbal communication of such an attitude of acceptance on the part of the teacher provides the security necessary for the most

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 94.

creative teaching-learning relationship. Pupil-teacher rapport assures genuine two-way communication. Here also is one-to-one relation in the classroom possible. Out of a bounty of goodwill and as asceticism which rejoices in the world nothing is impersonal any longer. Learning happens in such an atmosphere because here is the matrix of relation.

The teacher with such an attitude towards his world achieves immediate rapport with his class because he cultivates the habit of empathy. Real empathy is the reversal of the instincts of *eros*, with *eros* interpreted either as will to power or dependence. He is at the opposite extreme to that one whose erotic will to power makes him a manipulator of things and people to suit his purpose. He is different from that one who demands sensuous satisfaction in every relationship. These instincts are reversed in empathy. The will to power is transferred to the Thou of relation. The I opens itself to the will of the Thou in careless abandon. It is the "erotic" satisfaction of the Thou which becomes the concern of the I, and according to Buber it is in this relation that the continuum between *eros* and *agape* is traversed. There is no discontinuity between these two. One is but the broken winged bird of the other. In such empathy the striker receives and feels his own blow in the body of his fellow. The lover feels his caress in

the body of his beloved. This is genuine empathy. It is the way of the educator. Yet it is not a cultivated art, this empathy. It is not empathy which merely feels with the other, but is the attitude of unpremeditated "inclusion" which knows in dialogical relation both the knower and the known. It is this attitude of "inclusion" which constitutes relation at its most elevated level. It is the attitude most becoming of the Christian educator.

He is no descendent of the Greek gods, [the teacher] who kidnapped those they loved. But it seems to me they represent the true God. For if God forms the light and creates darkness, man is able to love both-- to love light in itself, and darkness towards that light.³¹

Here is both the consolation and the challenge of the educator.

TELL THE STORY

Brunner's most persistent advice to the Christian educator is to "tell the story." "Story" is the best medium of the "Word." The story is the story of God's redemptive acts as contained in the biblical accounts of men's lives, nations' epochs; especially the story of the birth, life and death of Jesus. It is the *kerygmatic* story which must be told. The paradigm of the *kerygma* is the story of the person of the mediator.

³¹*Ibid.*

Revelation and Relation. This does not mean that the Christian educator has only one story. Brunner subscribes to a certain doctrine of general revelation. God can be known *about* in His natural world, and many of His attributes can be learned *about* and illustrated *from* His handiwork in creation. But, "through God alone can God be known"³² is the never ending theme of Brunner's theology. General revelation is recognised only as *indirect* revelation. When this distinction is not made and men imagine general revelation is "authentic knowledge of God they are in untruth."³³ Direct revelation is only received through *personal encounter* in revelation. This is Brunner's principle of personal correspondence which is basic to his theology. If, as he claims, personal correspondence with God is only transacted through the Mediator, then the story of the Mediator is the story to tell. The Christian educator is the story teller.

It must be noted however, that the telling of the story is not the act of relation. The story becomes the medium of the work which calls men into relation. That the medium should ever be transformed into the living Word of relation is the providential work of God alone. The word as *promised* becomes the word *fulfilled*. All the Christian

³²H. Emil Brunner, *The Mediator* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947), p. 21.

³³*Ibid.*, p. 32.

educator may do is to tell this story. As there is a recognisable degree in the certitude of the revelation itself, so there is a degree in the clarity of the medium of revelation. The most vivid, effective and decisive medium of revelation is the story of the Mediator.

Why?

Because, *first*, "Only in the Mediator do we know ourselves as we really are."³⁴ Although there is self-knowledge apart from Christ, none goes to the root of the matter as the self-knowledge apprehended in Christ. Apart from the revelation of self-knowledge in Christ men are divided into stoics or epicureans. Both cherish illusions about man. The stoic becomes a cynical determinist, while the epicurean becomes an enthusiastic idealist. The stoic sees himself bound by nature who is a law unto herself and captive to the biological drives of his own nature. "The machine is kept going by hunger and by love."³⁵ The epicurean sees only too clearly the difference between the present state of man and the ideal possibility of humanity. He knows the responsibility of the spirit as distinct from that of the flesh. But he knows nothing of the presence of explanation of evil, the bondage of the will and the realities of guilt and death. If he has an inkling of these

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 600. ³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 601.

things he fails to recognise them as realities. He is deluded by his utopian image of himself, as the stoic is shackled in himself by fatalism. Neither knows the true man.

The Christian view of human reality comes not so much from within man, but from the "other side" in the person and work of the Mediator. No other source is available to indicate that: (1) man is created by God; (2) man is created to live in fellowship with God; (3) man has destroyed this relation and cannot restore it. The need for this restoration only becomes known to man in the moment it takes place. This is his existential moment on the Cross.

Only at the Cross do we know our guilt as human beings, without any excuse; our impotence to redeem ourselves without going to the extreme of fatalism, and the glory of our original destiny without wallowing in sentimental utopianism.³⁶

In the life, birth and death of Jesus Christ the Mediator does man feel the word of separation and hear the word of recall. Christ becomes the image of the way back. This is the story of the Mediator.

In the *second* place, "only in the Mediator is the Good known as Love."³⁷ There has always been the struggle for moral man to interpret and practice the good. He has felt himself bound to ethical consideration. In attempting

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 602. ³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 603.

to realise this ethic for life man has oscillated between the extremes of a strict paralysing legalism and an unsatisfying eudaemonism. The identification of the will of God with the good is clearly revealed in the life and death of the Mediator, and the incarnation is the story which defines the good as love. Such an image of love is the only historical synthesis strong enough to attract the two drives in man of *inclination* and *duty*. Only love can successfully unite the two. The Mediator represents, transmits and inspires this synthesising response on the part of man in the personification of such love. Christ is love, love in action, the will of God revealed in act. The mystic knows love only by introversion and recollection. Mysticism knows only the God approached by such meditation. It speaks nothing of the God who Himself approaches. It does not know the love which stoops to help, the love which acts to forgive and restore. The will of God--the good, is revealed only in His *act* of love. This act is Jesus the Christ. He is the act of mediation.

In the *third* place, "only in the Mediator is it possible to see and love one's neighbour."³⁸ This point has been covered well in the study of the "extended lines of relation meeting in the Eternal Thou," but here is a new

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 605.

thought. In the Mediator is the love of God present with us. The relation is love. Once this relation is recognised, love can never be anything less than what God brings to us. Other "neighbourly" ethics only demand respect. Hitherto the man next door is respected as a particular representative of the generally respected humanity. Now the mediated relation of love demands infinitely more. The neighbour is no longer a representative, a case, a need, and relation to him is not only a matter of the application of a law. The new dimension of "Thou" has been added. Such a movement towards relation is only possible subsequent to the movement of the Mediator to me. This movement of man's horizontal relation to his neighbour is merely the continuation of the primary vertical relation. Such love

is no human possibility, it is a denial of all that might be regarded as love from the purely human point of view.³⁹

Its stimulation is the Mediator.

Fourth, "only in faith in the Mediator is our arrogant self-will broken,"⁴⁰ and the primal relationship with God restored. All natural ethics are self-assertion. This is a degeneration of the doctrine of "justification by works." The principle of individuality, the striving for a "more spiritual self" and even Rousseau's doctrine of "true

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 606. ⁴⁰*Ibid.*

nature" which has exerted an influence on education to a large extent, are condemned as inadequate philosophies of life, when one stands in the light of relationship with the Mediator. Such a "spiritual self" is no entity and only assumes partial existence at all as the result of self-determination. Its basic premise is that the present state of man is good. Man has no chance of entering a primal relation with God while he considers himself a rival to God or as an equal or identical being with Him. The protest against accepting his "creaturehood" in realistic humility is the protest of the "partial I." It is the retreat of the defensive ego. When one recognises the role of the Mediator man sees himself and his situation as it is. To accept the claims of the Mediator is to accept his existence as creaturely. It is to express his dependence and contingency. Arrogant self-will in rebelling against such humiliation destroys the possibility of entrance into the primal relation. It is the rebellion of the partial self and it is the destruction of the "whole" self.

Entering into relation with the Mediator is to accept Him for what He is, and one's self for what he is. Such relation is an act of faith, and faith always involves repentance. This is a stumbling block for the wise and the mature. For a child it is simple.

Repentance and faith are the same thing. Both mean the cessation of the false independence of man and open the

way for his return to the original attitude of dependence. This return is the only thing which has an independent moral value. All other values are merely derived from something else.⁴¹

The story of the Mediator is the story of realistic assessments. Realistic assessment of man's true state is painful and involves the destruction of those forces within man which would militate against his entry into relation. To tell the story of the Mediator is to tell this story.

Finally, "only through faith in the Mediator does man gain real relation with historical reality."⁴² Realism is trapped on the treadmill of history. Idealism is betrayed by overconfidence in the ultimate utopia of progressive man. False assumptions are their fallacious foundation. The advent of the Mediator proclaimed a Lord of meaningful history and gave man the way off the treadmill. He also revealed the daemonic in man which frustrates his path of progress and inevitably leads to death and judgment. Judgment, his coming declared, is the unavoidable consequence of sin. The judgment of sin is separation, the state of non-relation. The Mediator, by definition, supplies the way back into relation and eternally frustrates judgment. Death is robbed of its sting. There is no longer an end of history. History has now been transformed into relation with the Mediator. The tabloid of this history

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 610. ⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 613.

is the story of Easter. The Christian educator and the pastoral counselor are the only story tellers of this peculiar story.

The telling of the story is not necessarily the verbalising of all that has been said in this last section on Brunner. All that the theologian asks is that the story be told and allowed to speak for itself. It is the best possible medium of truth for it is the medium of relation.

Neither is the story only related verbally. It is lived in relation with what it tells. Neither is it only communicated in words. In the non-verbal communication of attitude, expression, gesture and enthusiasm of the storyteller is the story heard and it is not merely heard. In the posture of the teacher or counselor towards him does the pupil experience this story. Beyond the merely intellectual level of apprehension is the story known in its depths. As in the metaverbal is the story's language of relation communicated, so in the metarational is its deepest meaning experienced.

SECTION 3
GOD AS SOCIAL BEING

CHAPTER XII

THE ABSOLUTE GOD REJECTED

There could be no better starting point for a critical survey of absolutism than the philosophy of John Dewey. A general criticism of the absolutism is inherent in Dewey's "naturalism," but particular attention is focused on what he has to say concerning the idea of a "supernatural" deity. This is relevant to the present task.

The primary purpose of this section is to demonstrate that while the postulates of absolute and relative deities are untenable, man's need as a social being to enter "cosmic" relation demands a medium which is "absolute" enough to be regarded as "cosmic," and "relative" enough to make finite relationship a possibility. It will be concluded that a doctrine known as "surrelativism" transcends the limits of both the relative and absolute notions of deity and presents a social concept of God adequate to meet the needs of the occasion.

It is assumed further that, although traditional theism is fraught with the dangerous limitations of either "atheism" or "idolatry" [Tillich], the best medium of cosmic relation available to finite being is to be found in the idea of a personal God.

This section sets itself the task of focusing the

problems of the tension between the absolute and relative concepts of deity, examining the alternatives, and formulating an adequate theistic doctrine of God.

This chapter begins with John Dewey, who represents the widespread discontent with the more orthodox theistic doctrines of God. His philosophy of education is used to focus the conflict between a dynamic process epistemology and a static absolutist theology, and to suggest some possible resolutions. A study of Whitehead's cosmology and his suggested solution to the problem follows Dewey. He poses an idea of God which combines the primordial and consequent natures of God in an attempt to achieve some synthesis of the absolute and relative aspects. Finally, an examination will be made of Hartshorne's attempt to present a "social concept of God," which he claims embraces the values of both extremes while transcending the errors of each, in his definition of God as the "self-surpassing surpasser of all."

GOD AND GROWTH IN DEWEY

It was perhaps the vehemence with which John Dewey attacked the established institutions of his day which projected his theories as a ready instrument in the hands of all who felt a similar dissatisfaction. The conflict between traditional religious beliefs and the expanding cos-

mology at the beginning of this century assured a ready response to any intelligent criticism which held some hope of a reconstruction to suit the facts. Santayana has reminded us that Dewey's philosophy was primarily a "naturalistic metaphysic."¹ As far as Dewey was concerned the "facts" were to be found in "nature" and so it was in the "natural" that any resolution of the problem was to be found. It is understandable, therefore, that when Dewey attacks the religious institutions of his day, the focus of his criticism would be on the concept of the supernatural. It was the "super" of the supernatural to which Dewey's naturalism objected. Because he held little hope for any resolution of the conflict without first discrediting the supernatural which seemed to stand in contradiction of his naturalistic metaphysic, Dewey set his hand to this task with characteristic enthusiasm. Dewey was correct in diagnosing a source of the conflict, but it seems to this student that his undoubted skill as a diagnostician was not matched in the curative attempts of his drastic surgery. His criticism of religion and the supernatural will serve well, however, to lay open the heart of the matter.

The Transcendent and the Supernatural. A cursory

¹Paul A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of John Dewey* (New York: Tudor, 1951), p. 245.

reading of his small book, *A Common Faith*,² will reveal the hostility Dewey felt towards religion. One has to grasp his underlying motive and understand his thesis, however, before it is possible to appreciate that it is a certain type of religion that calls forth his wrath. He makes the distinction between "religion" and the "religious." It is the former term he reserves for that which he rejects as being contradictory to his philosophy of process. With religion he links the supernatural. It is the supernatural "antecedent reality"³ which gives the offence. When he makes an appeal for a *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Dewey calls philosophy away from the "arrogation to itself of the office of demonstrating the existence of the transcendental. . . ."⁴ There is no hope for any reconstruction, Dewey says, until

it is recognized that under the disguise of dealing with Ultimate Reality, philosophy has been occupied with the precious values embedded in social traditions. . . .⁵

By somewhat reading between the lines it can be recognised that what Dewey objects to is not so much the transcendent, *per se*, but the cultural and traditional

²John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).

³*Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁴John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York: Holt, 1937), p. 23.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 26.

practice of invoking the authority of this "transcendent" or "supernatural" to impose the stultified and outmoded norms of one generation upon another. This has resulted in the stifling of free enquiry. In religion he specifically objects to the "old, old inference to the Supernatural," which which all too often sprang "from a basis of ignorance, and [became] a substitute for intellectual quest and real knowledge."⁶ Religion "stands in the way of effective realization of the sweep and depth of the implications of natural human relations."⁷ Even though the God of theism would not be acceptable to him, Dewey finds a place for "God" and "the religious" in his philosophy. To these we now turn.

Religion and the Religious. An inkling of what Dewey means by "religion" has already been given. It is that body of

specific intellectual beliefs . . . [which demands] assent to its doctrine as true: [which have] literature held specially sacred, [and which claims] special historical material validity for its religion, [and whose] doctrinal apparatus is encumbent upon "believers," [and arrogates to itself] a special and isolated channel of access to truth. . . .⁸

The result is that among the converts the

weak natures take to reverie in comfortable security,

⁶Dewey, *A Common Faith*, p. 76. ⁷*Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 29.

and the strong take to fanaticism. Those who dissent are mourned over by the former and converted through use of force by the latter.⁹

Religion has become a mere substitute for knowledge and "faith is assent to a proposition . . . on the credit of its proposer" (Locke).¹⁰ This ascription of absolute authority to the supernatural or the transcendent is responsible for the degeneration of religion. "What is genuinely religious will only undergo an emancipation when it is relieved from this encumbrance."¹¹ When Dewey speaks of genuine religion he refers to "the religious."

The difference is that between an experience having a religious force because of what it does in and to the process of living; and religion as a separate kind of thing altogether.¹²

Here is a plea for the authentically religious to be categorised as that which is an integral part of creative and developing experience. The protest is against mere intellectual and emotional assent to an exterior, imposed, and objectified creed or "supernatural absolute."¹³

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 20. Such criticism is inherent in Bonhoeffer's appeal for "religionless Christianity (Martin E. Marty [ed.], *The Place of Bonhoeffer* [New York: Association Press, 1962], p. 212).

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 2. ¹²*Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹³There is reflected here the rebellion of Dewey against any fragmentation of life. His realist objections to any dichotomy in epistemology between knowing subject and known object; in educational psychology between theory

Dewey's description of the "religious" appears to have some affinity with genuine religious experience, which is to be found some place at any time in the Christian tradition. His denunciations parallel those of the Old Testament prophets who warned the formalists that Yahweh would "not smell in their solemn assemblies" and that what was required of them was "to do justly, to love mercy, and walk humbly with [their] God."¹⁴ Dewey appears to have in mind the same empirically validated religious dimension on which Emil Brunner bases his twentieth-century theology. Brunner comes close to making the Dewey distinctions and criticism when he refers to the reformation antithesis between the noun, "Faith" as objectified *Credo*, and the verb, *credo*, which represents the "faith" experience of the believer. This latter is faith realised in the experiential dimension integral to and permeating the whole of life and the

and practice or education and society; in metaphysics between natural and supernatural is reflected here in his objection to the bifurcation of religion and the religious. See John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York: Minton, Balch, 1929), whose subtitle is "A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action," for this general theme and especially pp. 4, 6, 12-13, 29 and 69 as it is related to God, the transcendent and the supernatural. For more sophisticated treatment of his epistemology, see Dewey's chapter on "Thought and Its Subject Matter" in his *Essays in Experimental Logic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916) and as it relates to education in the educative process in his *How We Think* (Boston: Heath, 1933).

¹⁴Micah 6:8.

subject-object antithesis resolved in the synthesis of act and being. Can it be affirmed, therefore, that the Christian theologian and the pragmatic philosopher are one at this point?

The Religious Experience and Process. The answer is both yes and no. Yes, the experience is the same as described in the mainstream of Christian theology; but no, it is not merely confined to this so-called "religious" dimension. Dewey's experience of the religious is wider than the theologian would allow. He opposes

those who hold to the notion that there is a definite kind of experience which is itself religious . . . marked off from experience as aesthetic, scientific, moral, political; from experience as companionship and friendship. [The religious] . . . as a quality of experience signifies something that may belong to all these experiences.¹⁵

One understands that the theologian's religious experience is only one among many designated by Dewey's religious experience. He is quite prepared to admit that the former is genuine in so far as it fulfills his requirements of a first hand, creative, progressing, integral experience of the experiencing subject.

There is another yes and no. The philosopher notes that there are many "religionists" who are dissatisfied with the so-called "proofs"--ontological, cosmological, and

¹⁵Dewey, *A Common Faith*, p. 10.

teleological--of the existence of God, and that some of them are seeking to be "just as good empiricists as anyone else."¹⁶

A writer says, "I broke down from over-work and soon came to the verge of nervous prostration. One morning after a long sleepless night . . . I resolved to stop drawing upon myself and begin drawing upon God. I determined . . . to set aside a quiet time each day when I could relate my life to its ultimate source, regain the consciousness that in God I live and move and have my being. That was thirty years ago. Since then I have literally not one hour of darkness or despair."¹⁷

This is an authentic, impressive illustration of a religious experience as far as Dewey is concerned, and to this the theologian would agree. What Dewey objects to, however, is that it is also an illustration of "the use of that quality [religious experience] to carry a superimposed load of a particular religion."¹⁸ Nor can such experience, in the opinion of Dewey, "prove" the existence of God.

In reality, the only thing that is proved is the existence of some complex of conditions that have operated to effect an adjustment in life, an orientation that brings with it a sense of peace and security.¹⁹

Further, it is to be noted that the interpretation of the experience is not inherent in the experience itself. Interpretation is the result of the external, *a priori* cultural

¹⁶Dewey, *A Common Faith*, p. 12.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 11. Also, his *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 255 and 285.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 13. ¹⁹*Ibid.*

orientation. The fatalist, the Mormon, the atheist, and the Christian Scientist will all interpret the same experience differently. The thing to be noted, however, is the empirical quality and the pragmatic result.

The actual religious quality in the experience described is the *effect* produced, the better adjustment to life and its conditions, not the manner and cause of its production.²⁰

A Teleology of Effects. Two things need to be said. In his "effects" is to be found the teleology of the pragmatist Dewey. This appears to be the criteria by which value is established. All else is finally judged as instrumental to this end. It will be necessary to examine the criteria by which Dewey will determine a "good" or a "bad" effect, but for the moment this is the concept which pulls his pragmatism and his instrumentalism together.²¹ In so far as Dewey can be charged with having an "absolute," it is here exposed. This is the gospel of "by their effects ye

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 14.

²¹A critical examination of Dewey's "instrumentalism" is undertaken by Will Durant (*The Story of Philosophy* [New York: Pocket Books, 1958], pp. 522 f.). John Dewey's chapter, "Nature, Means and Knowledge," in his *Experience and Nature* (New York: Dover, 1958), pp. 121 f., is a full treatment--educationally, metaphysically and epistemologically--of his theory. For our immediate purpose, he says there: "Objects and events figure in work not as fulfillments, realizations, but in behalf of other things of which they are means and predictive signs" (*ibid.*, p. 122).

shall know them," and indeed this could be analogous to the original--"by their fruits ye shall know them." However, Dewey must be confronted with the question of whether he is merely substituting one absolute for another, or new gods for the old. He must also be asked on what ground he adjudges the new any superior to the old and whether the errors of rigidity and authority of the old absolute are not surpassed by the errors of the new relativity, in its multiplicity, its lack of definition and form.²² It does not seem possible to him that the real God above these gods --old and new--may be rather something of both. But this is to anticipate some final conclusions. If it is correct to call Dewey's pragmatism one of a "teleology of effects," we must ask now by what criteria those effects are to be judged. Dewey appears to answer the question with something like "to the extent to which they contribute to the growth of a good society."

Apart from participation in social life the school has no moral end or aim. . . . Only as we interpret school activities with reference to the larger circle of social activities to which they relate do we find any standard for judging their moral worth.²³

²²"Truth," for instance, "is approved by Dewey to mean 'the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate it.'" Russell retorts that "this leaves us completely in the dark as to what the investigators are doing, for we cannot without circularity say that they are endeavouring to ascertain the truth" (Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959], p. 824).

The key terms in Dewey's "ideal effect" are "growth" and "good society." One must now enquire what Dewey means by these two concepts.

Growth and Its Elements. The elementary factor in the growth of the organism is "impulse." From impulse comes habit and from refinement of habits comes intelligence.

In the case of the very young it is patent that impulses are highly flexible starting points for activities which are diversified according to the ways in which they are used. . . . In the career of any impulse activity . . . there are three possibilities . . . *Explosive Discharge*, which is blind and unintelligent, *Sublimation*, i.e., become a factor co-ordinated intelligently with others in a continuing course of action . . . *Suppression*, to become the cause of all kinds of intellectual and moral pathology. . . .²⁴

It appears that it is agility in sublimation that becomes the hallmark of intelligence. Reflective thought enables a previous habit pattern to be applied to any "experienced obscurity, doubt, conflict . . . to transform it into a situation that is clear, coherent, settled, harmonious."²⁵ The process is most commonly illustrated by Dewey in a "unit of thought." The "unit of thought" pattern is clearly illustrated in a "problem-solving situation."²⁶ The de-

²³John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1922), p. 56.

²⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 155-157. ²⁵Dewey, *How We Think*, p. 10.

²⁶Dewey's idea of "problem" was very inclusive. Re-

fining limits of

a unit of thinking are a perplexed, troubled, or confused situation at the beginning, and a cleared up, resolved, unified situation at the end.²⁷

Within the unit of thought a usual order seems to be followed. On first being confronted with a situation there is:

suggestion of immediate solutions, followed by

intellectualization of problem experienced as whole, then

observation of facts and data, and

hypothesis formulation and comparison, then

elaboration and objectification of leading hypothesis, and finally

testing of hypothesis by overt or imaginative action.²⁸

A Theory of Value. The foregoing is a simplified version of the process of growth. But now one must ask what it is that constitutes the "problem"? For example, what is that which is being frustrated? Is it "growth" or is it growth towards something? The answer to this question will bring us to some finality in regard to Dewey's teleology. It must also be his highest value. In addition

flective thinking is characterised by "doubt," and "enquiry" motivated by that doubt. Dewey is "willing to extend the meaning of the word 'problem' to whatever--no matter how slight and commonplace in character--perplexes and challenges the mind so that it makes belief at all uncertain . . ." (*ibid.*, pp. 12-13).

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 15. ²⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 106-115.

it is the answer to our original question concerning the definition of Dewey's "effect." Although Dewey is fascinated with the process of reflective thought, he would not agree that the final frustration inherent in problem solving is the epistemological one. Reflective thought like all else in Dewey is instrumental to something further. "An idea normally terminates in giving understanding, so that an event or thing acquires meaning."²⁹ Reflective thought is instrumental to meanings. If meanings are denied, a "problem" is constituted. In their turn "meanings" are also instrumental to adaptation.

Thinking enables us to direct our activities with foresight . . . to grasp the meaning of a thing, to see it in its relation to other things, what consequences follow from it, what causes it, what uses it can be put to.³⁰

The end of the process then is adaptation of the organism to its environment. This is the ultimate for Dewey.

Interaction of organism and environment, resulting in some adaptation which secures utilization of the latter is the primary fact, the basic category.³¹

Adaptive adjustment is never wholly passive for "even a clam acts upon its environment."³² Durant reports Dewey as saying in a series of class lectures on "Psychological Ethics" that

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 136. ³⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 17 and 187.

³¹Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 87.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 84.

complete adaptation to environment means death. The essential point in all response is the desire to control the environment,³³

and comments himself that for Dewey "thought is the instrument of continuous re-adaptation."³⁴

The criterion, then, by which Mr. Dewey would account an "effect" as "good" is the extent to which it may be the instrument for this environmental adaptation. Here is exposed, within his instrumentalism, Dewey's theory of value.

Caution must be exercised in ascribing too much "value theory" emphasis to Dewey. In the first place he is forever lamenting the fact that philosophy has been too concerned with a "realm of values" and exhorts that "value theory must abandon the notion that there is a predetermined or limited number of ends."³⁵ Choice among any number of ends is arbitrary because the problems are arbitrary.

Philosophy will have to recognize that natural termini are as infinitely numerous as are the individual systems of action they delimit.³⁶

Because of this traditional limitation of philosophy, Dewey is loathe, it appears, to use any term like "value theory," which would suggest that his system shares this same limitation.

³³Durant, *op. cit.*, p. 523. ³⁴*Ibid.*

³⁵Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 397.

³⁶*Ibid.*

Further, a system of values is a too static and objectified concept to satisfy his philosophy of evolution. *This* problem is never the same as *that*, how then can this solution be applicable to any but its own problem? The growing organism is never at the same stage of progression after it has passed this particular point. How can the instrument which was "good" for that situation be "good" for this one? He says somewhere else that the definition of

a good man is the man who, no matter how morally unworthy he has been, is moving to become better . . . [and] the bad man is the man who, no matter how good he has been, is beginning to deteriorate. . . .³⁷

Yesterday's good instrument in a progressing man's experience would possibly become a bad instrument tomorrow.

This is a beginning of an understanding of what Dewey means by growth and that out of his "reverence for it as the finest of all things, he made this relative but specific notion [of growth] and not 'absolute good,' his ethical criterion."³⁸ It is, as it were, the philosophy of the potential, a teleology of the possible.

Growth and the Environment. Now the question of what constitutes the "good society" must be asked. Here is

³⁷Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 176. An identical illustration is used by Whitehead to support a similar "dynamic ethic" (Alfred North Whitehead, *Religion in the Making* [New York: Macmillan, 1926], p. 97).

³⁸Durant, *op. cit.*, p. 524.

a further qualification of the "yes" concerning Dewey's "instrumental value theory." It is not only the growth criterion which values the organism within its society environment, but the same criterion is incumbent upon the "actual" environment to realise its "potential."

But what is this "potential" for any society? And if this is his theory of ideals, as it appears to be, how can he speak of a realm of ideals without "degenerating" to the metaphysic he so often warns against, or calling upon the supernatural which is so foreign to his inclination? He tries to avoid it, and does--to a degree.

The Realm of the Ideal. There are ideals in Dewey's philosophy. He says, "The reality of ideal ends as ideals is vouched for by their undeniable power in action."³⁹ To avoid the Scylla of a metaphysic on the one hand and Charybdis of the supernatural on the other, Dewey invokes Santayana's concept of "imagination." It is the imagination which by projection sets the self on the quest beyond itself. This "beyond itself," however, is still in its source, within the self. Imagination is that which completely interpenetrates all elements of being. It is that which allows the limited self-world of observation and reflection to become the universe in projection. It is by

³⁹Dewey, *A Common Faith*, p. 43.

the ideal of the "whole" self that the "idea of a deep seated harmonizing of the self with the universe . . . operates, [but] only through imagination."⁴⁰ Because of this Dewey contends that religionists have been right in believing that this "harmonizing" experience is an influx from beyond conscious deliberation, but of course they have been wrong in attributing it to a supernatural source. The intimate connection between ideal elements and imagination has long been recognised, and it is Dewey's conviction that:

Philosophy can make it easier for mankind to take the right steps in action by making it clear that a sympathetic and integral intelligence brought to bear upon the observation and understanding of concrete social events and forces can form ideals--that is, aims--which shall be neither illusions or mere emotional compensation.⁴¹

It is in this last quotation that one perceives a slight withdrawal from a realm of the ideals he seemed to have projected earlier. It is as though the more mystical realm "of harmonizing of the self with the universe," etc., has led him to take a step which would inevitably lead him to take another against his better judgment. It is the question of the link between the actual and the potential. It is here that he comes face to face with his latest and most ultimate question. It is the question to which inevitably

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁴¹Schilpp, *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, p. 131.

all process and thought seems to lead. What is the principle of stability and selection by which the actual can become the potential with some degree of predictability, though with the additive of novelty? To discover this would reveal the basis and criteria of value. What is the principle which limits the selection of all the myriad possibilities from the realm of infinite ideals? This must be the springboard of all valuation.

Here is Dewey's answer:

These considerations may be applied to the idea of God. . . . This idea is one of the ideal possibilities unified through imaginative realization and projection. But this idea of God is also connected with the natural forces and conditions . . . that promote the growth of the ideal and that further its realization. We are in the presence neither of ideals completely embodied in existence nor yet of ideals that are merely rootless ideals, fantasies, utopias. . . . It is this *active* relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name "God." I would not insist that the name must be given. . . . Whether one gives the name "God" to this union is a matter for individual decision. But the function of such a working union of the ideal and the actual seems to me to be identical with the force that has in fact been attached to the conception of God in all the religions that have a spiritual content; and a clear idea of that function seems to me to be urgently needed at the present time.⁴²

Apart from the *activity* of this *function* "God," there is another important note in Dewey's discussion. There is some indication of a value and valuing authority inherent in this function. He says:

⁴²Dewey, *A Common Faith*, pp. 50-52.

There exist concretely and experimentally, good--the values of art form . . . knowledge, education, fellowship, of friendship and love. . . . These goods are there and yet they are relatively embryonic . . . for, also, there are forces at work that threaten and sap existent goods as well as prevent their expansion.⁴³

God, or the divine (as Dewey is always careful to add) is that selective quality in the function of actual-ideal union. It is selective with a bias toward good. It is distinguished from "nature," for of itself "Nature produces whatever gives reinforcement and direction but also what occasions discord and confusion."⁴⁴ On the other hand, Dewey's God is not the god of pantheism.

For it involves no miscellaneous worship of everything in general. It selects those factors in existence which generate and support our idea of good as an end to be striven for.⁴⁵

This, then, is Dewey's concept of God. There is, he implies, a dualism of a kind. It cannot be the dualism of the natural and the supernatural realms, of matter and spirit. It is a dualism of the creative, and the destructive or the not creative. To be creative, for him, is to contribute to the "adaptation" of the organism to its environment in mutual enhancement. And there is a dualism of the actual and the ideal. Most important of all there is an agent or agency of union at work in favour of creativity

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 51. ⁴⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 53.

which not only assumes the teleological attraction of the "good" but binds the actual to its ideal with some principle of limitation and predictability. Dewey's name for this agency is God. But Dewey's God must be a "natural God. This point is final.

Nature and the Natural. Though not explicit on the point, Dewey seems to have made a distinction between the "natural" and "nature." Nature is that non-selective neutral growth force and the natural, which is so important for him somehow, includes this selective uniting of the actual with the ideals. In trying to walk the razor's edge between these two, Dewey is attempting to avoid the extremes of pantheism and theism. He certainly avoids the latter, but not altogether the former. He rejects the easy middle roads of atheism and humanism, because they share a common error with supernaturalism in that they set man in exclusive isolation from nature, which is held as either accursed or negligible. Atheism, humanism, and supernaturalism as religions

if they exclude our relation to nature [are as] pale and thin as . . . presumptuous when [they] . . . take humanity as the object of worship.⁴⁶

Dewey cannot accept Matthew Arnold's conception of the principle of limitation as "a power not ourselves." It is

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 54.

too narrow in its basis of selection--righteousness. But one must answer this criticism by a question. What is meant by righteousness? Is it not the state of being right? But, being right by what criteria? If it can be interpreted as "being right" with the process of growth in the continuing of the union of actual with the ideal in its selectivity of the "good," then there is no argument as far as it goes with a great line of theological tradition. Dewey must not be surprised, however, if the theologian wants to go a step further in his definition of this participating, active function which binds together the whole of being--actual and potential, and tends to separate the good from the not so good, the creative from the destructive. In the central stream of Christian theology, the definition of such an agency has been given the image of the most potent relational, selective and unifying moral agent known to man, that of person. This appears to be Dewey's limitation. For his ultimate he has chosen an image less "potent" than "person," that is, "principle." He limits God to agency and his concept of righteousness to that of a naive, slavish obedience to an objectified, rigid, outmoded, moral code interpreted as the static demand of the supernatural who held himself aloof from both nature and the natural. The vast majority of modern theologians would be as critical as Dewey of such a concept and

Dewey himself knew better.⁴⁷

Conclusion. It is as evident as it is reasonable that God was not Dewey's main business. It is not surprising to learn, therefore, that we have surveyed all that the philosopher had to say explicitly about God. The following appear to be the significant concepts relevant to our present discussion.

Dewey's God is "natural" agent or agency, but cannot be equated with "nature." This makes Him relevant to our finite appreciations, for we are empirically limited to the natural sphere.

"God" is the principle of limitation in growth; therefore, he must be present and available to observation everywhere in the world.

"God" is the principle of selectivity, therefore, he is a "choosing" agent. God is selective with a tendency towards the good. This gives his agency a measure of moral responsibility.

This may be too relative a concept of God for most Christian theologians, but if we are looking for some relative god to bridge the gap between the relative and the absolute, Dewey certainly starts on the quest. This is as far as he will go. For further elucidation of these con-

⁴⁷He was a lifelong regular church attender.

cepts, for some appreciation of the possible richness of others merely hinted at, and the resolution of some of the dilemmas, it is necessary to go to other authorities. It is anticipated that a more satisfactory resolution of the dilemma will be found in an examination of Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy (primordial and consequent natures of God) and Charles Hartshorne's concept of God as a social being.

CHAPTER XIII

GOD OF TWO NATURES

It has been reiterated that the orientation of this argumentation is empirical. When these boundaries have been transgressed, signals have been given. It seems unnecessary to point out, however, that such a transgression is not the peculiar "guilt" of the theologian. Dewey committed the crime as does Whitehead. Dewey did it at the point where he named his selective principle of limitation "God." Whitehead does the same. Up to the stage of naming the principle, the rules of empiricism have been observed. Dewey attempted to protect himself, as noted; but he, and Whitehead, no less than any theologian, make "a leap of faith" beyond this point. It may be noted that there is a difference in degree in that the leap of the former is rather the "faith" of Bergson's intuition or perhaps Santayana's "imagination," while that of a Karl Barth is boldly affirmed as "irrational." The present writing rather stands with the former but nevertheless admits the necessity of a compromise between the two extremes and prefers to term the direction of the area of "the leap" that of the "metarational" rather than the Barthian "irrational."

The advantage is that the "metarational" is tied to the "rational." The empiricist can take account of both.

In the present situation two dimensions of the empirical may be discerned. The first is that "God" has been in fact named by the vast majority in the history of the race as a determining or influencing factor in their lives; and second, the majority of the philosophers in every age have given the same name to an ultimate principle in their otherwise most rational and systematic cosmologies and ontologies.

An adequate illustration of the point is the cosmology of Alfred North Whitehead. He provides some very satisfying conclusions concerning the nature of God, answers some of the questions left by Dewey, and is generally supportive of the thesis of this work.

One becomes immediately conscious of a difference between Dewey and Whitehead. In a published appreciation of John Dewey, Whitehead places him beside Augustine, Aquinas, Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and Comte, as those who have made philosophic thought relevant to the needs of their own day. He respects him for not fearing the novelty of an idea and for his attacks upon self-satisfied dogmatism "with which mankind at each period of his history cherishes the delusion of the finality of its existing modes of knowledge."¹ But, says Whitehead, it is precisely because of this relevance to

¹Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and Philosophy* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), p. 129.

a particular age that any philosophy is limited in its scope.

The excellence of Dewey's work in the expression of notions relevant to modern civilization increases the danger of sterilizing thought within the puny limitations of today.²

Here is the difference between Whitehead and Dewey. One senses that the cosmology of Whitehead is relative only to this cosmic epoch. This is Whitehead's intention, at least; and there are enough authorities who agree that the intention has been fulfilled. The student confronted with a work which is so incomprehensible in parts, may only conclude either that it is sheer nonsense, or that it must justify the above claim. There are exponents of both conclusions.³

THE COSMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION

Whitehead preferred the term "philosophy of organism" for his system. Although he is the most prominent of the

²*Ibid.*, p. 130.

³The dilemma is not confined to the student category. When Alfred North Whitehead's *Religion in the Making* was published (New York: Macmillan, 1926), Meland reports the embarrassment of the faculty of Chicago Divinity School. He says: "Shailer Mathews was heard to remark, 'It is infuriating, and I must say embarrassing as well, to read page after page of relatively familiar words without understanding a single sentence.' Shirley Jackson Case was able to set the book aside as being another instance of a metaphysically burdened philosopher stumbling through unfamiliar terrain, creating problems and giving explanations where no real problems existed" (Bernard E. Meland, *Realities of Faith* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1962]).

process philosophers, his own term is more descriptive of his philosophy. Although he is as much concerned with the "many" as he is with the "one," his primary quest is for the One of cosmic inclusion. He is enthusiastically opposed to any bifurcation of the "world." The concept of organism serves this purpose. Organism becomes the basic unit and the "one" for Whitehead. These "ones" in a maze of complexes called societies and nexus, become the "many" which form the world. The "many" of the world becomes the "One" of the all-inclusive organism. This all-inclusive One is Whitehead's God.

The Actual Entity. The basic unit is termed an "actual entity." God is a non-temporal actual entity.⁴ Man, as "dominant occasion" in a corpuscular society of actual entities,⁵ is an actual entity. An electron is an actual entity, and perhaps a molecule and maybe a cell.

The basic unit comprising the "world" is the "actual entity," and there is no minute "trivial puff of existence in far off empty space"⁶ which is not included.⁷ Actual

⁴Perhaps "atemporal" would be a better term for the Whiteheadian connotation of "everlasting." See Alfred North Whitehead's *Process and Reality* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 524 f.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁶Alfred North Whitehead, *Alfred North Whitehead: An Anthology* (New York: Macmillan, 1961), p. 585.

entities are "the real final things of which the world is made up."⁸ There is no going behind or beneath or above them to find anything more real. They are the reason behind everything that is.⁹ To search for the reason behind anything is to search for the actual entities or the actual entity which it is. Actual entities are myriad with

gradations of importance, diversities of functions, yet in the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level.¹⁰

Permanence and Flux. The traditional problem of permanence and flux is resolved by Whitehead, in the way he claimed everything can be resolved, by appeal to his "ontological principle"--the reason behind everything--which is an actual entity. Time and space are not categories, but are abstractions from the process of the world from one actual entity to another and are bound together by the generic derivation of one actual entity from another. To grasp Whitehead at this point, it is easier to regard the actual entity in spatial terms, as the basic unit of "matter" and in temporal terms to think of it as the basic unit of "time." In this respect Whitehead uses the terms "actual occasion" and "actual entity" interchangeably.¹¹

⁷This is Whitehead's "ontological principle" (*Process and Reality*, pp. 9, 27, and 36).

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 27. ⁹*Ibid.*, p. 36. ¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 28.

Time, then, is that which results from the progression of actual occasions. Growth is that which results from the progression of actual entities. There is no temporal passage within the unit of the passage--the actual occasion. Time is only measured from the succession of units in relation to each other.¹² The actual occasion or entity cannot be divided temporally or spatially and indeed "time" and "space" are without meaning apart from their abstraction from actual entities in relation. In the theory of the actual entity can be found the reasonable explanation of both flux and permanence. There is permanence in a primordial and in a process sense. In the actual entity there is no change. There is no passage of time. It cannot be divided. The flux is found in the relation of one entity to another and change cannot be found anywhere else. There is permanence in the necessary dependence and interdependence of the actual entities as stipulated by the ontological principle, and there is flux in the additive of novelty by the principle of creativity¹³ to each succeeding actual entity. There is flux in that there is a different degree of possibility.¹⁴ There is permanence in that the possibilities as the eternal objects are unchanging possibilities for

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 27. ¹²*Ibid.*, p. 52. ¹³*Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 44.

every actual entity.¹⁵ Each of these statements stimulates another question. To the necessary clarification of these questions and to the end of seeking some "penultimate" answers, it becomes necessary to analyse the "process."

Becoming and "Prehensions." It is necessary to note that there is no reference to temporal passage when the term "becoming" is used in respect to the phases of the actual entity.¹⁶ It is the useful term of analytical description to assist in identifying the "phases" of stages within the concrescence of an actual entity.

The first analysis of an actual entity into its most concrete elements, disclose it to be a concrescence of prehensions, which have originated in its process of becoming. All further analysis is an analysis of prehensions. Analyses in terms of prehensions are called divisions.¹⁷

The "becoming" actual entity prehends every previous actual entity in the universe by taking it into account positively or negatively in its own becoming. A prehension is the appropriation by a becoming actual entity of "the already constituted actual entities and some eternal objects."¹⁸ "Negative prehensions" are so called because they are subordinated to and negated by the positive prehensions of the actual entity and are eliminated thereby from further posi-

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 34. ¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 35. ¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 335.

tive contribution to the becoming of the actual entity.¹⁹ The positive prehensions which Whitehead calls "feelings," are those which in a hierarchy of intensity and relevance are effecting the concrescence of the becoming actual entity.²⁰

There is a further division of prehensions into those of the physical and mental poles. Every actual entity has two poles. The physical pole prehends all of the antecedent actual entities of the initial data. The mental pole prehends the eternal objects. Efficient causality derives from the initial data while the final causality comes mainly from the mental prehensions of the eternal objects. It would appear that there could be an abundance of efficient causality from the physical prehensions as against the final causality in the mental prehensions. Whitehead explains that the eternal objects have a secondary effect on the becoming actual entity by reason of "hybrid physical prehensions." Every physical prehension includes both the mental and physical poles of the antecedent actual entities. The influence of the eternal objects is, therefore, felt by every becoming actual entity through the mental poles of all its antecedents. By reason of this complex interconnection and dependence, the unity of the world is to be understood

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 337. ²⁰*Ibid.*

and the observable continuity of life somewhat explained.

The Structure. It is necessary now to take a brief glance into the internal structure of the actual entity which is doing the prehending. Whitehead finds he is able to analyse five factors which help towards an understanding of the "becoming" of each actual entity. There is

- (1) the "subject" which does the prehending or feeling;
- (2) the totality of all antecedent actual entities which are felt, called the "initial data";
- (3) the elimination of some of these by virtue of the negative prehensions;
- (4) the "objective datum" which is the totality of what the "subject" feels in both the negative and positive prehensions;
- (5) the "subjective form" which is how the subject feels the "objective datum" in degrees of relevance and intensity.²¹

It is necessary to add one more factor for a comprehensive analysis of the whole. The culmination is termed

- (6) the satisfaction."²²

This is the analytical description of the concrescence of an actual entity. Now there are two questions to be answered. The first one concerns the advent of the "subject" and the second the determination of the "satisfaction." They are both tied together in Whitehead's explanation.

Each temporal entity, in one sense, originates from its mental pole, analogously to God himself. It derives from God its basic conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world.²³

²¹*Ibid.* ²²*Ibid.*, pp. 38 and 129. ²³*Ibid.*, p. 343.

Apparently the initial factor is this "basic conceptual aim" which Whitehead calls the "subjective aim." But there is another principle which is apart from God, not actual in itself but actualised in everything that is. This is the principle of "sheer ongoingness" which Whitehead terms "creativity."²⁴ This is Whitehead's ultimate, even God is transcended by it.²⁵ Sheer ongoingness demands a form. The "subjective aim" provides the content for form; and when the subjective aim is stated as the self-creative motive of its subject, Whitehead seems to believe he has the necessary explanation for the advent of "subject."

A subject concretized in its satisfaction is called a "superject." The envisagement of itself as superject is the final causality of the organism.

Final and Efficient Cause. The final cause (*telos*) is provided to the subject by the medium of its given subjective aim which is the realisation of itself as superject. It is the importance of retaining the indeterminacy of his process that causes Whitehead to stress the final causality in preference to the efficient cause. This is why he says it must be remembered that

the operations of an organism are directed towards the organism as "superject," and are not directed from the organism as "subject."²⁶

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 11. ²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 135. ²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 228.

It is the superject seen as final cause which provides the context of a lure for the prehensions.

The feelings are inseparable from the end at which they aim; . . . The feelings aim at the feeler as their final cause. The feelings are what they are in order that their subject may be what it is.²⁷

It must be stressed with equal emphasis however, that the subject cannot be identified apart from the superject. Because the subject is the "initial data," it represents efficient causality also. The efficient cause embodied in the subject cannot be separated from the superject which embodies the final cause. This ensures the unity of Whitehead's causality. He is not at his most comprehensible when he speaks of the unity of the subject and superject, but claims that it is best, because of their insoluble unity, to speak of the organism as "subject-superject." It appears best to consider the subject as the feeler of feelings and the superject as the totality of those feelings. Here is unity. So is there unity in the causality, both final and efficient. Further elucidation will clarify this essential unity in the discussion concerning feelings, lures, and novelty.

Feelings, Lures, and Novelty. The "eternal objects" are the "conceptual possibilities" of the actual world. In

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 939.

an order of relevance they are offered for prehension to the "becoming" actual entity.²⁸ The "actual world" of the prehending entity is in a sense predisposed in order of relevance to these conceptual possibilities. This arranged order of relevance in the eternal objects is called the "objective lure for feeling."²⁹ Here again is seen the unity of efficient and final causality. The predisposition to certain eternal objects is given to the actual entity from both the mental and physical poles of all its antecedent actual entities.

The primary stage in the concrescence of an actual entity is the way in which the antecedent universe enters into the constitution of the entity in question, so as to constitute the basis of its individuality.³⁰

It will be seen by this that there is a measure of determinacy in the system. Whitehead classifies this determinacy under three headings.

The final phase--satisfaction, is fully determinate (a) as to its genesis, (b) as to its objective character for the transcendent creativity, and (c) as to its prehension--positive or negative of every item in its universe.³¹

In addition to these three fully determinate features, there appear to be two others--partial but worth consideration. There is a measure of determinacy in the order of relevance and intensity with which the initial data is presented at

²⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 35 and 70. ²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 131.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 230. ³¹*Ibid.*, p. 38.

the "beginning" phase of the concrescence of the actual entity. In this sense the actual entity cannot help its past, even with respect to relevance for feeling. Also, as will be the subject of later attention, to the extent that the "subjective aim" is already in relation with its whole "past" universe through the "subjective aim" of what Whitehead has termed the "consequent nature of God," the subjective aim of each actual entity is also to this extent determined. It is established also that there is indeterminacy.

The breath of feeling which creates a new individual fact has an origination not wholly traceable to the mere data. But the "how" of the feeling, though it is germane to the data, is not fully determined by the data.³²

The subjective form (factor five above) exercises a measure of "freedom" in the gradation of its acceptance of positive prehension and rejection of negative prehensions.³³ With respect to the "conceptual possibilities" presented to the "becoming" actual entity, there is some freedom of choice, too.

The relevance of an eternal object in its role of lure is a fact inherent in the data. . . . But the admission into, or rejection from, reality of conceptual feeling is the origination decision of the actual occasion.³⁴

The evidence of such freedom, for Whitehead, is the point at which novelty is introduced into the "process." This is

³²*Ibid.*, p. 131. ³³*Ibid.*, p. 338. ³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 131.

always within the mental pole and takes place with all the abruptness of the concrescence of the actual entity as such. Novelty is illustrated by right of each actual entity's peculiar *appetition*,³⁵ that is, its individual predisposition to feelings composed of the predispositions of antecedent entities and its own individual additive: *intensity of feeling*, that is, the quality of the lure inherent in presentational relevance of the eternal objects:

To be *causa sui* means that the process of concrescence is its own reason for the decision in respect to the qualitative clothing of feelings. It is finally responsible for the decision by which any lure for feeling is admitted to efficiency. The freedom inherent in the universe is constituted by this element of self-causation.³⁶

Attainment, that is, the degree to which every actual entity realises the "ideal" of its conceptual possibility. There is order, by reason of some degree of "ideal" attainment in each actual entity, but the process "also involves the specific disorder due to the inclusion . . . of components which exclude the attainment of the full ideal."³⁷

Whitehead's concept of feelings, lures, and novelty give some idea of the complexity and coherence attempted by his system. The only link remaining for an examination of his system as an introduction to his specific theory of

³⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 47-48. ³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 135.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 128.

God, is the connection between the eternal objects and the "becoming" actual entity.

Propositions. A proposition is a new kind of entity. "It is a hybrid between pure potentialities and actualities."³⁸ It is the hybrid character which allows it to be the link between the appetition of the actual entity and the lure of the eternal objects.³⁹ True or false does not apply as a category to a proposition. "The primary mode of a proposition in an actual entity is not by judgment but by entertainment."⁴⁰ A proposition is the promise of "tales that perhaps might be told about particular actualities."⁴¹ Whitehead's proposition has the traditional terms of "subject" and "predicate" but with peculiar connotations. The qualification of the predicate on the subject is as valid as *vice versa*. The "logical subjects" of the proposition are the antecedent initial data and the predicate is the complex eternal object which provides the lure for the subject. The subject prehends its predicate--the eternal object. The proposition binds these two together and thus provides the margin of definiteness in a universe of order.

The proposition is the potentiality of the eternal object, as a determinate mode of restricted reference to

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 282. ³⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 281 and 343.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 281. ⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 393.

the logical subjects. This eternal object is the "predicative pattern" of the proposition.⁴²

Here is exposed the principle of limitation necessary to restrain order from chaos which, in the early development of his philosophy, Whitehead called "God."⁴³

It will be remembered that this is just the point at which Dewey invoked his God. Dewey, also, had a "realm of ideals." The similarity between the two, however, may need to be confined to the common function they serve. Dewey's ideals were the "imaginative projection" of the actuality. Whitehead posits a separate actual entity in which resides the eternal objects discrete from the prehending actual entity. This actual entity is God. We are now ready to enter this area of Whitehead's thought.

The Actual Entity--God. It is impossible to speak of God in Whitehead's terms without some examination of the three concepts of creativity, primordial nature of God, and the consequent nature of God. These will be the main headings of the discussion.

Creativity. Creativity has been mentioned as a principle. It is non-actual but it is evidenced in actuali-

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 393.

⁴³Alfred North Whitehead, "Science in the Modern World," in his *Anthology*, pp. 447-448.

sation by the concrescence of actual entities and the creative advance of the world through them.⁴⁴ It is no "minor" principle and the only time Whitehead speaks of an "ultimate" is in reference to creativity. "Creativity is the universal of universals characterising ultimate matter of fact."⁴⁵ Creativity, as that by which the one and the many become co-joined, is the conceptual unity of the two basic principles of "novelty" and "advance."⁴⁶

These three notions (One, Many, and Creativity) complete the category of the ultimate and are presupposed in all the more special categories.⁴⁷

Traditionally, God and the ultimate have been either equated or exclusive of each other. Does Whitehead's system include a dualism with a rival for his God? No, and for two reasons.

Whitehead never thinks of God in terms of the Ultimate in any traditional or classical sense. The concept is fraught with too many metaphysical contradictions, cosmological anachronisms and theological deficiencies. Once Whitehead has posited God, one cannot fail to be impressed

⁴⁴Though Whitehead is reputed to be the leading exponent of process philosophy, the term "process" is not used by him. The closest he comes in concept is that of "creativity." He says: "The ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance from disjunction to conjunction, creating a novel entity other than the critics given in disjunction" (*Anthology*, pp. 31-32).

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 31. ⁴⁶*Ibid.* ⁴⁷*Ibid.*

by the necessity of an included as well as an inclusive God. Here is the particular problem of this section.

First, Whitehead postulates a God with two natures to satisfy this criterion. Later, Hartshorne attempts to make such a divine relativity theologically acceptable.

Secondly, there can be no dualism or rivalry in Whitehead's system. The philosophy of organism demands both an individualism and a universality that does not permit dualism. The utter interdependence and interrelation of all actual entities, as the many, provides the unity of the actual entity, which is the one. The whole unity depends on the contrast of the individual actual entities for its complimentary order and structure, as much as it does on their affinity. The satisfaction and novelty of the parts are derived from their contribution and addition to the whole. This applies to the non-temporal actual entity God. As each individual actual entity both transcends the principle of creativity and is transcended by it, so it is with God and creativity. As every actual entity is nothing initially and finally apart from its world nexus, and yet attains its satisfaction as individual, distinct and novel; so is God thoroughly a part yet differentiated from all other. The "superjective nature" of God shares this characteristic with the most insignificant puff of matter in outer space as an entity when it is additive to and a quali-

fyng agent of creativity.

The superjective nature of God is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances.⁴⁸

This is to be expected in a philosophy of organism. Nothing can transcend the system. By right of the ontological principle nothing can be nowhere. Not even an ultimate can be the transcendent efficient or final cause.

A Superfluous Concept? This poses the question of why there is any necessity for such a "principle" as creativity at all. With the elaborate expositions of the actual entity as *causa sui* until the world nexus including God is posited, it seems there is a closed system of a self-creating organism. Why is creativity necessary as a "given" to his system when God in one or other aspect of his nature, seems to fulfill the function? Again, by the principle of creativity Whitehead suggests that the disjunctive many become one in the conjunctive process of concrescence of the actual entity and because of passage with novelty the many are increased by one. But the elaborate detailed explanations of the process of concrescence and its efficient and final causal explanations, appear to render this non-actual principle of creativity superfluous. Further, Whitehead has

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 135.

defined creativity as

the formative element whereby the actual world has its character of temporal passage to *novelty*.⁴⁹

But it seems that the theory of objective lure, positive and negative prehensions, ingression of eternal objects and the variable intensity of feeling, are sufficient reasons for the process of a world with novelty. Also, although Whitehead refers to creativity as the effect of "passing on" in the sense of "the verb *create*--to bring forth, to beget, to produce,"⁵⁰ it appears not to have any function of selectivity or limitation, etc. It is "neutral." In this respect Whitehead's creativity is very similar to what is suggested as Dewey's neutral "nature."

Creativity is another rendering of the Aristotelian "matter" and the modern "neutral stuff." . . . Creativity is without a character of its own . . . and is the ultimate notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality.⁵¹

The "objectified causality" of the antecedent world, combined with the envisaged *telos* of his own satisfaction by God, providing the basis for lure to every actual entity, appears to exhaust any necessity for the function of *create*.

Because of its particular concern for an adequate concept of a divine relativity, Whitehead's inclusion of the

⁴⁹Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 90.

⁵⁰Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 324.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

principle of creativity is especially curious. The most satisfactory explanation is that it is a residual developmental idea. In his earlier work there was no necessity for God. God was first introduced as the principle of limitation which Whitehead would not allow to be a function of creativity. When the theory of the eternal objects assumed an increasingly important role in his scheme, it became necessary for Whitehead to expand his doctrine of God until creativity was no longer necessary because one or other of the natures of God had taken over its role.

Perhaps this conjecture can be substantiated by a quote from one of his earlier writings. Whitehead introduces his "Formative Elements of the Actual World" as:

. . . the creativity whereby the actual world has its character of temporal passage to novelty

. . . the realm of ideal entities or forms which in themselves are not actual but are such that they are exemplified in everything that is actual, according to some proportion of relevance.

. . . the actual but non-temporal entity whereby the mere creativity is transmuted into a determinate freedom. This non-temporal actual entity is what men call God.⁵²

It seems that this could well have been the very order in which Whitehead's final necessity evolved with his system.

Now we must ask whether his theory of God is adequate to replace creativity and fulfill the necessary functions

⁵²Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 90.

referred to above.

The Primordial Nature of God. It becomes necessary to posit a primordial nature of God in Whitehead's philosophy first as the repository of the eternal objects. By the ontological principle, everything that "is" must be somewhere. Although Whitehead insists that an eternal object is non-actual, it "is" in an ideal sense. This "is-ness" must have residence. It resides in the non-actual, ideal, mental pole of the actual entity God. This pole is called His primordial nature. It needs to be stressed, that like all actual entities, God is not divisible and the reference to two natures is merely an analytical separation.

The problem of the non-actualised eternal objects is resolved, but what of the matter of their "proximate relevance" and its function of "lure" which was, *in toto*, Dewey's God. This is only a part of Whitehead's primordial nature. ". . . 'proximate relevance' means 'relevance' as in the primordial mind of God."⁵³ This relevance is better understood in the relation of the consequent primordial natures.⁵⁴ This still leaves us with the dilemma of the "priority" of relevance of the eternal objects as presented to the becoming actual entity. And if "priority suggests

⁵³*Ibid.*

⁵⁴To be examined under that heading, *infra*, pp. 318 ff.

some function of selection then we are faced with the problem of who or what does the selection. Dewey's God was a "function" but Whitehead cannot allow for "function" in the primordial nature. He says:

God is abstracted from any commerce with particulars . . . and is therefore devoid of those impure cogitations which involve propositions. It is God in abstraction, alone with himself. As such it is a mere factor in God, deficient in actuality.⁵⁵

How can one explain this "non-functioning" factor in the primordial nature? It appears to be the attempt on Whitehead's part to meet the requirements suggested to the scholastics--the principle of "necessity"; an absolute in "perfection"; the "first cause" of Thomas, as it had been the "unmoved mover" of Aristotle. It will be remembered that the first God for Whitehead was the principle of limitation. But this, too, suggests something of a "functioning" principle. The only conclusion is that any necessity for a dynamic principle must be left to the "consequent nature" as that relational medium between the "given" of the conceptual primordial nature and the "given" of the actual world.

If the dynamic term "function" cannot be applied to the primordial nature, the term "priority" is befitting.

⁵⁵Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 50.

There is an "established" gradation of the eternal objects resident in the primordial nature. It is termed by Whitehead as a "gradation of valuation" which the primordial nature "gives" to the universe. There is a priority of presentation of valuation of eternal objects relevant to every becoming actual occasion, but it is the primordial nature of God which provides the totality of valuation for the whole universe from which the gradation of valuation for specific actual entities is derived. This totality of gradation of valuation is the gradation of valuation resident within the sphere of the eternal objects.

The primordial created fact is the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects. This is the primordial nature of God.⁵⁶

The primordial nature provides "valuation" in another sense as well. The "intensity" of an individual satisfaction is the attained degree of its "conceptual possibility." This "conceptual possibility" is an "eternal object."

Each occasion exhibits its measure of creative emphasis in proportion to its measure of subjective intensity. The absolute standard of such intensity is that of the primordial nature of God.⁵⁷

So the primordial nature of God is the conditioning factor involving all the determinate features of the becoming actual entity by right of these two aspects of its valuation

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 46. ⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p. 75.

resident in the realm of the eternal objects.

There is one more thing of significance concerning the primordial nature. It has been noted that appetite plays a very important role in the becoming of the actual occasion. Appetition has been defined as:

the immediate matter of fact including in itself the principle of unrest, involving realization of what is not and may be.⁵⁸

The source of this appetite is complex but Whitehead states that the principle of unrest as well as the matter of factness is derivative of the appetite resident in the primordial nature of God. This primordial appetite is the sum total of all appetitions from which all appetitions derive their initial aim.

God's immanence in the world in respect to his primordial nature is an urge towards the future based upon an appetite in the present.⁵⁹

It is in this sense of derivative appetite that every actual entity shares in the appetite of God and his urge to the attainment of his envisagement of the possible world. The primordial nature thus becomes the "lure for feeling," the eternal urge of desire.

His primordial nature . . . [in its] relevance to each created act as it arises . . . constitutes God, the initial object of desire, establishing the initial phase of each subjective aim.⁶⁰

This is as far as the discussion can proceed without con-

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 47. ⁵⁹*Ibid.* ⁶⁰*Ibid.*, p. 522.

trasting the primordial nature with the consequent nature.

In a system as complicated as Whitehead's it is difficult to find parallels, but it is interesting to note that the combination of the gradation of valuation in the degree of intensity of the actual entity and that of appetition derivation comes close to what Dewey envisages in what the previous chapter termed the "natural." This is the perception of an attraction to the "good as an end to be striven for."⁶¹

The Consequent Nature of God. It has been stated that every actual entity must have two poles, the mental and the physical. This is true of the actual entity of God. His mental pole is the pole of pure potentialities. This is his primordial nature. His consequent nature is the

physical prehension of God of the actualities of the evolving universe.⁶²

The primordial nature is not in direct relation with the processing world. It is merely the non-actual envisagement of the potentialities, the reservoir of the ideals which lure the actuality to a reformulation of itself in the never ending process of the creative advance of the uni-

⁶¹John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 53.

⁶²Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 134.

verse. God is dependent upon his consequent nature to make him actual.

It is difficult to distinguish between "creativity" and the consequent nature at some points. Whitehead himself brings the two together at one stage. He says of creativity:

. . . it is always in concrescence and never in the past, it receives a reaction from the world; this reaction is its consequent nature. It is here termed God.⁶³

In his primordial nature God conditions the world. In his consequent nature God is being conditioned by the world.⁶⁴ By reason of his primordial nature God participates in the mental pole of every actuality thereby initiating a definite outcome where otherwise there would be ambiguity. In this respect every actual entity is contingent upon God. But in his consequent nature God is himself contingent upon the world of actual entities. These are eternally being prehended by the physical pole of his concrescence and thereby constitute what he as actual entity is becoming.

By reason of the relativity of all things (through his primordial nature) there is a reaction of the world on God (in his consequent nature). The completion of God's nature into a fullness of physical feeling is derived from the objectification of the world in God. He shares with every new creation its actual world . . . His conceptual (primordial) nature is unchanged by reason of its completeness. But his derivative nature (consequent) is consequent upon the creative advance of

⁶³*Ibid.*, p. 47. ⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 19.

the world.⁶⁵

Whitehead may become quite lyrical when he makes the comparison between the two natures. The primordial nature is pure mental pole, wholly conceptual, free, infinite, complete, eternal, actually deficient and unconscious. In his consequent nature as God prehends the actual world, he is determined, incomplete, consequent, fully actual and conscious. With God the ascendancy is with the mental pole of the primordial nature. In the world it is the physical pole. But, without the physical pole of his world God is not actualised. It is as true to say

that God creates the world, as it is to say that the world creates God, . . .

. . . that God transcends the world as that the world transcends God, . . .

. . . that God is one and the World many, as that the world is One and God many, . . .

. . . that the world is immanent in God as that God is immanent in the world, . . .⁶⁶

There seem to be three important ways in which the consequent nature characterises in its function the primordial nature of God.

The perfection of the primordial nature issues in the function of the consequent nature in the "prevention of any loss" in the world. The world is "everlasting" by

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 523. ⁶⁶*Ibid.*, p. 528.

right of its objective immortality prehended by the consequent nature and resident in the primordial nature of God. Nothing is lost. Even what succeeding actual entities may not prehend from their predecessors is prehended by the consequent nature of God.⁶⁷

Second, God is omnipresent to His world in a unity of order and continuity made possible again by the consequent nature able to prehend in a "unity of immediacy" the whole world, both process and residual of process. His consequent nature enables "no obstruction" to God's prehension of the whole world.

Third, the primordial nature of God is characterised in the consequent nature by his "infinite patience." This is best understood if Whitehead is distorted⁶⁸ a little to say that God as actual entity is always in the process of concrescence and that His final satisfaction is still to be realised. It would be the image of His striving to reach that satisfaction which would best express the concept of His "infinite patience." The process can be understood, so Whitehead says, by the threefold creative act of the universe:

one is the infinite conceptual realization (in his primordial nature) . . .

two is the multiple solidarity of free physical reali-

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 524. ⁶⁸*Ibid.*, p. 530.

zations in the temporal world (consequent nature) . . .

three, is the ultimate unity of the multiplicity of the actual fact with the primordial conceptual fact. (satisfaction?)⁶⁹

It is the contrast between the middle term and the first and third which illustrate the "infinite patience" of God as He seeks to realise His subjective aim.

It appears that this is the most ultimate fact of explanation for the creative advance of the world; that which supplies the subjective aim for the whole epoch of actual entities; that supplies the efficient and final cause of the world; that is the working out of God in tender care, with infinite patience, the satisfaction of His subjective aim. His motivation towards self-realisation is the motivation towards self-realisation of the world and every actual entity in it.⁷⁰ This is process, its initial and final cause.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, p. 525. ⁷⁰*Ibid.*

CHAPTER XIV

THE DIVINE RELATIVITY

Whitehead is reported to have said in conversation that:

the real greatness of William James lay in the fact that instead of offering a stereotyped definition of truth, he had left with his readers a sense of the need for a receptive mind and heart, and a readiness to find significance from new experiences from whatever direction they might come.¹

The same can be applied to Charles Hartshorne, his empirical method, and his "truth" about God. One is impressed with the sincere effort to understand the problems inherent in a philosophy of religion, the desire to alleviate some of them by good rational procedures, and his reluctance to formulate static doctrines which might become examples of the "misplaced concreteness" against which Whitehead warned.

Hartshorne's article on Whitehead's idea of God helps make the transition from the philosopher to the theologian.

Hartshorne identifies two examples of "misplaced concreteness" in orthodox ideas of God. The first is that

we may identify God, conceived in terms of value, with sheer "perfection" defined as completeness or maximality of value such that nothing conceivably could be added to

¹J. S. Bixler, "Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion," *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*, Paul A. Schilpp, editor (New York: Tudor, 1951), p. 489.

it, and from which therefore every form of self-enrichment, every aspect of process, and of potential and unactual value, is absent.²

The second abstraction which commits the "fallacy" is the idea which

identifies God, conceived in terms of causality, with sheer power or activity, a "cause of all," which is in no aspect of its being the effect of any, an agent which acts, but is not acted upon.³

To these two fundamental problems of the "idea of God," Hartshorne adds another. It is the concept of God as the "most real being" or "pure actuality."⁴ In such a theology potentiality must be omitted, for only actuality could be present in an absolute maximal reality.

Hartshorne is as dissatisfied with the situation as is Whitehead, "Carneades to Hume, Kant, Dewey, Santayana and Russell," and he resolves to make some contribution to resolve the dilemmas inherent therein.

The Absolute. The dilemma is projected because men in all times have felt the necessity for some sort of an absolute, an adequate metaphysical principle. Hartshorne notes that there have been many philosophies which have led naturally to God, but Whitehead's is, in his opinion, "the

²Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Idea of God," *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*, Paul A. Schilpp, editor (New York: Tudor, 1951), p. 516.

³*Ibid.* ⁴*Ibid.*

first great systematic philosophy to do so."⁵ It has already been noted that a philosophy like that of Dewey "needed" a name for its most "ultimate" principle, which, while necessary to the system, need not necessarily be named God. The philosopher as "religious" man, and not as metaphysician, named that name to his principle.⁶

It is noted that this "unnecessary" naming of God as the ultimate bespeaks the great human need. This is not to delineate the habit as neurotic or to label the whole religious enterprise as

so patently infantile, so incongruous with reality, that for one whose attitude to humanity is friendly, it is painful to think that the great majority of mortals will never be able to rise above this view of life.⁷

Those men which the race has numbered amongst its most profound thinkers have considered the positing of the idea of God as valid and appropriate to their maturity. Hartshorne delineates the historical reasons given for the idea of God the ultimate. This "absolutist" contention contributes to the present tension between the absolute and relative in the theological venture, so time taken with Hartshorne to survey its basis is justified.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 515. ⁶*Supra*, pp. 287, 314.

⁷Sigmund Freud, "Civilization and Its Discontents," cited by Ernest Jones, *The Life and Works of Sigmund Freud* (New York: Basic Books, 1957), p. 358.

First Cause. If God is the First Cause as Thomas found him to be, then, by definition, He must be uncaused. Aristotle believed him to be the Unmoved Mover. Anselm took him to be the ultimate in perfection. He cannot be improved. He that is first cause cannot be "effected." He that is unmoved must be immutable.

The traditional attributes befit the first cause as the creator of all. As omnipresent, there can be no place wherein he is not included. He must be the only limit--the all-inclusive one. The omnipresent, inclusive creator of all must also be the omniscient one.⁸ He is absolute in knowledge. The omniscient, omnipresent creator of all must be absolute in power. He is the omnipotent one. There is nothing outside his presence, his potency and his knowledge.

This is the picture of God the Absolute, the Supreme, the Creator. He must be all. He must be highest. He must be uncaused.

And there is much to substantiate these contentions even in the twentieth century. When Charles Wesley sang: "Father, Thou art all compassion, Pure unbounded love Thou art," Hartshorne concedes that although he was not "denying relativity or passivity to Him, yet he was distinguishing God metaphysically."⁹ Theology is "the most literal science"

⁸Charles Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 123.

The only literal statements which can be made are those made about God. Human compassion is limited, indifferent, qualified. So is human love, knowledge, will, and social awareness. All these attributes must be literally qualified as they apply to man. They can only be literal when applied to God. So, God is love, God knows, God has compassion, God is power, God is wise, etc., are the only types of literal statements possible. "It is our natures which negate the categories, not God's."¹⁰ In this sense, then, it is not sheer nonsense to conceive of God as some sort of Absolute or Supreme being.

In addition to these affirmations, however, there are others which traditional theism has seen fit to make. Herein lies the dilemma.

THE DILEMMA

How can any cause be regarded as non-relative to its effect?

Has not the Absolute always been thought of as the cause or ground of all things, and is not the cause in relation to its effects?"¹¹

This is simply the question of whether "there may be relations 'external' to their terms, or at least to one of these, so that the term in no way depends for its being or

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 36. ¹⁰*Ibid.* ¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 6.

nature upon the relations?"¹² The Middle Ages accepted the affirmative as doctrine. The illustration was of the donkey which stood to the left of a pillar. Its stance and being was in relation to the pillar but not the pillar in relation to it. Hartshorne will not accept the illustration. Is it not a fact, he asks, that it is the superiority of the animal in mobility and cognition which makes it only appear to be more relative to the pillar than the pillar is to the animal? This is blasphemous if the immutability and non-relativity of the pillar is meant to be analogous to that quality in God. It is a contradiction if the very superiority of the animal is taken as the premise to prove that the animal is inferior to the pillar.

There is another problem concerning the concept of God as absolute with respect to his being cause or creator of the world.

If effect as such is inferior to cause as such, process as such is transition to the inferior and essentially degeneration.¹³

If this were fact it would contradict most of the evidence of our senses.

The problem is magnified and focused in that theologians have not been content to say that the world is produced or caused by God; they wish also to assert that it is willed, known and even loved by him.¹⁴

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 7. ¹³*Ibid.*, p. 78. ¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 16.

It may have been possible to support a doctrine of the "absolute" if the philosopher or theologian had been content to leave his affirmation to that of "first cause" or the "unmoved mover," but when they have with equal insistence claimed the attributes of willing, knowing and loving, then the antinomies presented are myriad.

Will and Relativity. It is customary to relate the concept of the will of God to the attribute of omnipotence. If will suggests intention, and perhaps desire, then to the empirical observer the will of God is evident in the creation of the world of things and creatures. Align the concepts of an absolute will and absolute power with the affirmation that creation is the result of this combination activated by a loving God, however, and the presence of evil--natural or intentioned--the free will of man and even the whole idea of progress project apparent irreconcilables. Bertocci poses the problem with respect to evil. He says:

Our reasoning . . . has led us to the conclusion that God, in working out his moral purpose, is confronted with some obstacle or obstacles which resist his good will. There results a world in which evil frustrates the creative realization of values.¹⁵

Many attempts have been made to reconcile the existence of evil with the idea of a good God, willing the world with

¹⁵Peter A. Bertocci, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1959), p. 420.

absolute power and loving desire towards his intended end. Brightman has enumerated them. There is the appeal to *finite ignorance*. Here the Barthian extreme separates the world and God so completely that he exhorts man to turn away from reason if he would find God at all. Brightman agrees with Josiah Royce that it is "the better part of wisdom to admit that we do not know, rather than infer God's absoluteness from our ignorance."¹⁶ Hartshorne is not impressed with this appeal to ignorance, nor even the popular retreat to the so-called *paradoxes*.

A theological paradox, it appears, is what a contradiction becomes when it is about God rather than something else, or indulged in by a theologian or a church rather than an unbeliever or a heretic.¹⁷

Such paradoxes or contradictions--to avoid the customary euphemisms--are not to be taken as the "inevitable result of human limitation," and are not the necessary corollary of man's inferiority in his relativity or the indication of God's absoluteness. Hartshorne is critical of the Thomists whose epistemology claimed that in all categories apart from the divine it was the knower who was related to the known. This distinction cannot be validated. God as knower also becomes relative to the known.

¹⁶Edgar S. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 310.

¹⁷Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity*, p. 2.

It is as ignorant that Plato is absolute in relation to Leibnitz, and as knowing that Leibnitz is relative to Plato.¹⁸

It is obvious that to know a fact is to become relative to it. To be ignorant of it is the only way in which one can be considered absolute and independent of it.

It is now seen that Hartshorne has given the usual connotation of "relative" a slight variation. His definition of "absolute" is "that which is non-relative," and he takes "relative" in its generic meaning of "having relation to."¹⁹ The problem has been that "relative" has been connoted as the "limited" and the "inferior." This is the primary fallacy, and Hartshorne is desirous of showing that the Divine is superior, not in spite of, but because of, His relativity. When he speaks of the Divine as being relative, he means in this superior sense of "absolute relativity" which allows God to be in relation with all that he knows and wills and loves. These concepts, however, run counter to some of the most cherished traditional theology, and are therefore in need of some elucidation.

Brightman notes a second way in which the problems of evil and the will of an absolute God has been handled, namely, by the *ascription of surd evils to the Divine will*.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 18. ¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 83.

Since theistic absolutism includes the belief that the divine will is omnipotent and faces no conditions that it did not create, an upholder of the view must find the ultimate source of all surd evils in the will of God.²⁰

Another solution has been that if God is to be still regarded as absolutely good, then evil must only be *apparent evil*.

It must be "good" in the will and omniscience of God. This solution, however, would destroy any possible discernment on our part of the categories of good and evil, and cut the nerve of man's moral endeavour. Martin Luther, Brightman notes, was direct enough with his solution to the problem. He explained that

all men find the omnipotence of God "written in their hearts" and that the omnipotent one wills the existence of sin and suffering as the just and best way to reveal his power, mercy and honor; . . . if this could be comprehended by reason then faith would be unnecessary.²¹

The only other alternative to this is to agree that evil is somehow outside the will of God by drawing a distinction between *intentioned* will and *inclusive* will. This distinguishes between what God desires for his creation and what he will allow to happen in it. Because of factors resident in his inclusive will (free will in man, etc.), his intentioned will is allowed to be frustrated temporarily. The parallel to this is to be found from Plato to Dewey and all points in between.

With some variance on a theory of forms (realm of

²⁰Brightman, *op. cit.*, p. 310. ²¹*Ibid.*, pp. 310-11.

ideals for Dewey), many have attempted to resolve the problem of evil and an absolute Divine will. Whitehead has more comprehensively proposed the solution in his concepts of the two natures of God (Primordial as intentioned will, and Consequent Nature as the inclusive will), and provided a more adequate rationale of their functions than any other metaphysician or theologian.

Love and Relativity. If the ability to will and know demands a relativity within the being of God, then that of love must assure it. Maslow has pointed out in another context that men are often "afraid to love because this [means] letting [their] defences drop and becoming vulnerable to hurt."²² Although it may be objected that this statement is made in reference to neurotic tendencies, it is replied that so-called normality is, after all, only the functional degree of the abnormal traits of the neurotic and psychotic. At least it is affirmed that the human manifestation of love must of necessity include "relativity" to a marked degree. To love means at least to be in empathic relation. Empathy ensures that the subject's feeling responses are appropriate to those of the love object. My beloved's hurt is my hurt.

It may immediately be objected that the analogy of

²²Abraham H. Maslow and Béla Mittelmann, *Principles of Abnormal Psychology* (New York: Harper, 1951), p. 6.

human love cannot apply to what must be the example of perfect love in God. Hartshorne replies that it is precisely the imperfections that make themselves irrelevant to the analogy.²³ Love is the finest example known of human inclusiveness, of social awareness and individual responsibility. This allows an appropriate analogous application. God must be at least the best of which man is capable or can conceive.

Love is inclusive. In this it is different from hate. Hate is particularised and selective. Love is inclusive.²⁴ "Love means sharing in the reality of other individuals; hatred means a partial refusal to share."²⁵ Love is inclusive of imperfection. We are loved even on the human level, not because we are perfect or that we have the potential to be perfect, but in spite of (*trotz*) our imperfections. "'Worthy of Love' is a silly phrase, if love means adequate awareness of the value of others."²⁶ Hartshorne is certain that it is not as "potential good" that God loves his crea-

²³Charles Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism* (Chicago: Willett, Clarke, 1941), p. 295. Also, Charles Hartshorne, *The Logic of Perfection* (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1962), p. 101.

²⁴There is one way in which God as love is exclusive, and that is in respect to some possibilities. He is not exclusive of any *particular* possibility; ". . . not everything possible could ever be real, but there is no one possible thing which is impossible" (*ibid.*, p. 100).

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 102.

²⁶Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God*, p. 165.

tion. He includes its imperfect actuality in his concern;²⁷ otherwise, in view of the above, "the essence of the religious belief in God [as love] is sacrificed."²⁸

There is another problem for the insistent absolutist.

Is God absolutely perfect in all respects? What about happiness or bliss? . . . Is not God displeased by sin, and so something less than purely happy in beholding it? Does he not love us and therefore sympathize with our sufferings, wish that they were removed?²⁹

Absolute perfection and absolute love cannot be reconciled in the orthodox views. This is the problem of suffering and death. The problem is not of suffering and death as such, but rather the presence of unhappiness and pain it causes to God's love object. Can the love Subject be perfect in love and still be unmoved by the agony and tears of his love object. "If not then God is less than the poorest of human creatures."³⁰ If it is again objected that this analogy is merely an anthropomorphic fallacy, again it must be replied that God must be at least as perfect as man's idea and practice of his own best. It is a theological phenomenon that man has been strangely reluctant to ascribe to God some of the best human qualities. Conversely, there has been little reluctance to make Diety bear traits not particularly admir-

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 166. ²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 164. ²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 12.

³⁰Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity*, p. 55; cf. also p. 127.

able. It is not self-evident, for instance, that independence and immutability are desirable traits; but without compunction they have been made divine attributes for no other reason than that they seemed to meet the requirements of some image of the absolute. The question may be raised whether they even fulfilled this function. In the concept of dependence, for instance, there is evidence that "the higher the form of life the more dependent on certain things it is. An oyster is not affected by my joy."³¹ In the reading of a poem, the higher the faculties of sensitivity in the hearer or reader, the more affected he is. Here is Nicolas Berdyaev, from his *Destiny of Man*, on the matter:

It is extraordinary how limited is the human conception of God. Men are afraid to ascribe to him inner conflict and tragedy characteristic of all life, the longing for his other, for the birth of man. . . . Self-sufficiency, stony immobility . . . the demand for continual submission are qualities which the Christian religion considers vicious and sinful, though it calmly ascribes them to God. . . . That which in God is regarded as a sign of perfection, in man is considered an imperfection. . . . To deny tragedy in the Divine life is only possible at the cost of denying Christ.³²

So also with goodness. In the face of suffering and deficiency in the world

perfect goodness is not sufficient condition of all possible bliss. Rather the good person suffers more than the bad at the spectacle of badness and the suffering of others.³³

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 48.

³²Cited by Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God*, p. 142.

Mere quantity of joy has never been virtue, but rather its appropriateness. Can less be expected of God?

THE RESOLUTION

Hartshorne is convinced both of the necessity for, and the possibility of, some resolution of the tension between the absolute-relative concepts of God. He believes with Whitehead that God is not to be regarded as an exception to ontological principles, but rather "the idea of the deity is the chief, if not the sum of the metaphysical ideas."³⁴

The resolutions have been anticipated to some degree, but by way of summary they can be stated again. God is absolute will and power best conceived not in a mere quantitative sense, but qualitatively in that his will includes such things as the contrary will of man, his desires, his chosen goals, needs, etc., always in the light of God's own will and end for man. Perfect love always has two aspects at least--love of self and love of others. In this respect the inclusive, qualitative will of God is not limited. Yet this also implies that it is not absolute in the sense of being non-relative to the other wills and power most evident

³³*Ibid.*, p. 14.

³⁴Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity*, p. 2.

in the world. Absolute inclusiveness makes for absolute relativity. This relativity is to be regarded as complementary to the Divine Being.

God is absolute in knowledge, which makes him immediately ever-present in awareness. This, too, is seen as an absolute relativity, for to be aware of all things is to be affected by all things. But because it is total awareness, his relativity does not have the limitations of human partial awareness. As we have seen with respect to the law of the spheres, when knowledge of all factors and variables involved in a particular situation is exhaustive, then the absolutes can be fully and accurately determined.³⁵ God's absolute knowledge of all things, his inclusive will and his perfect love make him the absolute possibility in adequacy. This absolute adequacy is correlative with absolute relativism.

God's love is absolute in that it is in no sense fickle, the same "yesterday, today and forever." It is not relative to *some* of the facts of existence, but to the totality. Absolute love which demands sensitivity and concern for suffering is incongruous with the idea of an absolute state of bliss and happiness which must necessarily be impaired by such sensitivity. However, these latter qualities

³⁵*Supra*, p. 78. Also, Hartshorne uses this specific image, *The Divine Relativity*, p. 6.

also are not regarded by man as the highest attributes.

The idea of perfect goodness is not transgressed by these categories because

the holiness of God consists not in a strange reconciliation of justice and mercy . . . but in the single aim at the one primary good, which is that the creatures should enjoy rich harmonies of living and pour this richness into the one ultimate receptacle of all achievement, the life of God.³⁶

It appears from this that Hartshorne's final resolution of the dilemma is an acceptance of the world as part of God himself. This makes all his relations internal to himself, as term of them, and is in harmony with his first injunction that this must be so. Does this imply pantheism? No, for God as centre of person can be envisaged as distinct from the whole. He calls his theory panentheism and uses the illustration of the human organism. Here is to be found both the hierarchy of parts and individuality with respect to the whole. God in his person is analogous to the mind of the organism, and is superior, as mind is to the body; is present in all extremes, taking them into account and being taken into account by them--in a sort of psychosomatic unity.

God is the mind which enjoys the fullest intimacy with all things and therefore in an undiluted sense has the whole world for body. . . . God is the self identical individuality of the world somewhat as man is the self-identical individuality of his ever changing patterns of atoms.³⁷

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 128.

Whitehead and Hartshorne. The affinity of Hartshorne with Whitehead is obvious. He does not posit the two natures of God in the primordial and consequent natures, but the analogy of the mind and body and the envisagement of the ideal end in the inclusive will of God are common to both.

In place of two natures and a comprehensive cosmology, Hartshorne has a formula of distinctions to validate his theistic doctrine of divine relativity. Although Hartshorne's philosophy to this point is much more profound than is possible of present treatment, reference is made to it.

There are two places where Hartshorne gives specific attention to the formal construction of his theories. Both were originally published in the same year (1941), but one seems to represent a little later development in his thinking. The first is in his book *Man's Vision of God*,³⁷ and the second is contained in his chapter entitled "Whitehead's Idea of God" in the book *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*.³⁹ This latter has the added advantage for us in that it is an attempt to correlate his own philosophy of religion with the philosophy of Whitehead.

In the former and more detailed treatment Hartshorne

³⁷Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God*, pp. 200, 230.

³⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 8 ff.

³⁹Paul A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead* (New York: Tudor, 1951), pp. 518 ff.

contends that there are seven possible "formal classifications of possible doctrines about God."⁴⁰ Such a classification is relevant to religion, because religion

believes in an unsurpassable being. And it certainly is relevant to philosophy; for the seven cases follow automatically from concepts which philosophy is bound to use.⁴¹

These seven cases may be divided into three main groups.

These divisions are

exclusive and exhaustive. To prove any two of these propositions false is to establish the truth of the remaining proposition. . . .⁴²

He tabulates the triad grouping of the seven cases thus:

Group	Case	Symbol	Interpretation
I	1	A	Absolute perfection in <i>all</i> respects.
II	2	AR	Absolute perfection in <i>some</i> respects, relative perfection in <i>all</i> others.
	3	ARI	Absolute perfection, relative perfection and imperfection, each in <i>some</i> respects.
	4	AI	Absolute perfection in <i>some</i> respects, imperfection in <i>all</i> others.
III	5	R	Absolute perfection in <i>no</i> respects, relative in <i>all</i> .
	6	RI	Absolute perfection in <i>no</i> respects, relative in <i>some</i> , imperfection in the others.
	7	I	Absolute perfection in <i>no</i> respects, imperfection in <i>all</i> . ⁴³

⁴⁰Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God*, p. 9. ⁴¹*Ibid.*

Group I is identified as a "theism of the first type" such as that held by absolutists, Thomists and most European theology prior to 1880. It conceives of a God who is in all respects absolutely perfect, immutable and unsurpassable, so that he can be in no way improved or changed. The second group is classed as a "theism of the second type" and identified with many contemporary protestant theology doctrines of a "finite-infinite" or "perfect-perfectible" God. Its premise is that there is no being which comes completely under group I but that there is a being in some respects absolute but in other respects not so. Relative perfection is defined as a presently unsurpassed perfection but is not absolute perfection because there is the possibility that such a state may be surpassed (by self or others is an open question for the time being). The third group classifies God as a merely finite being and belongs to some form of polytheism and atheism. It claims that there is no being in any respect absolutely perfect and that all beings are in every way surpassable.⁴⁴

The facts of change, growth (in the sense of improvement) and a finally indeterminate future exclude the first category from serious consideration. Simply put, the question is: if God includes all things (if he doesn't, that

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 12. ⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 8. ⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 12.

something which includes God and those things which God doesn't include must be more absolute than him), then any change or improvement in the whole must also be a change or improvement in the totality of God.⁴⁵ "X" may be inferior to "y" in one instance, but it is often the case that "x" becomes superior to "y" in another instance. As there is not necessarily a deterioration in "y" commensurate with the improvement in "x," it follows that the totality which includes them both (all other things being equal) must also be improved. Or, *vice versa* in the case of the relative deterioration of the parts.

The group under III is equally non-acceptable because if there is no principle of being which in some respects is unchangeable, then there can be no true individuality or durability because the identity of all things and especially self-identity is incompatible with "change in all aspects whatever." Time also would cease to be a category of being, "for time too must have some identity as well as differences."⁴⁶

This leaves group II. Of the three cases in this group, that of ARI first appeals in that it combines the three desirable aspects: that of "A" which assures continu-

⁴⁵Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity* , p. 84.

⁴⁶Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God*, p. 15.

ity and identity necessary to all categories of being; that of "R" which accounts for change; and that of "I" which assumes that all is change. Upon reflection, however, this case is already disqualified by the criticism of group III. Although the all-inclusive term can allow for all change internal to itself, there must necessarily be, by the definition of a term, that which indicates limits. The limit is "nothing outside itself." An analogy of the all-inclusive term is difficult, but if the human organism is taken to be that term then there is freedom of movement of any of the limbs relative to the body but it is impossible for the arms to become completely detached and yet remain functional parts of the organism. If the organism be defined as "all," then we have the disqualification of the ARI case by reason of its "I" term.

With respect to the case of AI, which attempts to combine the classifications of absolute perfection and a completely changeable perfection, the obvious antinomy is revealed as an inherent contradiction in the terms themselves. The terms dictate that there must be the possibility that "absolute perfection" could be completely changed to absolute inferiority.

This leaves the one case of AR in group II to be the truth of the matter. Because Hartshorne claims that the seven cases in formal terms are "exclusive and exhaustive,"

he believes that the analysis of exclusion surveyed above concludes the truth of theism of the second type. Granted the premise, the conclusion must follow. He says:

The formal analysis of perfection makes evident the absurdity of supposing the theistic question to be a mere product of superstition or of some "complex." The notions which define perfection are logically inevitable in philosophy.⁴⁷

The Self-Surpassing Surpassed of All. It is in his introduction to Whitehead's Idea of God that Hartshorne gives the best definition of his terms A and R and AR. By way of introducing Whitehead's two natures, Hartshorne takes the term WW (World) to mean the total dependence of God on the world. This would be his consequent nature as the totality of his being and would be represented by case seven, I, envisaged in the above. For the primordial nature he has taken the term CC (Cause) which represents the absolute independent causal agency of God and would be represented by Hartshorne's A above. He concludes that Whitehead's God can be represented by the combination CW and that this corresponds to his own formula of AR. He says:

Suppose that perfection had two aspects. . . . Then C in CW might be A in AR, and W might be the R. . . . It is also apparent that as CW is to CC and WW, so is AR to AA and RR. In each case we have a positive synthesis which excludes only the negative or abstract aspects of the extremes.⁴⁸

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 18.

Finally, he defines perfection. Perfection, whether it is represented by A or R, in its generic meaning, is that state which "surpasses all other conceivable states." "A" perfection under his terms means the property of "surpassing all others and not surpassing self." This excludes the growth or improvement aspects. "R" perfection still qualifies under the category of perfection because it also possesses the property of surpassing all others, but it has in addition the quality of being able to "surpass self."

Thus R becomes a richer concept than A since it includes the relation of universal superiority to others, which is the only positive feature of A, and includes also the equally positive relation of self-superiority or self-enrichment.⁴⁹

This seems to satisfy Hartshorne concerning the formal requirements of a divine relativity while the theological and empirical ones can be stated in the following terms:

The Absolute is God with something left out of account. God is more than his absolute character. . . . I am arguing that the absolute is, rather, an abstract feature of the inclusive and supreme reality which is precisely the personal God. . . . The absolute is not more, but less, than God--in the obvious sense in which the abstract is less than the concrete.⁵⁰

In view of all this it is now appropriate to reveal

⁴⁸Schilpp, *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*, p. 518.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 519.

⁵⁰Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity*, p. 83.

Hartshorne's definition of God. God is the "self-surpassing surpasser of all"⁵¹ and Hartshorne's doctrine of the divine relativity which we have surveyed is called that of "Sur-relativism."⁵²

Conclusion. There remains nothing to be said excepting the reminder that Dewey, Whitehead and Hartshorne have combined to provide some of the answers satisfactory to the problem of God, growth and relation in a composite and congruent whole. It is more than coincidence that they have also provided us with the concept of a God, who, as social being, provides man with opportunity to enter cosmic relation.

This is in accord with the general thesis. Attention is now turned to the problem of how man is able to enter such relationship, and one particular solution that mankind and his history--and, it is affirmed, God--combine to provide. In this conclusion will be found also some resolution of the problem inherent in axiology and valuation.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 20. ⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 22.

SECTION 4

THE CHRISTOLOGICAL SOLUTION

CHAPTER XV

HISTORY AND CHRISTOLOGY

A contemporary Christological problem is focused on the question, "If the first-century Jesus of Nazareth is the central fact of Christianity, how are the categories of time and space transcended to make him presently efficacious to twentieth-century man?" The defence by the Church, through its theologians, during the latter half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, has distinguished the first-century Jesus of Nazareth from the Christ of Faith who enters the experience of twentieth-century man. The faith believer claims to intuit the truth of the matter, but the analytic scholar cannot be content, as scholar, to regard intuition as an adequate tool in his analytical task. The result has been an unprecedented interest in the philosophy of history. The question is, as it is the intention of this section to show, not a problem peculiar to religion or Christology, but involves the whole question of how any past event becomes efficacious in present experience.

Because of this, the first chapter in this section is preoccupied with the general problems of a philosophy of history, and then seeks to make this general application to the specifics of theology and Christology. Such a study, it is believed, is a necessary prerequisite to the conclusions

of the final chapter, which claims to present the Christological resolution of the problem of values.

HISTORY

The Etymology. The etymology of a word reveals its meaning. The study of "history" will serve two purposes. One is illustrated by the fact that Buck's *Dictionary of Selected Synonyms of the Principle Indo-European Languages*¹ has no comment on the word at all. The special interest is a modern emphasis. Man has always been interested in his past, but only modern man has become fascinated by his interest in that interest. This introduces the second point. *Webster's* doesn't disappoint with a sufficiently non-specific definition to allow for all meanings in all times. The word and its use is as old as man. History is

a narrative of events connected with a real or imaginary object, person or career; tale, story, especially such a narrative devoted to the exposition of a natural unfolding and interdependence of the events treated.²

It has synonyms in the Latin and French (*historia* and *histoire*), with their many derivatives, but apparently both derived from the Greek *historia*. The Greek and the German

¹Carl D. Buck (ed.), *A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principle Indo-European Languages* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).

²*Webster's New International Dictionary* (third edition, unabridged; New York: Merriam, 1961).

derivatives give the most help.

Liddell and Scott's *Greek-English Lexicon* gives *historia* (ἱστορία) as a feminine noun meaning

enquiry . . . in empirical medicine, body of recorded cases, written account of one's enquiries, narratives; history.³

The same authority reveals that the noun comes from the verb *historeo* (ἵστωρῶ) meaning "to enquire into or about a thing."

A most significant development took place between the Greek classical usage of *historeo* as reflected above in Liddell and Scott and the *koine* (common) Greek use of the same verb in the New Testament. In Bauer's *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*, the meaning of the verb *historeo* is given as "to visit, for the purpose of coming to know someone."⁴ If the New Testament "historians" wrote their "history" with a greater sense of responsibility--"to get to know someone"--than to that of presenting the "brute

³Henry G. Liddell and Robert Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), I, 842. Professor James M. Robinson's remark to the effect that the early Greek *historia* was a reference to the "physician's exploratory surgery" (lecture given at the Southern California School of Theology, Spring semester, 1964) finds support here. Further, Galenus Medicus, writing about 11 A.D., used the word *historema* (ἱστορημα) to represent "clinical history" (Gal. 17, 1648). *Historema* is a derivative from the neuter *historion* (ἱστοριον) meaning "factor or illustration in proof."

⁴Walter Bauer, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*, ed., trans. William F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 583.

facts" of the "visit" itself, then a new criterion of the "trustworthiness" of the gospel narrative is presented. On this basis, not so much credence may be given to the charge of "untrustworthiness" of the historical record of the life of Jesus as the nineteenth-century questers and the twentieth-century demythologists may have inferred.⁵

Historie and Geschichte. This generation's preoccupation with the problem of history and theology has centered largely around two German partial synonyms for the English word "history." The continuing dialogue on the subject between the various schools of German-Continental theology has made much of these words, namely, *Historie* and *Geschichte*. Differentiation is easier if the adjectives are used rather than the nouns. *Historisch*, according to one authority, has as its primary meaning "spot, place or times, etc."⁶ This distinction is the opposite to that made by the theologians in the current debate,⁷ but it tends to be supported by the

⁵The second point is made by Professor Robinson (James M. Robinson, *The New Quest of the Historical Jesus* [London: S.C.M. Press, 1959], p. 32) when he says that "the Gospels, however, do not present the historical Jesus in distinction from the *kerygma*, but rather present a kerygmatised history of Jesus" (*ibid.*, p. 80).

⁶Karl Wildhagen and Will Heraucourt, *German-English, English-German Dictionary* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1960), II, 606. Also note: it does include the secondary meaning of "historical . . ." but it also refers to *geschichtlich* under this category.

other authorities consulted. For instance, the same dictionary in its English into German volume renders "historic" as *historisch*, and "historical" as *geschichtlich*, and that of "historian" as *Geschichtschreiber* (although it also gives as an alternative *Historiker*).⁸ In general, *New Cassell's German Dictionary* supports these renderings.⁹

Whatever the reason may be for the discrepancy between the above and the current German theological usage of the words, this chapter will follow the latter. The term *historisch* will refer to "any events of the past" (historical), while that of *geschichtlich* will be used to designate those "facts and events of special significance" (historic), such as that implied in the phrase of Elizabeth of England

⁷Richard R. Niebuhr, in his book *Resurrection and Historical Reason* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), interprets Bultmann as saying that "man may live on two levels--*Geschichte* and *Historie* (p. 116); that for Bultmann "the history of the kingdom of ends is *Geschichte*; and the history of the kingdom of means is *Historie*" (p. 82); and that for Barth *Geschichte* represents the "immediate action of God (creation and Christ), and *Historie* is the mediate action of God (Exodus through Moses)" (p. 84). Also, Reginald H. Fuller, in his translator's introduction to *Kerygma and Myth* (Rudolf Bultmann *et al.*, ed. Hans W. Bartsch [New York: Harper, 1961], p. xi), says: "The distinction that Bultmann makes between *geschichtlich* and *historisch* I have endeavoured to observe by the use of 'historic' for the former and 'historical' . . . for the latter." The whole doctrine of *Heilsgeschichte* depends on this distinction between *Historie* and *Geschichte*.

⁸Wildhagen and Heraucourt, *op. cit.*, I, 400.

⁹*New Cassell's German Dictionary*, ed. Harold T. Betteridge (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1958), pp. 234-36.

to President Kennedy on the occasion of the first U.S. manned flight into space: "We offer congratulations on this 'historic' occasion. . . ."

These two German words are invoked, therefore, to distinguish between the philosophies of history which are accounting for the major thrusts in the current theological debate. They may be termed *universal history* (*Historie*) and *significant (or particular) history* (*Geschichte*). Our main attention throughout will be given to *significant history*.

SIGNIFICANT HISTORY

Richard R. Niebuhr interprets John Knox as saying:

. . . the data with which biblical theologians have to deal will become luminous only if they are approached not as simple facts, but as events. Event is the basic category for an analysis of history and the way in which it is known.¹⁰

Knox draws together the subjective experience of the historian with the objective fact of the historical happening (*geschehen*) to make an event. There are many who would

¹⁰Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63. Also, it is significant to notice the increased emphasis that has been placed on the "event" in current New Testament scholarship. Knox is undoubtedly making some contribution to the development, but he is certainly benefited by the discussion of the new hermeneutic school. Taking advantage of the field day in linguistic analysis, both Fuchs and Ebeling have coined respectively "language event" (*Sprachereignis*) and "word happening" (*Wortgeschehen*) as the saving event, and thus tie history into the "word" of God. See James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb (eds.), *The New Hermeneutic* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 57 (Robinson); 88 f. (Ebeling); 124 (Fuchs).

claim that this "dualism" is not permissible in a philosophy of history, others who would call history writing capricious subjectivism, and others who ask for the "bare facts" as they really happened, with the recording of them entirely independent of the historian as subject.¹¹

Wie Es Eigentlich Gewesen. Many historians have avowed the necessity of reporting the facts "as they actually happened." Leopold von Ranke, who is said by Stern to be the father as well as the master of modern historical scholarship, defined his task as an historian in these specific terms.

To history has been assigned the office of judging the past, of instructing the present for the benefit of the future. To such high office this work does not aspire: It wants only to show what actually happened.¹²

¹¹Robin G. Collingwood, in his book *The Idea of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), attempts to effect a reconciliation of extremes by defining the term "philosophy of history." He claims that to Voltaire, the term meant nothing more than a "critical or scientific history"; Hegel meant "universal or world history"; and the nineteenth-century positivists said "the philosophy of history was the discovery of general laws governing the course of events which it was history's business to recount." Collingwood then says that "my term 'philosophy of history' differs from all of these" (p. 1). He examines the process and concludes that there are three disciplines involved. There is the historian who is concerned with the actual recording of the past, the psychologist who is concerned with the thoughts in the mind of the writer of history, and the philosopher of history. "For the philosopher, the fact demanding attention is neither the past by itself, as it is for the historian, nor the historian's thought about it by itself, as it is for the psychologist, but the two things in their mutual relation" (p. 2).

Because he wrote events for their own sake without interpretative comment or with any *a priori* purpose, Ranke wonders "just what will be said of my treatment of particulars, which is such an essential part of writing history?" He concludes that it may often "seem harsh, disconnected, colorless and tiring." Nevertheless, the first responsibility of the historian was to individual and particular facts treated "with unswerving impartiality," for it is

the strict presentation of the facts, contingent and unattractive though they may be, [which] is undoubtedly the supreme law.¹³

Significant history for Ranke was to be found in individual facts.

Mommsen gives support to this when he states that "history, after all, is nothing but the distinct knowledge of actual happenings."¹⁴ Toynbee, a little closer to our own day, agrees that "history must look at the facts, even if it does not stop there."¹⁵ Macauley can bemoan the case that "history proper . . . is disappearing. The high, grave,

¹²Leopold von Ranke, "Histories of the Latin and Germanic Nations from 1494-1514," *The Varieties of History*, Fritz Stern, editor (Cleveland: World, 1956), p. 57.

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴Theodor Mommsen, "Rectorial Address," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 192.

¹⁵Pieter Geyl, Arnold J. Toynbee, and Pitirim A. Sorokin, *The Pattern of the Past* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949), p. 80.

impartial summing up of Thucydides is nowhere to be found."¹⁶ Charles Beard, the historical relativist of the century, is quite certain that:

the distinction between particular facts that may be established by the scientific method and the "objective" truth of history must be maintained, if illusions are to be dispelled. . . . The effort to grasp at the totality of history must and will be continued, even though the dream of bringing it to earth must be abandoned.¹⁷

The historians at their trade have been at great pains to preserve the skills of impartial presentation of particular brute fact, "just as it happened." And there are many who believed it possible.

Some claimed to have embarked upon if not accomplished such a feat. This is no more evident than in the attempt to reconstruct the biographical facts of the "historical Jesus" by the objective historical method of the nineteenth-century scholars from Reimarus to Wrede. Schweitzer called their attempt "the greatest achievement of German theology."¹⁸ Their motives, however, were as many as their attempts. They have been charged with "the strangest paradox of all that the greatest attempts to write a 'Life of Jesus' have

¹⁶Thomas B. Macauley, "History," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 83.

¹⁷Charles A. Beard, "That Noble Dream," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, pp. 327-328.

¹⁸Albert Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, trans. W. Montgomery (New York: Macmillan, 1961), p. 1.

been written with hate."¹⁹ They wrote an *apologia* (rational defence) as *apologoi*²⁰ are written, in the attempt to reconstruct things as they actually were, by using the identical norms, patterns and criteria of those to whom they addressed their writings. At times they accomplished their task with consummate skill, but at others they were seduced by their own subjective aims. In most cases the objective critical method, which prevailed, was the reflection of "that thorough-going theological rationalism which accepts only so much of religion as can justify itself at the bar of reason."²¹

Some were in revolt against the necessity of apology and its method. Professor Burkitt could say:

We see now that the object of their attack was not the historical Jesus at all, but a temporary idea of him, inadequate because it did not truly represent Him or the world in which he lived.²²

Others, as Professor Robinson indicates, were motivated by the spirit of the enlightenment in its effort to throw off the shackles of dogma.²³ Some were on their own individual

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. v.

²⁰The second-century apologists wrote not only in defence of the gospel but also in an attempt to present the "reasonableness" of the faith to the sceptic, the heathen, the pagan, the agnostic, etc. and in each case adapted their methods, terminology, and argumentation to that of their readers.

²¹Schweitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

religious quest.

There can be no doubt, however, that the

quest of the historical Jesus was originally the quest after "the Jesus of Nazareth who actually lived in first-century Palestine," unrestricted by the doctrinal presentations of him in Bible, creed and church.²⁴

They were certain that this was possible, and they were confident that their method of "reconstruction of his biography by means of the objective historical method,"²⁵ would effect some sort of bridge between the first and nineteenth centuries, or as we now fashionably say, between the Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith.

The Historian. Of course the quest for the "historical Jesus"²⁶ failed. Apart from the reason given by Lessing that

²²Quoted in *ibid.*, p. vi.

²³Robinson, *The New Quest of the Historical Jesus*, p. 27. We catch a feeling of this undertone from Schweitzer himself when he remarks: "The history of the critical study of the life of Jesus is of higher intrinsic value than the history of the study of ancient dogma or the attempts to create a new one" (p. 2).

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 28. ²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶The distinction is made by Professor Robinson between the "historian's Jesus" and the "historical Jesus." "Quite apart from the assumptions of the Christian faith it is easy to see that all that Jesus actually was is not likely to be fully grasped, objectively demonstrated, and definitely stated by historical research in any given period" (*ibid.*, p. 30). Because of this fact, "the historical Jesus comes really to mean no more than 'the historian's Jesus'" (*ibid.*, p. 31).

The Christian traditions must not be explained by the inner truth of Christianity, and no written traditions can give it that inner truth, if it does not itself possess it,²⁷

there are those given by Robinson²⁸ of the illegitimacy of the quest in the first place and the impossibility of the task in using sources designed primarily "for the history of the early churches and only secondarily as sources for the history of Jesus." To these another is added. They had disqualified themselves in the first place by indicating that the inadequacy of the only sources available to them (namely the Gospels) was the motivation of their task.

There is a more significant reason for possible failure. The facts presented by the eyewitness are suspect. Can any historian be trusted to *see* what really happens? Here are two quotations from the same symposium and unnoticed by the editor apparently. Both the story and their peculiar context here illustrate the point. Both of these were prominent historians of their day, and both made strong assertions concerning the importance of sources and factual validity. The first writes:

Sir Walter Raleigh, who watched a tumult in the courtyard of his prison and afterwards heard the affair described by the jailor who brought him food, and who then, troubled by the discrepancies between his own

²⁷Schweitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

²⁸Robinson, *The New Quest of the Historical Jesus*, pp. 32-35.

... observation and that of another eye-witness, is said to have flung his newly-finished *History of the World* into the fire.²⁹

The other historian puts it thus:

The old story of Sir Walter Raleigh's looking from his prison-window, on some street tumult, which afterwards three witnesses reported in three different ways, himself differing from them all . . . ³⁰

It is obvious, therefore, that the subjectivism of the historian is a major factor to be taken into account in the attempt to bridge any gap between the first and this century with respect to the historical Jesus. It is now necessary to look at some of the motivating factors of this subjectivism. The first is that of the historian's "subject." What is the real "subject" of any writer?

Tendenzkritik. We deal with the "subject" (*Tendenzkritik*) of the historian. It was said of Bancroft's *History of the United States* that "every volume voted for Jackson."³¹ "Aim and subject mould the form of a book," says Ranke. Many historians, "without realizing that these [*a priori*] ideas are exposed to many doubts, . . . set out to find them reflected in the history of the world."³² Some historians

²⁹J[ohan] Huizinga, "The Idea of History," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 301.

³⁰Thomas Carlyle, "On History," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 94.

³¹Fritz Stern, "Introduction," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 18.

have openly confessed their intent. Augustin Thierry, the French historian of the early nineteenth century, states:

In 1817 my predominant concern was to contribute my share to the triumph of constitutionalism. As a result I turned to historical works to find corroboration of my political beliefs.³³

Some are motivated by passionate loyalty to a "cause" such as nationalism. Walter Frank, the leading Nazi historian, could say in his address at the opening of the Berlin Institute for Modern History:

Then the rebuking fingers of those academicians were wagged at us. Their rebuke was: Commitment is the arch-enemy of knowledge.

And since we had been in deadly earnest about knowledge . . . we came to know [one] thing:

. . . Being German, to us, means seriousness.

Being German, to us, means thoroughness.

Being German, to us, means having a conscience.

Being German, to us, means going to the depths of things, even if this means our death.³⁴

The charge that the historian's "subject" is to the detriment of his historical impartiality is undoubtedly true.

There is another side to the coin. Collingwood recognises the importance of the subject to the historian, and in his discussion of the "subject matter" of history recognises the impossibility of separating the "interest"

³²Leopold von Ranke, "A Fragment from the 1830's," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 58.

³³Augustin Thierry, "Letters on the History of France," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 64.

³⁴Walter Frank, "Guild and Nation," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, pp. 342-43.

(equated with "subject" in the present discussion) of the historian from his writing--for even his noticing of history is dependent on his "interest."

It is a familiar fact that every generation finds itself interested in, and therefore able to study historically, tracts and aspects of the past, which to its fathers were dry bones signifying nothing. . . . This is to say that the historian's thought must spring from the organic unity of his total experience, and be the function of . . . its practical as well as its theoretical interests.³⁵

"The writing of history," says Ranke, "cannot be expected to possess the same free development of its subject . . . [as] a work of literature." He also observes that

to history has been assigned the office of judging the past, of instructing the present for the benefit of future ages,³⁶

and in so doing it can hardly be expected to assume a neutral role in the process. When Professor Geyl chides Toynbee for having a chart, Toynbee retorts:

Geyle, too, has a chart, like Spengler and me. We all of us have a chart, whether we admit it or not, and no chart is any more than one man's shot in the dark. . . . What was our father's chart of history? A tale told by God, unfolding itself from creation through the fall to final redemption. Professor Geyl sees it as a tale told by an idiot.³⁷

Neither is the New Testament historian free from his *Tendenzkritik*.³⁸ Nor the Church historian. It is with

³⁵Collingwood, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

³⁶Ranke, "Histories . . . ," p. 57.

³⁷Geyl, Toynbee, and Sorokin, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

reference to this latter that Niebuhr comments on the difficulty experienced by the Church historian in maintaining his impartiality.

The Church is constitutionally unable to keep from violating the neutrality of the past because it has a vested interest in the outcome of the investigation.³⁹

What may be done in such circumstances? How does the historian safeguard his validity and the New Testament its authority?

The first necessity is the open recognition of the problem as such. The second is to accept the near impossibility of a completely *objective* critical historical method. The third thing is for the reader as well as the writer of history to take into account the *Tendenzkritik* of the historian. This will enable some compensations in the interpreting of the records.⁴⁰

³⁸Professor Robinson reports (lecture given at the Southern California School of Theology, Spring semester, 1964) the young German scholar Wolfhart Pannenberg as claiming that the "real point" a writer is trying to make (*Sache, res*) stands behind his "subject." Professor Robinson thinks it is not possible to distinguish between the two. It would appear that only if *Tendenzkritik* may be used to represent the "subject," or the way in which the writer writes his "subject" (point made by Collingwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 302 f.), could such a distinction as Pannenberg's be sustained.

³⁹Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁴⁰It would seem that none can eclipse the skills and methods involved in this art evolved by the biblical form critics (Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Kundsinn, *Form Criticism: A New Method of New Testament Research* [Chicago: Willett, Clarke, 1934], also in Harper Torchbooks; and Martin

It is worth noting again at this point that the history of the New Testament shares this problem in common with all history. The problem is not peculiar to the writers of "faith" literature. Butterfield warns against this error in judgment of biblical writings specifically. He says:

It is possible that the power of much of the Old Testament teaching about history would be more vividly appreciated, and its relevance to the twentieth century more readily recognized, if only we could rid ourselves of an obsession and genuinely convince ourselves that the history of the ancient Hebrews was fundamentally of the same texture as our own.⁴¹

We look back, in the twentieth century, on our history as they did in theirs, says Butterfield, with a mixture of hope and scepticism and nostalgia. "We have heard with our ears, O God, and our fathers have told us, what work Thou didst in their days, in times of old."

This commonality, however, does not alleviate responsibility for the problem of *Tendenakritik*. It is noted that with skill it is possible to reconstruct within close proximity the original event from the conflicting accounts of witnesses. Huizinga reports that

When contradictory evidence was placed in the hands of an experienced judge, he was usually able to reconstruct the actual event, as previously recorded, from the faulty materials.⁴²

Dibelius, *From Tradition to Gospel*, tr. Bertram Lee Wolff [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935]).

⁴¹Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity and History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 72.

The synoptic problem thus becomes both a rich fount of research and a claim to validate the "trustworthiness" of the record. If there were no conflict in these "histories" there would be a serious lack of data to aid interpretation. A too literal agreement in the text would merely reflect one biased *Tendenzkritik* with little possibility of balancing the final judgment by comparison with other *Tendenzkritiks*. Here is a strong indication that the Gospels are authentic history, and a rich fount of "authentic" data with which to reconstruct the scene.

There is another criterion for testing the reliability of any historian. Harnack says that if "an historian fairly competently interprets his own culture it may be used as criterion by which to judge his historical skill."⁴³ Collingwood remarks that "as the historian is a son of his time, there is a general likelihood that what interests him will interest his contemporaries."⁴⁴ It is because the would-be historian discerns what is the "interest" of his time that makes him an historian. This is the skill referred to by Harnack. Not everyone who writes history has it read. The historian whose history is read to an extent not only

⁴²Huizinga, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

⁴³Adolf Harnack, *Christianity and History* (London: Black, 1907), p. 19.

⁴⁴Collingwood, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

validates his material as that which the general consensus approves as significant, but also indicates his skill as historian. So there are some criteria of the trustworthiness of history and historians even allowing for the problem of *Tendenzkritik*.

Niebuhr's original statement concerning the "subject" of the New Testament writers says there is an inherent fallacy in the suggestion that the past is some sort of neutral ground for the historian. His special concern is the resurrection tradition of the Church. Where memory is concerned, Niebuhr is saying in effect, the historian cannot be justifiably charged with partiality in reporting the events remembered. The resurrection for Niebuhr and Knox is the "memory of the Christian Community."⁴⁵ The historian's memory was that of one contemporaneous with the events recorded and in addition was received and read by those contemporaneous with both the historian and the events. When Professor Colwell reports that over 1,500 "gospel" manuscripts are known to have been circulated in the first century,⁴⁶ the argument above is most supportive of the four which received validation.

⁴⁵Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁴⁶Ernest Colwell, "The Second Century Apologists" (lecture given at the Southern California School of Theology, Fall, 1962).

There is yet another point to be made. When the Christian community is charged with "defending its traditions with a vested interest in the outcome," a distinction needs to be made concerning the evolutionary order of these two--"history" and the *Tendenzkritik*. For instance, there is a glaring difference between the Nazi and the French political historian, on the one hand, and that of Toynbee, on the other. Both have an admitted *Tendenzkritik*. The former had their *Tendenzkritik* and then wrote their history to substantiate it. The latter--to all avowed intents and purposes--studied his history and recognised a plot to the drama. This recognition created his *Tendenzkritik*. Though Toynbee and anyone who makes the claim for this chronological priority may be challenged, nevertheless the Christian community would claim that its stance is analogous to that suggested above for Toynbee. Christendom generally would insist that this order is not only that of the original writers of the New Testament but is consensually validated throughout the history of the faith community by those who read. "Faith does not depend on scripture but scripture on faith,"⁴⁷ was how Schleiermacher put it.

Whether or not the problem of *Tendenzkritik* is resolved for the critical historian and the New Testament

⁴⁷Richard B. Brandt, *The Philosophy of Schleiermacher* (New York: Harper, 1941), p. 306.

scholar by the preceding argumentation, it seems evident that every community and individual is free and responsible to ask with Hegel:

In contemplating history as the slaughter bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states and the virtue of individuals have been sacrificed, a question naturally arises: to what principle, to what final purpose, have these monstrous sacrifices been offered?⁴⁸

It seems that those who look at Hegel's question and come up with the "nonsense" answer that Toynbee accuses Geyl of espousing are worse off than those who take Toynbee's "shot in the dark." The only real question, then, is for man to discern among the qualifying "shots in the dark" which comes closest to meeting the needs of the question and the questioner. This could be interpreted as saying that it is not the past history that is so important but the present interpretation of it. Just so. But clearly, as both Knox and Collingwood suggested in the beginning, it is not possible to have an interpretation without a history or a history without an interpreter, unless one dares to run the risk of negating history and with it the whole of existence.

⁴⁸Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Reason in History*, tr. Robert S. Hartman (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), p. 27.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SIGNIFICANT "EVENT"

How does an event become "significant"? How does man choose the significant event (*Geschichte*) from among all the alternatives (*Historie*)? That the historian does this is self-evident. That the choice of some historians is validated and others not is also accepted. Is man motivated to give significance to those things which meet his biological needs,¹ or those that meet his psychic needs in remembering and explaining,² or those that meet his spiritual needs to worship the Providence who directs his path and pervades the whole with unity?³

Whatever an epistemology of history may eventually reveal, current opinion appears to have decided one thing: that the unit of history (*Geschichte*) is "event." How "event" is to be defined is the subject of this particular chapter. Is it "word" or "language" or "person" or "occasion" which becomes the unit? An affirmative at one time or another has been given to each of these alternatives and an

¹Primitive noticing and signification of Langer and Cassirer.

²Necessity for meanings in the primal consciousness of Usener and Cassirer.

³Taoism and Cassirer's "nameless god of a thousand names."

examination of them may help answer the questions with which this chapter opens.

THE PARADIGM

Harnack speaks for both the secular historian and the Christian theologian when he asks:

When all history seems a process of ceaseless decay, is it possible to pick out a single phenomenon and saddle it with the whole weight of eternity?⁴

Harnack agrees that Lessing is most probably correct,

when he warns against coupling matters of the highest moment with "accidental truths of history" and hanging the whole weight of eternity on a spider's thread.⁵

One can ask what Lessing was referring to in his "matters of the highest moment" and if such can be coupled in any way with history. He answers, "Yes," if by his phrase "accidental truths of history" he means to imply that there are some "essential truths of history," and that these are to be considered as something of a more substantial drape for the "whole weight of eternity" than "a spider's web." Lessing, however, cannot be made to say this⁶ and perhaps not Harnack, but at least the latter affirms some significance for historical event when he asks:

⁴Adolf Harnack, *Christianity and History* (London: Black, 1907), p. 18.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 20-22. To some extent, however, Lessing

But are we to say that such external details as have been handed down are of no significance whatever? Who would be so short-sighted, or so frivolous, as to maintain such a proposition?⁷

The question that follows is that concerning the difference and the possibility of the recognition of the difference between events which reflect best the "matters of highest moment" and those which do not, and, how is it possible to recognise that difference. It may be difficult to find a secular historian to admit to the responsibility of having done so in his particular "history." There are some, however, who would claim to have isolated some of the more significant "truths of history" and of selecting in their writing those events which more efficiently illustrate those truths. These may be called the "paradigmatic events" which,

tried to make some sense of history. Harnack says of him: "It is true that Lessing himself made great efforts to do justice to history; but his efforts were uncertain, and they were but little understood." It is also enlightening to understand the difficulty that confronted Lessing, as Harnack continues to explain the above statement: "His [Lessing's] generation had no concern for anything but the truths of Reason, alleged to be eternal, and the 'natural religion' which it had rediscovered; and in possession of these blessings, it looked down on the 'accidents of history' with contempt, and cut the bond between them and religion. All historical religions, so the eighteenth century taught, are at best only the one true natural religion in disguise . . . and of this religion Reason, fixed and unalterable, is the only content. By the side of it, even Christianity and its founder can make no special or particular claim; for everything that is particular is accidental, superfluous, and intellectually mischievous" (*ibid.*).

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 62.

"modeled" before the historian's audience, reveal to them in an economy of staging, props, and actors, what the significant plot of the whole play has been.

Reductionism and Determinism. This is not to reduce the whole story to a single factor,⁸ nor to say that history is no more than a progression of a few causes and effects readily identified by the historical determinist.⁹ "A man must be infatuated," says Harnack,

⁸Such a tendency is to be seen in the premise of the positivist historian Henry Thomas Buckle of the mid-nineteenth century. A similar charge is laid at the feet of the universal historian Ranke, the philosophy of Hegel, and the Hebraic linear view of history. Buckle regrets "the unfortunate peculiarity of the history of man, that although its separate parts have been examined with considerable ability, hardly any one has attempted to combine them into a whole, and ascertain the way in which they are connected with each other. In all the other fields of inquiry, the necessity of generalization is universally admitted . . ." (Henry Thomas Buckle, "History of Civilization in England," *The Varieties of History*, Fritz Stern, editor [Cleveland: World, 1956], pp. 123-24).

⁹Harnack deplores the *nil admirari* attitude of such reductionists which only asked of an event or a man if they "said anything new; and if so, whether it could be deduced from something that went before; and they profess themselves content if they ascertain that it was only 'relatively' new, and that nothing very wonderful has happened after all" (Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 33). Also note Nietzsche's similar complaint in his 1874 essay, "Use and Disadvantage of History," where he contends, according to Stern, "that historical thinking had overpowered the creative, spontaneous forces of life, and that historians had succumbed to a lifeless scientism" (Fritz Stern, "Introduction," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 20).

to maintain that, because all history is a history of development, it can and must be described as a process of material or mechanical change.¹⁰

Both the "how" and the "why" of historical progression are important to the historian.¹¹ The thoughtful historian must always have a sense of the complexity of human life, but he must also believe that this complexity is somehow comprehensible. While explaining the course of history as he sees it illustrated in the paradigmatic event he must also have some skill in discerning the accidental causality of other incidental events.

While explaining the course of Roman history he must make allowances for contingency, for Pascal's mischievous observation that if "Cleopatra's nose had been shorter, the whole aspect of the world would have been different."¹²

There is a difference between accidental detail or even events of major contingency and the paradigmatic illustration of the process of history. The critic may reply that the only difference is in the judgment of the historian and the only validation of his opinion is the consensus of future readers and future historians' new facts. The paradigmatic historian would be content with this.

Event as Paradigm. But can one event adequately illustrate the process of history more quantitatively or

¹⁰Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

¹¹Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 29. ¹²*Ibid.*

qualitatively than any other? F. W. Maitland believed so.

If some fairy gave me the power of seeing a scene of one and the same kind in every age of history of every race, the kind of scene that I would choose would be a trial for murder, because I think that it would give me so many hints as to a multitude of matters of first importance.¹³

Some have declared that the choosing of paradigmatic events is all the historian does. Friedrich Meinecke, the "best known German historian of the twentieth century,"¹⁴ states that history does not "accept the totality of the events (*Historie*) as its domain." This would be an impossible mastery, he claims, and adds:

From the huge and unencompassed mass it selects only the tiniest segment, that, namely, which is held to be essential, and rightly regards occupation with unessential human happenings as idle microscopic curiosity.¹⁵

The contemporary cultural historian, Jacques Barzun, has bluntly stated that "what culture leaves to the historian is but vestiges of the doings of a few."¹⁶

Criteria of Paradigmatic Event. So it is said to be both impossible to include all *Historie* and necessary to choose *Geschichte*. But what are the criteria of choice? For Meinecke it is not causality or the degree of influence

¹³Quoted by Stern, *ibid.* ¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 267.

¹⁵Friedrich Meinecke, "Values and Causalities in History," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 271.

¹⁶Jacques Barzun, "Cultural History: A Synthesis," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 396.

which is the determining factor. He quotes Rickert in support: "Degree of influence alone can never provide the criterion for that which is historically essential."¹⁷ He concludes that there are both causal and supracausal meanings in history, of which the historian must take account. Events are signified by causal meanings in that the mighty events of their own past in myriad ways influence them in the present, and they have supracausal meanings in that the desire of the present historian is to derive profit from history of the past. Where these two requirements are satisfied, *Geschichte* event is isolated from *Historie*. In this sense, "it is values, life-values, that we win from history. . . ."¹⁸

It is now clear that there can be two main tendencies in writing history: One of them attracted by causalities, yet never able to escape from values and hardly ever from its own intrinsic value; the other attracted by values without being able to dispense with causalities. . . .¹⁹

Meinecke believes that the writing of history from what we have called paradigmatic events selected by the above criteria would eventually point to "every significant revelation of authentically spiritual existence," and that because

¹⁷Meinecke, *op. cit.*, p. 271. ¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 271-72.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 274. Cf. the amazing parallel of Michael B. Oakeshott's thinking on the same subject, as interpreted by Collingwood (Robin G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1956], p. 154).

it is derived not only from the singular point of view of one historian but that of "the ideals of one's opponent as well." Butterfield notes that it was with an eye to particular values that the Hebrews wrote their history.

What was unique about the Hebrews was their historiography rather than their history--the fact that their finer spirits saw the hand of God in events.²⁰

One is given to understand that Meinecke believes that every historian, consciously or unconsciously, chooses his events and writes his history from these two criteria. He cites some noteworthy conscious attempts at this type of historiography.

Wilhelm von Humboldt was perhaps the first to call for history in our sense--a history oriented to all of mankind's spiritual values . . . and founded on the investigation of all knowable causalities. The fulfillment came with Ranke who, in ideal fashion, organically connected the exposition of value to causal inquiry, and in the last analysis, therefore, sought God in history. Hence he may be claimed, for that tendency which gravitates to values as the final and decisive basis.²¹

The Dangers of the Paradigm. Meinecke's confidence may be a little too idealistic. The dangers of making too much of a so-called paradigmatic event are great. Macauley relates how Bishop Watson

²⁰Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity and History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 73.

²¹Meinecke, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

compares a geologist to a gnat mounted on an elephant and laying down theories as to the whole internal structure of the vast animal, from the phenomena of the hide.²²

The same historian points out that mere accuracy in detail or arrangement of the order or treatment of events may mislead or be misinterpreted, for "a history in which every particular incident may be true, may, on the whole, be false."²³ Toynbee warns concerning the discernment and sincerity of the historian in both his choice and use of paradigmatic events, because "what the author leaves unsaid is at least as important as what he mentions."²⁴ Macauley says that it "perpetually happens that one writer tells less truth than another, merely because he tells more truths."²⁵

It is as inevitable as it is obvious that there are "good" and "less good" choosers of paradigmatic events. For Meinecke, the bad choosers are those who place too much emphasis on causality in history to the exclusion of value. "Troeltsch and I," he says, "have often talked about the 'overestimation of causalities' which still predominates in the selection of material."²⁶ Robinson, the progressive

²²Thomas B. Macauley, "History," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 84.

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴Pieter Geyl, Arnold J. Toynbee, and Pitirim A. Sorokin, *The Pattern of the Past* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949), p. 43.

pragmatist of the beginning of this century, in his "New History" regrets that "hitherto writers have been prone to deal with events for their own sake."²⁷ He lists the errors:

A careless inclusion of mere names. . . .

A penchant . . . to recite political events to the exclusion of other matters often of far greater moment.

. . . [N]arrating extraordinary episodes, not because they illustrate the general trend of affairs or the prevailing conditions of a particular time, but simply because they are conspicuous in the annals of the past.²⁸

There are those who would claim that history is her own chooser and that it has little to do with the historian. The positivist Buckle says that "history is that upon which most has been written, and which has always been most popular."²⁹

In spite of all this, even that one who wins wide recognition for his work will be thought to have left himself open to criticism of his motive and choice. Geyl says to Toynbee's face: but he [Toynbee] selects . . . instances which support his theses."³⁰ But there is room for some optimism. It is Macauley, after his warnings about this type of history writings, who says that the "perfect historian is he in whose work the character and spirit of an age

²⁵Macauley, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

²⁶Meinecke, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

²⁷James Harvey Robinson, "The New History," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 260.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 261. ²⁹Buckle, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

is exhibited in miniature."³¹ It is by his "judicious selection . . . [that] he gives to truth those attractions which have been usurped by fiction."³² The real historian cannot give history's answer to his day, says Barzun, without

the application of such finesse as he is gifted with. Intelligibility being his goal, he cannot escape the effort to understand; he cannot ask somebody else to explain nor shut his eyes and count. It is insight, after the count has shown a preponderance of old-fashioned dwellings, that makes him say the dominant architecture of New York is modern. The rest is footnotes.³³

Footnotes and Form Criticism. The New Testament scholar has dominated the theological debate of this century. in the old and the new, the legitimate and the illegitimate quest for the historical Jesus, his findings have provided the authoritative backdrop to the Christological drama. Because the tools of research were those of the critical historian, the form critic has been in the center of the stage.³⁴ It is suggested, however, that his findings are

³⁰Geyl, Toynbee, and Sorokin, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

³¹Macauley, *op. cit.*, p. 86. ³²*Ibid.*

³³Barzun, *op. cit.*, p. 402.

³⁴It may be correct that this is only in an indirect way as noted by Professor Robinson (James M. Robinson, *The New Quest of the Historical Jesus* [London: S.C.M. Press, 1959], p. 37): ". . . one may say that form criticism, as applied to the gospel tradition, has to a large extent passed out of vogue. Yet it is all the more striking that the basic orientation with regards to the gospels, of which form criticism was but one manifestation, continues as the

footnotes to the main narrative. This is not to say they are dispensable. On the contrary. For a continuing critical evaluation of its tradition and its methods of communicating that tradition, Christianity must have the finest critical apparatus available. The ability to distinguish the "authentic" from the "inauthentic" sayings of Jesus is the necessary prerequisite to critically evaluating the early church's judgment of that which was "paradigmatic" of the sayings and ministry of Jesus.³⁵ If their historical judgment may be evaluated by some means, then "inauthentic" will only apply to those sayings and narratives about Jesus which cannot be classed in any sense as "paradigmatic." Perhaps there are some of these in the gospels. It is difficult to share the optimism of Bornkamm when he would claim that each of the *pericopae* which constitute the gospels are so inclusively "paradigmatic" as to each tell the whole

basis of twentieth-century scholarship." Also see footnote on form criticism (*ibid.*).

³⁵The "paradigm" is a recognised "form" of the critics. According to A. M. Perry ("The Growth of the Gospels," *The Interpreter's Bible*, VII, 69-70), this original term of Dibelius was rendered by Bultmann as "apothegm." He differed from Dibelius in that although they could generally agree on the identification of the stories under this classification, Bultmann refers to the "sayings" of Jesus and Dibelius to the "narrative" about Jesus. Also, "Dibelius hints that the 'pronouncements' may have been added by the preacher who related them to give general application to the story; Bultmann is often sure that the story was invented simply to give a setting for the sayings."

story of Jesus. He says:

These story scenes give His history not only when pieced together, but each one in itself contains the person and history of Jesus in their entirety.³⁶

However--and this is the point worth making--it is agreed with the same writer that

. . . despite the fact that on historical grounds so many of the stories and sayings could be contested in detail, despite tendencies evidently active in the tradition, despite the impossibility of finally extracting from more or less authentic particulars a more or less assured whole which we could call a life of Jesus . . . the gospels give abundant evidence of such history.³⁷

Now it is this "such history" which does constitute a certain "whole." It is the intuition³⁸ of the life of the historical Jesus as a "whole" which is the most significant "paradigm" of history. It is the paradigm of all history.³⁹

³⁶Günther Bornkamm, *Jesus of Nazareth*, tr. Irene and Fraser McLuskey (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 25.

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸Bergsonian, not "feminine," intuition. Bergson claims that the epistemological process follows this pattern: reception through the senses; perception through the mind; cognition through the intellect; conception through the intellect and finally re-cognition through intuition. Further, he states that "absolute knowledge" of a thing (and by this he means what is spoken of above as the "whole") as distinct from "relative knowledge" (and by this he means the knowledge of what is spoken of above as the "parts" of the whole) "can only be given in an intuition, while everything else falls within the province of analysis." (Henri Bergson, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, tr. T. E. Hulme [New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912], p. 7.

³⁹Note the statement of the Pannenbergian, Ulrich Wilckens ("The Understanding of Revelation in the History of Primitive Christianity," *Offenbarung als Geschichte*, edited

The life and fate of Jesus of Nazareth thus understood is proleptic of two possible ends for history. It contains, as paradigm, both a warning and a promise: the possible triumph of evil in history as illustrated in the crucifixion, or the triumph of good in history as illustrated in the resurrection.⁴⁰ If this suggestion is held to be at all

by Wolfhart Pannenberg [Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1963], p. 42): "In so far as the fate (*Geschick*) of Jesus was understood as the self-revelation of God in the context of Jewish-Apocalyptic thought, revelation is this one definite happening (*Geschehen*) as the 'sum' of universal history." Also the comment of McIntyre (John McIntyre, *The Christian Doctrine of History* [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1957], p. 36) as he attempts to effect a connection between *Historie* and *Geschichte* while enumerating the dangers of the doctrine of *Heilsgeschichte*. He says: "Providence operates across the whole of history. Incarnation occurs at a definite and limited time. . . . It [Providence] assists in making history [*Historie*?] what it is for the Christian and within the limits of the Divine Economy of salvation [*Heilsgeschichte*?] in preparing the way for the central events of that economy." He makes the point above, "that the manner in which God works and reveals himself in Jesus Christ is the manner in which he works providentially throughout the whole of history [*Historie*?]."

⁴⁰This is forgetting for the moment the neo-orthodox suggestion, made more extremely and perhaps more profoundly by Bultmann, that evil was only the apparent victor at the crucifixion and that in fact good did triumph there in spite of appearances. The present writing desires to take a more serious account of physical death as something more of an "end" than it appears to be given in most debate on the subject. Death is not seen as end (*finis*) and only preferred where it holds promise of something better. This is to say that implicit in the choice of death over life is the belief in the negation of death by the new life which follows it. Where this belief is not held men act and live as if physical death were the end, and it appears to this observer that this is indeed the underlying premise upon which twentieth-century man is living his life. The reason for this is because he is unable to find the reality of a resurrection

reasonable, then *Geschichte* becomes *Heilsgeschichte* for him who appropriates the promise of this paradigm, whether he recognises the warning or not.

Further, the paradigm not only becomes the paradigm for the history of the race but the paradigm of personal history for each member of the race. Implicit in the reason for the ultimate triumph of good in the paradigm of Jesus of Nazareth is the dimension of life he exhibited. In this sense he does become man's model (paradigm) and through possible emulation, man's life and death is endowed with hope. Emulation is not here to be taken in any sense of the imitation of the ethical superiority displayed in the figure of the paradigm, or the result of what Pannenberg has described in criticism as "man's conscience so overwhelmed by Jesus' ethical majesty that men take Jesus' image as a guide and completely trust in him."⁴¹ On the contrary, it is to found one's life on the same principle upon which the paradigm was founded. Pannenberg stresses that in Jesus, message and person become one. To accept Jesus as the paradigm is to accept his confident claim that in himself was to be found the authoritative declaration that the reign of God was at

for himself even in anticipating the crucifixion of his own existence.

⁴¹Wolfhart Pannenberg, "God's Revelation in Jesus of Nazareth" (unpublished copy in the possession of James M. Robinson, School of Theology at Claremont, 1964), p. 1.

hand. His message concerning the reign of God was not new but his peculiar emphasis made his presentation unique.

Jesus brought hardly anything new. He shared the Israelite tradition of his hearers. But by so sharply stressing its essence, namely, utter devotion to God, he clashed with other elements of Israelite tradition especially with the traditional validity of the law.⁴²

Emulation of the paradigm is emulation of the person who was in himself the message of "utter devotion to God"⁴³ by his confident expectation of God's nearness in his immanent reign. To reject Jesus is to reject his message and this principle upon which his life was lived.

And where Jesus was accepted that meant his message was accepted too. He became one with his message by the exclusive concern which he demanded of men for God's nearness.⁴⁴

To accept Jesus as the paradigm is to accept the message of himself as the *direkt* self-revelation of God, and thereby to understand that as in Jesus so is God present in all history, a fact which can only be revealed indirectly in all history (*Historie*).

NARRATIVE HISTORY

There is another class of historian called the "narrative historian." He it is who believes that the bare facts of events and dates and persons ought to be refurbished in the telling. This does not necessarily imply an inter-

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 2. ⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 1. ⁴⁴*Ibid.*

pretative "story telling" of the facts of history but rather the imaginative narration of the facts so that their "inner" meaning may be more readily apprehended by the reader. Obviously the practice is open to many dangers, and thus to much criticism.

For every narrative historian like G. M. Trevelyan there were a hundred historians who stuck to the narrow limits of their specialty. . . . There is general impatience with historians who simply tell a story.⁴⁵

Hofstadter would make a broad distinction between the two main streams of historical method as those of "narrative story" and "monographs of scientific inquiry."⁴⁶ His preference is obviously for the latter. Trevelyan, speaking of Carlyle,⁴⁷ illustrates the ambivalence most feel concerning the narrative historian.

Carlyle, indeed, sometimes neglected the accumulation of facts and the proper sifting of evidence. He is not to be imitated as a model historian, but he should be read and considered by all historical students, because of his imaginative and narrative qualities. While he lacks what modern historical method has acquired, he possesses in the fullest degree what it has lost.⁴⁸

Macauley, perhaps in an attempt to defend his practice,

⁴⁵Stern, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁶Richard Hofstadter, "History and the Social Sciences," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 359.

⁴⁷He was biased, of course, being both the protégé and grand nephew of Macauley the great narrative historian and a narrative historian himself.

⁴⁸George M. Trevelyan, "Clio, A Muse," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, pp. 232-33.

related how this type of history writing is quite traditional. "Mr. Mitford," he writes, ". . . showed us that men who wrote in Greek and Latin sometimes told lies."⁴⁹ The same authority warns of the dangers of such writing: "sometimes, it is true, superior eloquence and dexterity will make the worse appear the better reason"; but if both sides are thus presented,

it is at least certain that the judge will be compelled to contemplate the case under two different aspects. It is certain that no important consideration will altogether escape notice.⁵⁰

The cultural historian Hofstadter is not sure narration as historical method can be useful. He claims that "the narrative, . . . has too often disappointed our desire for new understanding."⁵¹ But, the biggest danger appears to be the questionable ability of the historian to use his "dedicated" imagination with skill to suit the best purpose. Hegel's earliest mention of universal history claims as the prerequisite to writing good history ability in

the elaboration of the historical material. The historian achieves this with his own spirit, which is different from the spirit of the material. . . . [But often] the spirit that speaks out of the writer is quite different from that of the times he describes. Thus Livy makes his old Roman kings, consuls and generals speak in the fashion of accomplished lawyers of the Livian era, which contrasts strongly with the genuine traditions of Roman antiquity, . . . Livy also

⁴⁹Macauley, *op. cit.*, p. 82. ⁵⁰*Ibid.*

⁵¹Hofstadter, *op. cit.*, p. 362.

gives us descriptions of battles as if he had seen them himself; but their features are simply features of battles of any period.⁵²

These are the reservations of historians concerning "narrative history."

The Narrative Advantage. Macauley tries to justify his type of history writing when he chides his contemporary historians for

practising all the arts of controversy [while] they miserably neglect the art of narration, the art of interesting the affections and presenting pictures to the imagination.⁵³

Carlyle claims that narrative is the essential element of communication. He says:

Our very speech is curiously historical. Most men, you may observe, speak only to narrate. . . . Cut us off from Narrative, how would the stream of conversation, even among the wisest, languish into detached handfuls, and among the foolish utterly evaporate.⁵⁴

Trevelyan is convinced that the "spinal weakness" of his contemporary historians was that they "seem never to have studied the art of telling a story."⁵⁵ The art of history must always be the art of narration. For Trevelyan it is

⁵²Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Reason in History*, tr. Robert S. Hartman (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), pp. 6-7.

⁵³Macauley, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁵⁴Thomas Carlyle, "On History," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 91.

⁵⁵Trevelyan, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

his ability to bring the deep lessons of the past before the notice of the present which characterises and justifies the role of the "story" historian. For him

[t]he value of Lecky's history did not consist in the fact that he recorded in a book the details of numerous massacres and murders, but that he produced sympathy and shame, and caused a better understanding among us all of how the sins of the fathers are often visited upon the children, unto the third and fourth generations of them that hate each other.⁵⁶

According to Trevelyan, Lecky did not prove that Home Rule was right or wrong, but "he train[ed] the mind of Unionists and Home Rulers to think sensibly about that and other problems. . . ."⁵⁷ Trevelyan contrasts "Gibbon's cold, classical light" to the "rich mediaeval hues of Walter Scott's stained glass."⁵⁸

To Scott each age, each profession, each country, each province had its own manners, its own dress, its own way of thinking, talking and fighting. . . . The great anti-quarian and novelist showed historians that history must be living, many-coloured and romantic if it is to be a true mirror of the past. Macauley, who was a boy while Scott's poems and novels were coming out, . . . was not slow to learn this lesson.⁵⁹

The narrative historian also claims the ability to present intact the true majesty of history by medium of his "story telling." Macauley bemoans the fact that the majesty of history is lost by those who insist in concealing it in the drab cloak of dignified phrase and stilted page.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 236. ⁵⁷*Ibid.* ⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 241.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*

Fiction is avidly devoured by the most frivolous and indolent while

histories of great empires written by men of eminent ability lie unread. . . . The majesty of history seems to resemble the majesty of the poor King of Spain, who died a martyr to ceremony because the proper dignitaries were not at hand to render him assistance.⁶⁰

The Historian and His Narrative. It would appear that the skill of the narrative historian is expected to provide the colour and animation for the setting of his history. Although Trevelyan and Macauley and the others represented above make bold claims for the art of the narrator, one wonders whether their art is merely an addition to that of the "bare facts" historian with his skill in critical historical method. The narrative historian's skill is in presentation. He is expected to become more interpretative and do most of the reader's imaginative work for him. His is the peculiar skill of the "story teller" which allows his history to come alive so that the reader becomes historian himself by the previous definition of a "visitor to the past."

But what of the nonfactual which must be part of the narrative? Such fiction is only allowable as it is an authentic rendering of the details of its contemporary scene, or at least appears so to the immediate perception of the reader. Macauley makes this point when he says:

⁶⁰Macauley, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

Fiction, therefore, is essentially imitative. Its merit consists in its resemblance to a model with which we are already familiar, or to which at least we can instantly refer.⁶¹

The New Testament and Narrative. Undoubtedly the gospel compilers were narrative historians. One mark of the authenticity of their work is that their fiction fulfills the qualifications outlined above for good narration. With few exceptions their "lives" seem authentic to the reader. Another mark of authenticity is that history seems to have placed its imprimatur on the four gospels. President Colwell produces the evidence of over fifteen hundred biographical accounts of the life of our Lord. Only four received the Christian community's and history's imprimatur of authenticity and became gospels.

They wrote as historians, it seems, what the preacher preaches and the teacher teaches--history as narration. There seems to be some consensus among our theologians that this is about all the contemporary Christian community can do. Bultmann is certain that it is only the Jesus of history that historical research may present to us and this cannot ever encounter any traces of the epiphany of God in Christ. Only the Church's proclamation can bring us face to face with *Kyrios Christos*.⁶²

⁶¹*Ibid.*, p. 78.

⁶²Rudolf Bultmann *et al.*, *Kerygma and Myth*, ed. Hans W. Bartsch, tr. Reginald H. Fuller (New York: Harper, 1961),

The Jesus of history is not *kerygma*, "for in the *kerygma*, Jesus encounters us as the Christ."⁶³ But it must be conceded that it is the telling of the story of Jesus of Nazareth by the teacher, preacher or gospel writer and witnessed to by them as more than just history (which witness becomes itself part of the history) which is the contemporary content of the Church's proclamation.

Barth is more emphatic concerning the source of the recurring epiphany of the proclamation. He says:

Speaking the word of God is the promise of Christian preaching. Promise is not fulfillment. Promise is man's part. Fulfillment is God's part. "We have this treasure in earthen vessels." No confusing of God's part with man's, of the treasure with the earthen vessel . . . but it is clear that even we can speak the word of God if only we believe. The word of God on the lips of a man is an impossibility. . . .⁶⁴

Man then is and has only the "earthen vessel." But that is not all, for the "promise" enhances it, and fulfillment transfigures it. However, it is his *all*. This all is man's narration, a narration which again contains a witness as part of its history.

Brunner more directly refers to the obligation of the narrator. One can do little better than tell the story.

p. 119.

⁶³*Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁶⁴Karl Barth, *The Word of God and the Word of Man* (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 124.

The content of the *kerygma* as story reveals the three great facts of himself to man. They are: one, man is created by God; two, man is created to live in fellowship with God; three, man has destroyed this relation and cannot restore it. One catches the impression from Brunner and Barth that history is merely the instrument or medium of something beyond or behind itself, the meaning of which it has a peculiar power to transmit. In this sense history is not some "past surviving into the present; it must be the present,"⁶⁵ as Collingwood quotes the empirical historian Oakeshott. Robinson the progressivist agrees that:

The present has hitherto been the willing victim of the past; the time has now come when it should turn on the past and exploit it in the interests of advance.⁶⁶

Is this the real reason of history, to live, to learn--to live? The theologian appears to think it so. One only needs to live through a presidential assassination to know its narrative potency to communicate meanings. The past becomes the present. It becomes a narrative crucible of new life. Trevelyan praised Lecky's history because it did not merely "record details of numerous massacres and murders, but produced sympathy and shame."⁶⁷ Deep emotions produce personality and character placidity receptive to change and

⁶⁵Collingwood, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

⁶⁶Quoted by Stern, in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 256.

challenge. Brunner the theologian sees this as the task of his narration, as certain historians have seen it of theirs.

Only at the cross do we know our guilt as human beings, without any excuse; our impotence to redeem ourselves without going to the extreme of fatalism, and the glory of our original destiny without wallowing in sentimental utopianism.⁶⁸

So Brunner urges us to narrate.⁶⁹

HEROES AND THE BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORIAN

Richard Niebuhr echoes a common question, whether it comes from the cultural historian trying to explain the trends in history, the empiricist attempting to understand life, or the Christian theologian defending a thesis of his tradition, namely:

Why should a particular individual come into existence, emerge into activity and contribute to the unique character of its environment? This is a question we can never answer.⁷⁰

The same authority concludes, however, that in the study of history we have to deal not "with classes of entities, but

⁶⁷Trevelyan, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

⁶⁸H. Emil Brunner, *The Mediator*, tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947), p. 602.

⁶⁹McIntyre (*op. cit.*, p. 106) says: "The Bible is the Old and New Israel's memory of the *kairoi*, and such is the Christian economy of salvation that it is only ultimately through hearing the story of these *kairoi* that the individual comes to his own *kairos*."

⁷⁰Richard R. Niebuhr, *Resurrection and Historical Reason* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), p. 140.

with individuals."⁷¹ Henri Berr, the French historian, at the beginning of this century, called for an historical synthesis effected by the collaboration of the specialties of all types of historians, the behavioural and social scientists, convinced that

the history of ideas depends in large part upon individual men, . . . [and] the study of historical categories must lead to the psychology of great men of thought and action, of ethnic groups and of historical crises.⁷²

For Voltaire it is the "principle figures [who] are in the foreground; the crowd is in the background."⁷³ Marx and Engels say their philosophy, which is

in direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, . . . ascends from earth to heaven. . . . We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process.⁷⁴

Their philosophy of history is not without premises, they declare. It starts from the real premises. "Its premises are men."⁷⁵ Hegel is sure that the "actions of spirit-filled men have often determined the course of the historical

⁷¹*Ibid.*

⁷²Henri Berr, "About Our Program," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 253.

⁷³Voltaire, "The Age of Louis XIV," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 39.

⁷⁴Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "The German Ideology," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 149.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*

process."⁷⁶ Professor Geyl in a polemical summary of Toynbee's theory of the growth and decline of civilisations says:

Toynbee expressly denies that the decline is inherent in the iron law of fate, . . . it is not decreed by any law; it is human failure, there is no necessity about it.⁷⁷

He then proceeds to criticise Toynbee for isolating illustrations from history convenient to his purpose. A good sample is seen in Toynbee's history of the papacy, "which having been carried to the height of its power by Gregory VII, was ruined by the blind self-conceit of Boniface VIII."⁷⁸ Whatever may be the validity of Geyl's criticism of Toynbee it can be readily illustrated that his history places great emphasis during the "growth" period of a civilisation, upon the force of "creative minorities and creative persons,"⁷⁹ in contrast to the influence of a general culture.

From all this has developed what has become known as the "great man" or "hero" theory of history. Hartman claims that Hegel was the first to postulate this theory and that his particular great man was Napoleon. Unfortunately,

like Nietzsche's superman, the Hegelian hero was misunderstood and mistakenly regarded as the prototype for the sub-human man of Fascism and Nazism.⁸⁰

⁷⁶Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. xx.

⁷⁷Geyl, Toynbee, and Sorokin, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 8. ⁷⁹*Ibid.*, p. 97.

If history is, as Hegel holds, the self-development of the spirit, "the actualization of the divine cosmic plan, then the historical man must be the one in whom the potentialities of the time concentrate themselves."⁸¹ Hegel later on says that

Caesar was such a man . . . his victory of enemies became at the same time the conquest of the entire empire. In accomplishing his original negative purpose, the autocracy over Rome, he at the same time fulfilled the necessary historical destiny of Rome and the world.⁸²

It is Carlyle, however, who gave greatest emphasis to the "hero" philosophy of history. Macauley had noticed that "biographies are perused with delight by the most frivolous and indolent,"⁸³ but it was Carlyle who finally concluded not only that history would be more widely read if it contained more biography but indeed that that was all history was. "History," he says, "is the essence of innumerable Biographies."⁸⁴ According to Stern he had learned his lesson from Scott to

look upon the past as peopled by living men--"not abstractions . . . but men in buff coats and breeches, with color in their cheeks, with passion in their stomachs and the idioms, features and vitalities of very men."⁸⁵

⁸⁰Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. xiii. ⁸¹*Ibid.*, p. xiv.

⁸²*Ibid.*, p. 39. ⁸³Macauley, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁸⁴Carlyle, "On History," p. 93.

⁸⁵Stern, in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 90.

Carlyle came under serious criticism for his theories and it is undoubtedly true that "few historians . . . acknowledged Carlyle as a member, much less a master of their craft."⁸⁶ Their criticism is not totally warranted, however, as his first work was an essay in "Social History" and according to Stern

his abiding concern with universal history transcended the strictly biographical, searching instead for the spiritual unity of an age.⁸⁷

The Weakness of the Theory. The theory has certain deficiencies. For various reasons a particular age will deny "the existence of great men; den[y] the desirableness of great men."⁸⁸ The trait that Carlyle isolated seems to belong peculiarly to this age. He says:

Show our critics a great man, a Luther for example, they begin to what they call "account" for him; not to worship him, but take the dimensions of him--and bring him out to be a little kind of man!⁸⁹

Great men are likely to be scarce in such an atmosphere because of the resistance cultivated by this *nil admirari* philosophy. Such men are not likely because of this to have affected their own history.

⁸⁶*Ibid.* ⁸⁷*Ibid.*

⁸⁸Thomas Carlyle, "On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History," in Stern, *The Varieties of History*, p. 102.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*

McIntyre spells out another danger of hero worship. The "heroics of the hero," he says, "have often consisted in a certain dexterity in exploiting his oneness with the group mind and emotion."⁹⁰ He is certain that historical man is man in community, and that for this reason "historiography in the hero and hero worship tradition must ever remain an artificial abstraction."⁹¹ It must be noted, however, that it is a fact that groups form about an individual and that the personification of the group mind and emotion by an individual is much more readily apprehended. The person, therefore, becomes an influence on the group more than any mere abstraction of the "group mind." Anyone who has experienced the difficulty in an experiment of group dynamics in trying to set up a "group" without a leader knows the frustration of the task.

There is another grave weakness of the hero cult. One may justify his appropriation of the group mind and/or his peculiar ability to satisfy the need of his times, but there is the tendency of his effecting an undue influence outside the particular area of his authority. This phenomenon is readily observable in the professor of science who expects his authority to be equally respected when he gives an opinion on theology, or vice versa. Unfortunately it

⁹⁰McIntyre, *op. cit.*, p. 29. ⁹¹*Ibid.*

often is.

And then there is the fact of greatness stripped off the greatest of men by a more intimate knowledge of the man. Hegel quotes, "No man is a hero to his valet," and then adds (which addition shows only too plainly something of the mere man of the great man Hegel):

And I added and Goethe repeated it two years later "but not because the former is a hero but because the latter is a valet."⁹²

The greatest weakness of this theory is that no man is an island. The reason this type of history had been chosen for the last heading under the category of "particular history" is that it is perhaps the opposite pole from the "universal history" which takes into account the myriad social, psychological, cultural and economic influences which all undoubtedly have a part to play in the making and writing of history. Whether the universal historian may find a single thread, as some have claimed, through all this maze, remains a question. The possibility may remain. There is good reason to believe with Carlyle, however, that:

Universal history, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the history of great men who have walked here.⁹³

⁹²Hegel, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43.

⁹³Carlyle, "On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History," p. 101.

The Great Humanity of Jesus. If the incarnation may be simply described as "the humanity of God," and the life of Jesus of Nazareth as being this event, then in him is to be expected the exemplification of the "great man." Does this "life" fulfill the criteria? If his influence upon history is one criterion of the "hero," then it can be claimed that in Jesus of Nazareth the race has a "great man." More words have been written and spoken in comment and debate over a longer period of time; more lives have witnessed to this historical reference as the major influence in their own lives, than has been the case of any other "great man."

Carlyle attempted to justify his great man theory by remarking:

That man, in some sense or other, worships Heroes; that we all of us reverence and must ever reverence Great Men: this is, to me, the living rock amid all rushings-down whatsoever. . . .⁹⁴

One cannot give much credence to this unless it be interpreted in the sense in which the historian intended. That in a great man is found the personification of those qualities which hold man's "bottomless and shoreless" history together. If it is possible to separate the Jesus of Nazareth from the Christ of faith, then Jesus was at least a great man. As Christ he is infinitely more but as Jesus

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 104.

of Nazareth he is at least magnificent humanity. It is suspected that because of theology's contemporary christological embarrassment--its perennial problem of the one person and two natures, and neo-orthodoxy's dichotomy between Jesus of Nazareth and the Christ of faith--there has been a tendency to reduce the humanity to a minor key in favor of the divinity. This is to reverse the process of God and taking the word made flesh and making it word again (*logos asarkos*). Perhaps the disappointment in the discovery that the historical Jesus could not be found even by the best and most critical means has misled the christologian into imagining that the humanity was forever out of his reach. It is postulated here that the historical Jesus and the humanity of Christ are not synonymous, and that the word must be clothed again in the flesh God saw fit to put upon it. The final chapter will attempt to elucidate this significant point.

Richard Niebuhr's thesis that the discrediting of the resurrection by modern biblical scholarship has robbed twentieth-century man of a sense of Christ as lord of history is well founded in pastoral experience. The point is supported, but for a slightly different reason. Nikos Kazantzakis' book, *The Last Temptation of Christ*, finds its big appeal, it is believed, because of the vividness of its portrayal of the humanity of Jesus. Unfortunately it is an

only too human Jesus which is revealed. He is too identifiable as inauspicious man to be a "great man" any longer. The New Testament writers did a better job. For the task of clothing the word with flesh again their narrative is commended.

CHAPTER XVII

THE CHRISTOLOGICAL RESOLUTION

It has been indicated from the beginning that any resolution of the tension between the extremes of the absolute and the relative in value theory is to be found in christology. In each questing age of its transition, with varying degrees of meaning and interpretation, Christian theology has promised that "Christ" is the answer. The present writing covets the privilege of being included in that tradition and indeed of making some contribution to apologetics in the presentation of a christology appropriate to and possible of being appropriated by mid-twentieth-century man.

It would appear that any successful *apologia* must satisfy at least two criteria. The first is communication in the terms and thought forms of the audience to which it is addressed, and second, the presentation of a persuasive rationale for the argumentation and its conclusions. This writing has attempted to fulfill these conditions. It now remains to focus on a christology which also satisfies these criteria.

THE PRESUPPOSITIONS

Secular man--and this constitutes our contemporary

audience--is empirically inclined. Any argumentation, therefore, must qualify at the experiential level. He is existentially oriented, so it must fit his experience "here and now." He is anthropocentrically demanding, so his validations must be within a human dimension.¹ This chapter attempts to speak in these terms of *Sitz im Leben*.

In attempting to address a christology to this age one is immediately confronted with a dilemma. Its horns have very little to do with the more traditional christological problems of the "two natures"; the trinity and the *persona*; the virgin birth and the resurrection; or the dichotomy between the "person" and the "work" of Jesus.

The christological problem for mid-twentieth-century man centers round the distinction between the "Jesus of history" and the "Christ of faith." The problem is projected by a double affirmation. The first is that the event

¹Tillich's concept of self-world correlation as the medium by which man may understand the structure of being is the one accepted here. Randall's criticism of Tillich is unfounded, but his point is well taken. "If Tillich is following the thoroughgoing idealism of Heidegger [must be early Heidegger] and looking for the structure of being in man," then Randall is correctly critical. But if "he holds that the structure of being is found *by* man in his encounter with the world . . . then this is quite a different ontology, not of idealism, but of what I would call empirical naturalism, and accept" (Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall [eds.], *The Theology of Paul Tillich* [New York: Macmillan, 1961], p. 154). David Roberts concludes that it is the latter and that "if it is true that man incorporates in himself all levels of being, then through self-knowledge he may at the same time reach ontological knowledge" (*ibid.*).

of Jesus of Nazareth is avowed to be the central fact of the Christian religion; and second, that in some way or other, this central event transcends the category of time and becomes "present" and "efficacious" in the "now."

The previous chapter has anticipated the problem as such and sought to establish certain facts.

The first point of significance appears to be that *history as a problem is not peculiar to religious history*. The question of how the life of any great man or any historical event is efficacious in the present is a question common to all historical epistemology.

Second, the problems inherent in the New Testament writers' "subject" (*Sache*), their "world view" (*Weltanschauung*) limitations, and their perceptive errors in reporting things "as they actually happened," etc., are not peculiarly theirs. They are common to all history and historians.

Third, the conclusion that history is only relevant as it becomes meaningful in the present applies equally to secular and sacred history. It is obvious that history and the historian will draw distinctions between *Geschichte* and *Historie*, and that it remains for the historian and the reader of history to be the final judge of what transforms *Historie* into *Geschichte* for him or his day. In view of this it is affirmed that in one sense it is in the experience

of the "visitor to the past" (both writer and reader of history)² that the time dimension is transcended and the past becomes the present. This is also equally true of secular and sacred history.

Finally, it is believed that there are some validated criteria by which it can be said that certain events, persons, etc., are paradigmatic of cultures, eras, trends, and even this epoch.

All these things, being common to all the past, erase for the present purpose many of the previous distinctions between "sacred" and "secular" history.

In view of these assumptions, it is here affirmed in concord with the central tradition of the Christian religion that the happening (*geschehen*) of Jesus of Nazareth³ is the *paradigm event of all history*, and that when this event becomes "present" to man his self-world correlation is enhanced, and the meaning of his own and all history being more readily available to him, new depths of self-understanding and ful-

²*Supra*, p. 351.

³This includes his birth (not in the sense of insistence on any particular doctrine of the birth but rather the fact of the entry of Jesus into material existence); the ministry, including the self-understanding of his ministry as well as the understanding of those who recorded their understanding of it; his life, which means the person of Jesus as distinct from his work (ministry), again with respect to self- and others' understanding; and his death and resurrection.

fillment result from this cosmic relation.

It is not the intention to argue these things but merely to state them as the facts of the belief, implicitly and explicitly affirmed by the Christian faith. It is the fact of "belief" that these things are so which is affirmed only for the moment, and not that in fact this is how things really are. The latter affirmation is relegated to the non-significant momentarily.

The remainder of our attention will be given, therefore, to an examination of "what really happens" in the present experience of the believer to confirm his (and the tradition's) affirmation that this one event of history is paradigmatic of all history and becomes an efficacious present event for him.

HOW IT REALLY HAPPENS

Any event or person of history becomes efficacious to present experience on a common basis. It is also affirmed that there is no such thing as "present experience" of any external events or persons, as they actually happen in themselves⁴ or in time, if this is taken to mean contemporary

⁴A pure Kantian epistemology from the point of view that *das ding an sich* is unknown. In fact, such knowledge would be disintegrating rather than synthetic. To know a thing in itself, in Whiteheadian terms, would be to know the myriad component "actual entities" which make it what it is in itself. This would be to know at least the "cosmic epoch"

coincidence of perception and happening. Whitehead reminds us that although there is prehension of the whole universe of antecedent actual entities, in every "actual occasion" there is no such thing as the prehension of contemporary actual entities. The fact is understood in terms of perception when account is taken of the delay of sense data to the experiencing centre of the experiencing subject. In this sense all "experience" is past. This makes everything common to the category of history. All experience is experience of the past.

Obviously there are some differences between what is coming to me now from the immediate past via primary sense data, and that which comes from 2,000 years ago. But the difference isn't as significant as sometimes thought. For instance, the transactional analysts have reminded us that Penfield,⁵ the famous neurologist, discovered that the "stimulation of certain areas of the temporal lobes revived not isolated memories, but complete ego states of former epochs."⁶ This phenomenon may indicate a blurring of distinctions between primary and secondary senses and sense data as it

in every "thing."

⁵Wilder Penfield and Herbert Jasper, *Epilepsy and the Functional Anatomy of the Human Brain* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1954), chapter 11.

⁶Eric Berne, "Current Principles of Transactional Analysis," *Current Psychiatric Therapies*, 1963, p. 35.

relates to the function of memory and imagination. If, for instance, hearing the story of a person or an event has by some means or other the same stimulation on the cortical area as hearing or seeing an "immediate present" person or participation in an "immediate present" event, then any significant distinction between the sources of the sense data for the experiential dimension has surely disappeared.

It may be argued, of course, that with an "immediate present" person or event all the primary sense media of sense, sight, sound, smell, etc., are present at once. In answer it can be said that the telling or reading of a story may become so "immediate" that the story teller, the book, and other "present" environment are superceded. Further substantiation is to be found in noting that although there is a mass of immediate sense data available to the experiencing subject in every moment, the vast majority is not "experienced" at all.⁷ This is the basis of the distinction between *Historie* and *Geschichte*. Two Australian Aborigines were brought immediately from their natural and primitive habitat to a modern city. The cars, telephones, airplanes,

⁷See Ernst Cassirer (*Language and Myth* [New York: Harper, 1946], p. 29) for his elucidation of the primal perceptual process from "denoting" to "noticing" to "signification"; and Susanne Langer's conjecture concerning the reflection of "signification" to the earliest step (Paul A. Schilpp [ed.], *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer* [Evanston: Library of Living Philosophers, 1949], p. 388.

and paved roads were non-perceptive data to their senses. They became wildly stimulated when they saw a telephone linesman scaling quickly up a pole with his side gridirons. This event alone had existential significance for them. The point is that there are always some "immediately present" data which just don't register, while something significant presented from across a thousand years will stimulate the senses and become efficacious in behaviour to a marked degree. This means that the temporal dimension as such is not necessarily of primary significance for present experience. This must not be taken to mean that the actuality as such is not of significance. To a serious degree the fact *that* an event took place in "time" is of significance. *When* it took place is of less significance.

So, then, what is the qualifying factor? It is "significance" as such. The criterion is: what is significant to the present moment (*existenziell*).⁸ Susanne Langer says the primal perceptive process found the earliest signification in the biological needs of hunger and sex, etc.⁹ Modern man has become conscious, in addition to these, of his psychic, intellectual and ontological needs. Together, it is affirmed, these needs comprise the *existenziell* basis for

⁸Magda King, *Heidegger's Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 64.

⁹Schilpp, *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*, p. 338.

the "signification" of events.

Paradigm of Significance. How does the event of Jesus of Nazareth satisfy the criteria of significance?

The answer upon which the thesis of this whole argumentation depends is that by entering into relation with the event-person of Jesus of Nazareth, man fulfills his ontic need of cosmic relationship upon which all his other relationship depends. If relation is assumed to be the *telos* of man, cosmic relationship is unavoidable. This is the climax of Buber's "lines of relation which meet in the eternal Thou." The incarnation provides actual access to the source of all being. Such access, it is affirmed, is not only desirable for the attainment of the "more fully human dimension"¹⁰ of life, but is in some measure, essential to biological, psychical, and intellectual survival.¹¹ God as God has his primordial nature in the ascendancy,¹² in his "divine relativity,"¹³ and so far actual man is unable to "perceive" him. In the Jesus-event the relative side, his consequent nature (the primordial in truck with the world), is in the ascendancy and God and cosmic relation through him become available to man.

¹⁰*Supra*, pp. 86 ff. ¹¹*Supra*, p. 92 .

¹²*Supra*, p. 314f. ¹³*Supra*, p. 345 .

The Tension Resolved. It is this relation which resolves the absolute-relative tension resident in existence.¹⁴ As this tension relates to value theory, it is divided into two aspects. One pertains to the "rational" level. The problem is to formulate the best possible axiology. The other aspect is the "moral" dimension. This pertains to the desire of man to value the highest value his best axiology makes available to him.

Relation with the Jesus-event fulfills both criteria to the highest degree possible. The new openness to being which results from congruence in cosmic relation, enhances all man's faculties so that there becomes available to him his best intellectual abilities for the formulation of an axiology. Relation with the Jesus-person enhances his deepest loyalties and desires to fulfill the best intentions as presented by the best possible axiology. Thus relation and the valuation which results, serves to affirm, confirm and intensify the unity of the organism, rational, emotional, and instinctual, etc.

The thesis has been stated. Attention is now focused on a more detailed examination of the process, namely: how

¹⁴A concept related to the one about to be proposed is that of Kierkegaard's "teleological suspension of the ethical." The discussion and support of this doctrine is given by Buber in his book *Eclipse of God* (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 115, under the chapter of that title.

it is that the Jesus-person¹⁵ effects the unity of intellect and intention in resolution of both the moral and rational dimensions of the absolute-relative tension in values. Although the distinction between the Jesus of Nazareth and the Christ of faith has tended to disappear, the problem now considered can be understood easiest in these terms and so we continue to use them. The whole question seems to resolve around: "How does the Jesus of Nazareth become the Christ of faith?"

*The Appropriation of the Paradigm.*¹⁶ When the event of Jesus of Nazareth is recognised as of paradigmatic significance and appropriated as such, then is the transition

¹⁵In the term "Jesus-person," "person" means the phenomenal unity of an individual human being, and draws no analytical distinctions between "self," "person," "personage," etc. It is taken to include the various aspects of the birth of Jesus and his ministry, etc., in a unity. "Person" is thought to be a more appropriate concept than "event," because "person" is a "self"; "person" is the most vivid exemplification of a unit in the structure of being (self-world correlation of Tillich), and it is the most clearly defined image available for relation with man. For these reasons the person of Jesus of Nazareth is best understood as meeting the requirements of the "great man" theory of history. He is not the *only* example, but is *paradigmatic* (as also person is to being), and this category shares the advantages as well as the disadvantages inherent in the "great man" theory (*supra*, p. 396.).

¹⁶Jesus as paradigm includes in this image not only the essence of the cosmos, being God; and of history, but also the paradigm of the *telos* of man, as a being, in time, in what is generally referred to theologically as the "eschaton." The Jesus-person is the proleptic symbol of what history and man will be at the end (*telos*).

made from the Jesus of Nazareth to the Christ of faith. The "past" event becomes "present experience." The actual entity (appropriating person), as centre of awareness, has prehended the actual entity of the Jesus-person with high priority in the ascending order of antecedent initial data, and all that is appropriate to it in descending and inter-related order of positive and negative prehensions. The question must be asked how it is that this particular event comes to assume such a priority in "presentational immediacy." The theologian answers that it is by "revelation." The Whiteheadian could say that it is presented to the world in the appetition of God for his envisaged possible world.

The empiricist answers that it is partially because of the commending and conducive environment. In ecclesiastical terms this is the "witness of the church." When Knox and Niebuhr refer to the "memory" of the faith community as being the important factor in the transmission of the faith they may have missed the main point. Any historian and history can "remember" an event as such. But it is only the faith community that "witnesses" to this event as that one which is paradigmatic to history and being, and efficacious in the present.

The initial steps towards appropriation seem to follow this pattern. After the "presentation" of the Jesus-

event as paradigmatic, there follows a period of "reflection" and "experimentation" and "observation." The rational side of man's nature reflects the emotional experiments with trial appropriations, and the volitional observes the efficacy of the appropriation, both internal to the subject, and external in the member lives of the witnessing community. If the essential criteria are satisfied in this process then the total being acts in "appropriation." It is in the act of appropriation that Jesus of Nazareth becomes the Christ of faith.¹⁷

Appropriation and Conversion. "Appropriation" has been traditionally called "conversion." This equation is accepted with some qualifications necessary to the continuation of twentieth-century dialogue.

First, appropriation is not to be considered as a static state. The dynamic dimensions within the "presentation to appropriation" stages are in a sense always present. The traditional "once for all-ness" applies in this context only to the historical event in *that* it "once" happened

¹⁷Acknowledgment is given to both Cassirer and Barth in the analysis of this process: Cassirer for the stage of the development of primal consciousness (Cassirer, *op. cit.*, pp. 24f.), and Barth in his doctrine of the "word becoming Word." His stages are: observation, reflection and appropriation (Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* [Edinburgh: Clark, 1952], I, 2, 725 ff.). Also see Sara Little, *The Role of the Bible in Contemporary Christian Education* (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1961), pp. 39-40.

(*geschehen*) and that its efficacy is available to "all" men universally. Without particular appropriation the Jesus-event may be "once for nothing," in a sense exhaustively for that particularity and in varying degree for the whole of creation by right of universal inclusiveness.

However, the initial "appropriation" is an individual experience is likely to be distinctive and remembered among the others in the continuum. It often accompanies and even stimulates individuation, promoted by or corollary of traumatic experiences and credited with their abreaction. It sometimes represents dramatic change in behaviour patterns and a complete teleological reorientation. For this reason some emphasis on initial appropriation may be appropriate. Often its significance is overemphasised by certain faith communities (so-called fundamentalist groups) and often underemphasised in the more traditional and established churches.

The particular significance for the present discussion is that the process of re-presentation, re-testing and re-appropriation is as continuous and dynamic in its contextual matrix as is the life process itself. It is possible that dramatic contextual change--emotional, intellectual, social, etc., can, if extreme enough, invalidate any previous or initial appropriation. Herein can the process be reversed and the Christ become again merely the Jesus of history--the

Word become flesh made wordless flesh again (*alogos sarkos*).¹⁸

Now is the time to discuss the question of how the appropriation of the Christ becomes efficacious in a continuing adequacy for the "more fully human" dimension in man.

RELIGION AND AUTHORITY FIGURES

When Jesus of Nazareth is appropriated as the Christ he becomes the authority par excellence. In healthy appropriation he becomes an authority figure without attendant negative and neurotic traits. Millions of words have been written and said about Freud's attitude to religion. His main criticism seems to have centered around the misappropriated authority of the church, and his diagnosis of man's religion as a symptom of his unresolved "primal oedipal complex,"¹⁹ expressing itself in the wish need for a providential father "who watches over him" and to whom "he will make up . . . in a future existence for any shortcomings in this life."²⁰

Religion is an attempt to get control over the sensory

¹⁸In contrast to the theory of *logos asarkos*?

¹⁹Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud* (New York: Basic Books, 1957), III, 354.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 358.

world, . . . by means of a wish-world, which we have developed within as a result of biological and psychological necessities.²¹

In this respect the whole religious venture was "patently infantile," and in so far as the authority of the "greatly exalted father" or organised religion became oppressive, it was denounced as the primary contributory factor to the development of the despotic superego.

Freud had a fascination for the religious experience as such however, and his last major work was given to the study of *Moses and Monotheism*. He discusses

the question of how it is that the religious emotion attains a greater sublimity, profundity and majesty than any other human emotion.²²

He accounted for this by saying that it represented a re-emergence from the depths of the unconscious "those extremes of feeling that are inaccessible except in religious transformation."²³

He was also interested in Paul and regarded him as the real founder of Christian theology. Freud wrote to Pastor Pfister: ". . . I liked very much your essay on Paul. Paul with his truly Jewish character has always appealed to me."²⁴ But the image of Jesus found no response in Freud. Jones reports:

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 359. ²²*Ibid.*, p. 361. ²³*Ibid.*

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 352.

The central figure of Christianity, Jesus, was, in Freud's eyes, so clouded over with sayings and mythical beliefs evidently derived from earlier religious sources in the East as to be too indistinct to be visualized clearly. . . . Once in a conversation on the topic Freud remarked to me that Jesus could even have been "an ordinary deluded creature."²⁵

Myth and Footnotes. And all this is possible.

Freud noted the main point, however, and missed its significance. The non-specificity of the person and event of Jesus of Nazareth is a necessary requirement for the myth making of the Christ. He was only witnessed to. His sayings are reported second hand. We only know what others said about him. He did not write a thing down. He cannot be documented, nor categorised or specified. The non-specificity of an image is necessary if it is to fit the requirements of all occasions and circumstances. A myth cannot become a myth otherwise. Specificity with respect to the Jesus of Nazareth would have precluded a Christ. When, in any age, the written witness to the myth tends to become a myth in itself another age must free truth and meaning from the shackles of the myth. When the record contains something incomprehensible or incongruent to our image of the myth, it is blocked out or relegated to the inconsequential. Specifics are too rigid to meet all needs of all times and all types. Jesus of history to become the Christ

²⁵*Ibid.*

of faith cannot be limited to the specific. The main point is his "wasness," not his "whatness." This is why the creedal ". . . born, . . . lived, . . . crucified, . . . dead and buried . . ." is sufficient statement of the fact. The rest is color and myth form. Sufficient to the myth is *that* a man lived and died and rose. All the rest is footnotes.

And the writing of the footnotes is a peculiarly individual prerogative as it is a personal responsibility in interpretation. Here are some of the footnotes to the myth.

Christ as an Authority Figure. The form of the Christ myth is the projected "self-ideal" of the appropriator. Freud originally postulated an "ego ideal" which "had criticised the deficiencies of the actual self and spurred it to attain a stricter standard in the moral or aesthetic sphere."²⁶ He later widened the concept to become the "super-ego" which took on the largely negative function for which it is noted. He continued to use the "ego ideal" in a limited and different sense from the super-ego. Jones concludes that

although Freud did not propose it, it would be more convenient to reserve the term "ego ideal" for our conscious ideals in the positive sense, and the superego at least in its unconscious part--being more concerned with the negative function of condemning.²⁷

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 282. ²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 283.

Karen Horney has posited an "idealised self." It too has negative qualities. Her main interest in the phenomenon is as a neurotic defense mechanism. In the third of the basic defense mechanisms,

instead of moving away from others, the neurotic moves away from himself. His whole actual self becomes somewhat unreal to him and he creates in its place an idealized image of self.²⁸

Through substituting an idealised self for the inadequate actual self the conflicts are removed. Like Freud and most of the psychotherapy theorists, her main concern is the cause and cure of neurosis, and the equivalent tendencies or functions at the "normal" healthy level receive scant attention. However, Horney has a positive note on her "idealised self":

It is an imaginative creation interwoven with and determined by very realistic factors. It usually contains traces of the person's genuine ideals. While the grandiose achievements are illusory, the potentialities underlying them are often real. More relevant, it is born of very real inner necessities, it fulfills very real functions, and it has very real influence on its creator.²⁹

It is this minor positive function we note.

Adler has a better appreciation of the "normal" function of the human psyche. Adler's theory of personality

²⁸Karen Horney, *Our Inner Conflicts* (New York: Norton, 1945), p. 16.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 108.

substituted for the Freudian efficient causes of instinctual drives and motivations, a teleology of final goals and values. He initially called these the goals of "final fictionalism." Later he replaced the term "fictional final goal" with the term "guiding self-ideal." At first Adler has posited the motivation and manifestation of this finalism as the "will to power." Later "will to power" became the "wanting to be a real man" of the "masculine protest" and finally he settled on a theory close to that of the contemporary "self-actualisation" school. He saw the final goal (*telos*) as that of "perfection." In his later writings the striving for superiority is equated with this theory of perfection.

I began to see clearly in every psychological phenomenon the striving for superiority. It runs parallel to physical growth and is an intrinsic necessity to life itself.³⁰

Every human psyche has its individual entelechy. Striving for "perfection" was the effort to actualise the individual self potential. This envisaged entelechy is Adler's "self-ideal," and is common motivation for both the normal and abnormal. In the neurotic it begets distorted manifestations and results in deviant behaviour patterns, will to power, sex manipulations, etc. In the "normal" it is the

³⁰Alfred Adler, "Individual Psychology," in his *The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler*, Heinz L. and Rowena R. Ansbacher, editors (New York: Basic Books, 1959), p. 103.

motivation to growth.

This theory forms the basis for the projected self image appropriated in the Christ. The "self ideal" takes the *fact* of Jesus of Nazareth, the witness of the Church to the fact that he was perfect man and the son of God and by appropriation integrates the self ideal and the Christ myth.

A Static Absolute. The only image of perfection available to an individual is that of the "ideal self." The Christ image is the imaginative projection of what the experiencing subject would be himself if he were perfect. It is claimed here that no person can have any other idea of perfection than this. This is each individual's absolute standard. But the standard is "personified," and "person" is the most dynamic image possible. The image is only absolute to the appropriating individual. It is relative to others. But it is a relative absolute to other relative absolutes. By reason of the underlying unity of the world with respect to universal prehensions of the component parts, some consensual validation of a Christ image is possible. The degree to which there is actual universal congruence of the appropriating components so will be the degree of unanimity of that consensus. Here will the relative manifestations of the image gradually become blurred into a unified one. Here is the relative finally become the absolute, not

static, not yet actual, but in imaginative projection of the possible, and in the dynamic image of person.

Until then each man has his own Christ to himself. Every Christ is a different Christ but identifiably the same and appropriated from the same yet different Jesus of Nazareth image. Freud objected to a slavish static imitation of the same Christ. He says:

every Christian loves Christ as his ideal. But the church demands more of him. Identification (with the group) has to be added where "object-choice" has taken place . . .³¹

And so do we object. As already noted, the injunction "to be like Christ" is taken to mean "to be truly oneself as He is truly himself." Herein is the absolute again rescued from the static in a truly dynamic concept.

Inherent Safeguards. This concept is saved from thoroughgoing subjectivism by two factors. The New Testament narrative provides the colour and the footnotes to give the image a common initial form with some authority. The Church remembers and witnesses to the consensually validated form. So on both sides there is possible some identification of forms, initially with Jesus of Nazareth and finally with the Christ of faith. But the myth and its image are ideal and free.

³¹Ernest Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 355.

There are also some inherent safeguards against possible neurotic tendencies in the "ego ideal," the "idealised self" and the "self-ideal." This is how it happens.

The image of Christ as envisaged above, belongs to the "spiritual" realm which makes the internalising process possible. This is the *immanent* Christ. But he is also God--other than I, and this keeps the image always *external*.³² This is the transcendent Christ. The internal authority is omnipresent. The external authority is omniscient. In face of this authority there can be no self-delusion. As internalised and omnipresent, every motive is known to Him. Because He knows the "real" me, initial unreal pretence is frustrated. Relation with the external Christ encourages and motivates tendencies to deal with the actual self.³³

There is also a safeguard against the authoritarian and destructive imposition of impossible and unrealistic *ideals*. This is the most common form of the criticism against the various self-ideal concepts. The image of Christ, although external *authority* figure of ideals, is internal in the sense that He is one's self understanding of

³²The traditional theological doctrine of the "immanence" and "transcendence" of God.

³³The problem here, of course, is that with self-distortion so projection distortion and thus Christ distortion take place.

perfection. If He is the subject's self understanding in projection, then He, even as external authority, understands the subject. This confidence in the empathy of the authority figure for the experiencing subject allows for a realistic appreciation of inadequacy and failure with respect to those ideals. Where there is understanding of motivations and necessities, a sense of *forgiveness*, and therefore one of restored relationships is more readily available. An external authority of forgiveness and acceptance assists towards a healthy self-acceptance and forgiveness when it might not be otherwise possible, especially if that authority is considered by the subject to be the supreme one.

*The Need for Intimacy.*³⁴ The appropriation of the Christ supplies the basic personality need for intimate relation at the deepest and most profound level. When human relations present existential and ontological disappointment, at both levels the appropriated Christ is able to fulfill the basic human need for intimate relation.

Intimacy belongs only to the *depths*. And the depths

³⁴Gibson Winter in his book *Love and Conflict* (New York: Dolphin Books, 1961) makes a good evaluation of the problems and gives some of the solutions attendant upon man's basic need for intimacy. His main treatment is of marriage and family relationships, but he makes many comments parallel to those above. He says: "The covenant of Marriage is only a human analogy to the real covenant with God" (p. 82).

demand intimacy. The superficial is contradictory to both and is excluded by them. Intimacy demands honesty. Honesty claims reality for its own. Intimacy, honesty and reality go together. Distortions and fictions are seen for what they are in the depths of intimacy. Prayer--individual and private prayer--as intimate relation with the appropriated Christ, takes man into the depths of relation as no other relation can.

These facts are illustrated in the husband who cannot pray with his wife because "I just can't bear to be that honest when anyone else is around." His marriage relation may be as intimate and congruous as any human relation can be.³⁵ It is also exemplified in the words of the man who has become an alien to himself--"I can't pray anymore." A common reason is because some defence or other will not allow the depth of honest self evaluation sufficient to the depth required to face his appropriated "ideal self image."³⁶ And even the most "fully human person" has this

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 97. The flight from intimacy is one side of marriage today. We all flee in different ways from the responsibilities of an intimate relationship. We want to pursue our own interests, and these do not always coincide. . . . We want to escape from the responsibilities of husband, wife, or children. Nevertheless, we need the intimacy of marriage and are usually unwilling to settle for mere co-existence. We may pursue our own interests for a time, but sooner or later we come to a reckoning with intimacy.

³⁶Healthy appropriation is described. When the tension between "intimacy" need and inability to meet the

experience. The retaining of some defences which preclude such honesty and intimacy may be more healthy for the moment than the dropping of the defences and thus becoming vulnerable to other dangers supplied *a priori* to a particular situation. This is the price of finitude, or perhaps more correctly, the price of the present finite social status of the race.

In prayer, as depth encounter with the infinite, man knows himself affirmed and fulfilled as an individual. The intimacy of prayer engenders the sense of cosmic relationships--and the experience of congruence with all being. In every age men have testified to the reality of this serenity of being--"peace which passeth all understanding." This is the possible "at-oneness" of self, God and the world referred to in the Christian doctrine of the "atonement."

For man to know this relationship is to *value* it above all else,³⁷ to see his appropriated "ideal self" as the highest of all values, and to respond to this Christ with a loyalty which engenders his will to valuation of

"ideal self image" is too great, the thin line dividing "normalcy" from neurosis is crossed and the Horney process takes place. The "real" self is substituted for the "ideal self," to the progression of the schizophrenic who has himself become "Jesus Christ."

³⁷This doctrine encourages the dictum that "to know the good is to value it" (Charles Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 124).

value. Herein is to be found the reduction of the tension between value and valuation. In the Christian tradition these formulations have been contained within the doctrine and affirmation--"Jesus is Lord." By the reduction of this tension within his intellect, will and emotion and the resultant unification of his being, man knows that he has become as fully himself as it is possible to be.

ECSTASY AND THE OTHER SIDE

One final thing. Although it is claimed that the steps in the appropriation of the Christ have been traced, there is one fact of central significance left unsaid. The "ecstasy" which accompanies the appropriation has become the hallmark of the experience witnessed to in every age. This is here affirmed as the indication that somehow, when Jesus of Nazareth becomes Christ, it is more than a subjective self projection. Tillich reminds us of the generic meaning of the word "ecstasy." It is that which "stands out." The analytic empiricist may identify the steps of appropriation, but standing out and apart from these steps comes a confirmation which is not inherent within them. A great number of men in every generation have claimed its source to be God.

Speculation concerning the source of the estatic experience may be outside the jurisdiction of empiricism and can only be witnessed to by the empiricist not as philosopher

or psychologist or even theologian, but as man. These disciplines may each take account of the phenomenon as such and analyse it in its own way, but only man in the depth of intuition or faith can call the name "God" to his highest value.

And in orchestra with Dewey and Whitehead, the other authorities who have graced this study, and a vast million of men, the present writing joins voice to name this Name which is above every name; the value of value and the valuation of valuation: the Christ of God and the Lord of Man, Jesus.

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